Why America’s Air Force Will DESTROY China’s

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In a hypothetical war between China and the United States, there's no question that both country’s air forces would play a massive role.  Establishing aerial dominance is key to  winning conflicts in the modern age and   that’s demonstrated in the Ukraine war,  in which Russia has failed to maintain a   strong aerial presence over Ukraine. That’s  forced it to take a ground-based approach,   which has arguably led to the war becoming  far more protracted than it otherwise would   have been. With aerial superiority, which Russia  should have achieved through sheer numbers alone,   its ground forces would have much better  support as they try to take Ukrainian territory.  Neither China nor the U.S. would  want to make the same mistake.  So, in a battle between the two nations’  air forces, who would come out on top?  Let’s start by looking at the numbers. For that, we turn to Global Firepower,  

or GFP, and its PwrIndex scoring system. Each  year, GFP takes the top military nations in   the world and compares them across a range of  categories, including manpower, land power,   naval power, resources, logistics, and, of course,  airpower. According to its ratings, the United   States leads the pack with the world’s strongest  military. China isn’t far behind – it came third  

in the 2024 rankings – but it’s clear that the  U.S. has a slight advantage from the offset.  Homing in on the two countries’ air forces, the  United States is a long way ahead of China. GFP   says that the U.S. has 13,209 aircraft  compared to China’s 3,304, meaning it  

has around four times the equipment. The numbers  get a little closer when comparing fighter jets,   with China having 1,207 versus America’s  1,854. That gives us some insight into   China’s approach to an aerial war, as over  a third of its fleet is fighter jets. Still,   no matter where you look, the U.S. comes out on  top in sheer numbers. It has 525 more dedicated  

attack craft and 668 more transports.  The latter would prove crucial in a war,   as they provide the United States with a  greater capacity to send troops into China.  The United States also has far more trainer  aircraft, coming in with 2,648 versus China’s   402. Again, this highlights a key difference  between the American and Chinese approaches   to their air forces – one that would play a  key role in a war and that we will revisit   later. The U.S. also has 606 aerial tanks  –aircraft dedicated to aerial refueling of  

other planes – versus China’s 10. And on the  helicopter front, the United States has 5,737   regular choppers and 1,000 attack helicopters  versus China’s 913 and 281 respectively.  Already, it’s clear to see that the United States  has the advantage in terms of pure numbers:  It has more of everything. Crucially, these numbers offer some insight into   the strategies the two countries would employ in  an aerial battle. China clearly favors fighters,   likely because these aircraft can serve multiple  roles ranging from air-to-air and air-to-ship   battles to running missile and bombing campaigns  on land-based targets. The U.S. still exceeds  

China’s asset numbers in this area, and it’s clear  that both believe that any conflict in which they   engage would have a heavy naval element. The right  fighters can be key to victory in a naval battle   as they can support destroyers and similarly large  ships while doing a lot of damage themselves.  Beyond that, though, we see the U.S. has far more  transports than China, which gives it a greater   capacity to send troops into a territory.  That would serve the U.S. well if it needed   to invade China as part of a war, in which it  would be aided by its 11 aircraft carriers and   the many overseas military bases it maintains. Speaking of strategy, let’s dig a little deeper   into that area, starting by looking at  the Pacific Air Force’s, or PACAF’s,   Strategy 2023 document. In it, the PACAF  highlights the aerial strategy it believes  

China would take if conflict were to arise in  the Indo-Pacific region. The PACAF notes that   China has focused on developing an anti-access  strategy combined with aerial-denial capability,   with its intention being to prevent U.S. forces  from entering the Indo-Pacific if China decides   to launch an attack. Key here is that this  strategy doesn’t focus on China attacking   the United States. Rather, China aims to keep the  U.S. at bay so that it can focus its attacks on  

territory that it wants to take, such as Taiwan. With that in mind, the PACAF claims, China’s   approach to an aerial war would be to focus its  attacks on U.S. air bases in the Indo-Pacific.   Missile barrages launched from Chinese military  bases, naval vessels, and aircraft would aim to   destroy these bases to limit the U.S. response.  And the PACAF has several of those bases.  According to the numbers put out directly by  the Anderson Air Force Base, PACAF has 45,000   civilian and military personnel serving in  nine military bases in the Indo-Pacific,   along with several smaller facilities. These bases  include several in Hawaii and Alaska – neither  

of which is likely to be targeted by a Chinese  attack due to their distance from Beijing – as   well as bases in Japan, South Korea, and Guam.  Combined, those bases host about 340 attack and   fighter aircraft, with an additional stock of 100  deployed aircraft that are in constant rotation   between the various locations. These craft include  three of America’s seven F-22 fighter squadrons,   along with both of the C-17 transport units  that are active outside the United States.  These bases would be China’s first  targets in almost any war it starts,   be that one with the United States or a war  with a country that the U.S. wishes to protect.  To counter Chinese missile barrages, the PACAF  says, the U.S. Air Force has developed an “agile  

combat strategy,” that’s designed to complicate  targeting for Chinese military planes. This   strategy includes diversification of base defenses  to include “additional camouflage concealment and   deception, infrastructure hardening, and active  defense capabilities.” Non-kinetic solutions are   also high on the PACAF’s agenda, with investments  being made into electronic warfare, lasers,   and high-powered microwaves intended to disrupt  Chinese targeting in the event of conflict.   Aircraft shelters are also a priority, with PACAF  likely hoping that these shelters would protect   its craft and people from Chinese missiles. PACAF’s document also highlights the crucial  

role that America’s allies would play during  an Indo-Pacific conflict. Japan, Australia,   Singapore, and South Korea are all mentioned  as nations that would enhance the PACAF’s   maintenance and refueling capabilities, with  the PACAF also noting that agreements are in   place with all four countries. It’s also worth  noting that these countries collectively host   201 of America’s 750 overseas military bases. So, we start to see the approaches China and   the United States would take to  the aerial aspect of a conflict.  For China, it’s all about deterrence and securing  the Indo-Pacific as quickly as possible. Its  

initial strategy would be the launch missile  barrages at as many American bases as possible,   with Guam, Japan, and South Korea being the most  likely targets. Its goal would be to cripple   America’s ability to respond quickly by not only  taking out as many of the 340 fighter and attack   aircraft that the PACAF has stationed in its  overseas bases but also destroying any bases that   are capable of offering maintenance and refueling  capabilities to any aircraft that survive.  By contrast, the immediate U.S. strategy  would focus on defense. PACAF’s investments   in camouflage, deception, and shelter technology  aim to protect as many of its aircraft and people   from the initial Chinese missile barrage.  From there, the PACAF would mobilize and,   working together with the U.S. Navy, counterattack  against China’s aggressive approach. Of course,   a Chinese attack would also trigger the launch of  more vessels and aircraft into the Indo-Pacific. 

This is where America’s overseas  allies would really come into play.  America’s goal would be to essentially pin  the Chinese air force into a battle within   the Indo-Pacific, likely centered around the  South China Sea. It would combine the U.S. Air   Force with the U.S. Navy to slowly push China  back into its own territory while barricading  

itself off from Chinese attack by creating  a combined aerial and naval border. Japan,   South Korea, and Australia would play key  roles here. Not only would the American   bases installed in these countries essentially  serve as conduits through which the U.S. could  

transport equipment and troops, but they would  be key points in the barricade that the United   States forms around China. After all, each  is at threat if China starts trying to take   territory in the Indo-Pacific, which is why  they have cooperative military agreements in   place with the United States in the first place. Which country would come out on top during the   early weeks and months of a battle would  depend on how well the PACAF’s defenses   against China’s missile barrages hold up. Assuming the PACAF manages to keep a large   portion of its bases operational,  China would face another problem:  It’s a long way behind the curve when it comes to  what the Military Review calls “Joint Warfare.”  The People’s Liberation Army Air Force, or  PLAAF, has undergone rapid development that   has often undermined its tactical capabilities.  Military Review notes this when discussing what   it calls the “second period,” of the PLAAF’s  development, which lasted between 1956 and   1990. Prior to this period, China built a  military with 60,000 soldiers and 800 pilots,  

focusing on volume ahead of strategy within  the PLAAF. The “second period” saw China being   heavily impacted by a cultural revolution, which  saw many of the key players in the PLAAF purged   from their positions due to suspicions  relating to their political reliability.  Essentially, the PLAAF was put on pause, at  least in terms of developing its tactical nous.  By contrast, the “second period” saw the U.S.  Air Force gain invaluable combat experience  

during the Vietnam War, upon which it refined its  tactics and developed the groundwork for the joint   warfare capabilities it would exhibit during  the Gulf War. For the U.S., the Air Force no   longer played a supporting role. It would become  an active player in combined military operations,   working alongside the Navy and ground forces  in operations. China’s approach still saw the   PLAAF serve a supporting role while grappling  with a loss of leadership during the purges. 

Fast-forward to the Gulf War and China starts to  see the U.S. Air Force’s – and overall American   military’s – focus on joint warfare in action.  The U.S. Air Force essentially integrated with its   Navy and ground forces to play a key role in the  coalition victory. This was demonstrated during   the first days of Operation Desert Storm. On  January 17, 1991, U.S. Navy ships stationed in the  

Red Sea and Persian Gulf launched Tomahawk cruise  missiles at Baghdad. That action triggered an   entire night of U.S. Air Force attacks. Fixed-wing  aircraft combined with attack helicopters launched   precision strikes against military installations  and communications equipment in Baghdad. The F-117  

was one of the stars of the show – its Tomahawk  missiles proved so effective that they shut down   Baghdad’s electrical systems to the point where  they knocked out CNN’s live feed of that attack.  In a single night, the coalition’s  joint warfare strategy had practically   overwhelmed Iraq’s aerial defenses and air force. The coalition obtained aerial superiority within   the first week of Operation Desert Storm. China, like many other nations, saw this and   realized the siloed PLAAF would be no match for  America’s refined joint warfare tactics. It needed  

to play catch-up, which would require extensive  training in joint operations. This realization   triggered what Military Review calls the “third  period” of the PLAAF, in which it sits today.  And China still hasn’t caught up. There are several examples, with one of the most   important being China’s lack of focus on in-flight  air refueling. If you remember GFP’s figures from   earlier, you may recall that the U.S. has 606  aerial tanks compared to just 10 for China. That   demonstrates China’s lack of understanding of the  role that in-flight refueling plays in supporting   its air force. It also partially explains  why China has been building artificial island  

chains within the South China Sea. In addition to  Beijing’s efforts to use its artificial islands   to exert its control over this vital waterway,  these islands serve as military bases that not   only host aircraft but provide landing points  from which they can refuel. China believes it   can use these islands to extend the range of its  aircraft without investing in aerial refueling   technology to serve the same purpose. But the United States doesn’t agree. 

That’s not to say the U.S. doesn’t see value in  maintaining bases from which it can launch attacks   and handle refueling. The many it has established  in the Indo-Pacific demonstrate that. But with its   heavy investment into aerial tanks, the U.S. Air  Force extends its capabilities both in terms of  

how long its planes can stay in the air and how  far they can travel before they need to land.  In simple terms, America’s planes can stay in  the air longer and conduct more complex joint   operations because they can be refueled in the  skies. China’s planes need to land at military   bases to refuel, perhaps even making them targets  for American missile barrages coordinated by the   U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force. Joint warfare in action. 

Through this strategic analysis, we begin to  see how China and America’s aerial approaches   would differ if they were to fight one another.  For China, the evolution away from using the   PLAAF in a supporting role has been slow and is  arguably incomplete. We see this in its lack of   aerial tanks, with Beijing instead focusing  on building bases on artificial islands to   enable its planes to cover a large portion  of the Indo-Pacific. That demonstrates the   intention to use the PLAAF as both a defensive  force and for regional attacks – China’s scope   doesn’t appear to stretch much beyond that. The U.S. enhances its regional presence through   its military bases in Japan, South Korea,  Australia, and Guam, enabling it to create a   naval barricade that keeps China within the South  and East China Seas. However, that naval approach   extends into far more advanced joint warfare  tactics. The U.S. would use its Navy to not only  

conduct missile strikes – as seen on the first day  of Operation Desert Storm – but also to support   the U.S. Air Force as it engages in precision  strikes on Chinese territory. Beijing’s artificial   islands would be obvious first targets, limiting  the PLAAF’s range in the process. It’s also   notable that the U.S. has 11 aircraft carriers –  further extending its reach in the Indo-Pacific –  

as well as many aerial tanks to enable in-flight  refueling. Add America’s large number of aerial   assets into the mix and you have the makings  of a quick-hitting strategy in which the U.S.   coordinates its attacks across multiple branches  of its military to quickly devastate China.  The U.S. Air Force isn’t solely a  supporting arm of America’s military.  It’s fully integrated, meaning it’s fluid  enough to switch between support and attack   as needed while working jointly with the other  arms on coordinated regional attacks. That   refined strategy would give the United States  the edge over China in an aerial battle and,   as it was in Operation Desert Storm, would  likely be the key to an American victory. 

So at this point, we can see that the U.S.  Air Force trumps the PLAAF in two departments.  For all of the modernization the PLAAF has  undergone, it’s still vastly underpowered   when compared to the U.S. Air Force in terms  of sheer number of assets. The U.S. has around   four times the number of aircraft, making  it capable of essentially “clogging up” the   skies and overwhelming China’s aerial combatants.  Combine that with far more refined joint warfare  

strategies, which would make heavy use of  the U.S. Navy, America’s overseas bases,   and its in-flight refueling capabilities, and you  get planes that stay in the air longer and conduct   more complex operations. China is lagging.  And that trend only continues  when you look at equipment. 

In January 2011, the maiden flight of the Chengdu  J-20 multirole stealth fighter took place. The   aircraft, which is China’s first fifth-generation  fighter and only the third to ever be created,   entered into service at some point between  2018 and 2020, though Beijing has still   only built two prototype versions of the plane.  Nevertheless, it’s an impressive piece of kit.  It has a blended fuselage and a low radar  cross-section. The prototype’s engine – the   Saturn 117S – is supplied by Russia and is capable  of generating 32,000 pounds of thrust. However,   China will likely replace this engine in  the production model with a pair of WS-10G   turbofan engines that generate 30,000 pounds  of thrust and are made in Shenyang. Regardless,   these engines give the J-20 a top speed  of 1,304 miles per hour, which is just   shy of Mach 2. It also has a service ceiling of  59,055 feet and a range of around 2,100 miles. 

It's an extremely impressive  multirole stealth fighter.  The J-20 also stacks up fairly well with  its U.S. Air Force equivalent, the F-35.  Though the F-35 has better stealth capabilities  than the J-20, owing to its smaller size and   lower radar cross-section, the J-20 comes out  on top in terms of speed and its ability to   disrupt supporting aircraft. The J-20 also has  supercruise. This feature allows it to fly at high   speeds without engaging its afterburners. The F-35  doesn’t have that, meaning its use of afterburners  

could give its position away in situations  whereas the J-20 would be able to stay hidden.  However, the J-20 has disadvantages of its own,  with the main one being the lack of a cannon. The   National Interest suggests that this means China  doesn’t anticipate using the jet in a dogfighting   capacity, with its likely role being to conduct  bombing runs and missile assaults before using   its speed to rapidly exit a conflict zone. Regardless, these quibbles about which is   the better jet are less important than  what the J-20 represents to China.  It’s Beijing’s step into the fifth-generation  fighter space, and it’s supposed to show that   China’s aerial assets are reaching parity  with those the United States can deploy. 

But there are two problems  with that representation.  The first is that, as impressive as the J-20  may be, it still doesn’t appear to be in active   production. There are only two of these jets  in service, with both being prototype models.   China is still tinkering away at the jet, which  means it may be several years before we see it   become a key part of the PLAAF. The U.S. doesn’t  have that problem with the F-35 – it already has  

630 F-35s and it plans to purchase 1,800 more. China is being forced to play catch-up again. Even   if the J-20 proves to be the superior multirole  fighter – which is already debatable – China’s   production of this jet is so far behind the U.S.  and its F-35 that it’s almost rendered moot.  But that’s not the biggest issue  the PLAAF faces with the J-20.  While Beijing is trying to get its  fifth-generation fighter off the ground,   the United States is already  working on the sixth generation.  In 2014, the U.S. initiated the Next  Generation Air Dominance Program, or NGAD.  Planned to enter service in 2030, NGAD  is a highly classified program, though we   do know that it represents the United States  shifting away from the concept of a singular   aerial platform to one that involves multiple  systems working in tandem. Think of it as an  

extension of the joint warfare concept, only  isolated to a specific collection of aircraft.  “Collection” is the appropriate word here. The U.S. Air Force demonstrated the NGAD program   in September 2020 with a full-scale flight,  which showed that the approach combined a   manned sixth-generation fighter jet and an array  of collaborative combat aircraft, or CCAs. These  

are unmanned supporting aircraft – essentially  more complex drones – that form a network with   the manned jet, allowing a pilot to not only  use the jet they’re piloting but also to control   CCAs in real-time as the situation requires. Each NGAD fighter jet is anticipated to cost   $300 million, with that high cost being part of  the reason the U.S. Air Force intends to deploy   CCAs. They’ll give it the option of lowering risk  by having fewer pilots in the air, while still  

maintaining a threat because each pilot commands  multiple assets. The CCAs are expected to carry   advanced sensors, as well as be equipped with  electronic warfare packages designed to disrupt   any aircraft the fighter engages. They’ll also be  stocked with munitions – ideal for supporting the   main fighter in aerial engagements. And there’s more. 

In the spirit of America’s joint warfare tactics,  the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy have announced   they’ll be collaborating on what they call  the “four fundamentals” of CCA drones. That   announcement came in September 2023, with the  goal being to ensure that all CCAs – regardless   of which arm of the U.S. military produces them  – will be interoperable, meaning they’re capable   of performing alongside multiple weapons systems. To ensure that, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy   want every CCA to have common communication links,  aircraft architecture, ground-control segments,   and autonomy architecture. Brigadier  General Dale White, who’s the Program  

Executive Officer for fighters and advanced  aircraft in the U.S. military, explains:  “We do have those four focus areas that allow  us to leverage the interoperability that we   think we need for a CCA because  this is not just a single-service   solution, and we know that going in.” Ultimately, the goal of this collaboration   is to ensure that the CCAs being developed  as part of NGAD aren’t only compatible with   America’s sixth-generation fighter. They should  also work alongside the latest F/A XX fighters   as well as ideally being compatible with the  existing aircraft in the U.S. military’s fleet.  What does all of this have to do with the  U.S. Air Force being capable of beating China? 

It once again shows how different the U.S.  approach is. China is not only playing   catch up on the joint warfare front, but it’s  also lagging when it comes to equipment. As   it works toward getting its fifth-generation  J-20 in the air, the United States is already   deep into the development of a program that  will not only lead to the launch of its first   sixth-generation fighter but will enable it to  support that fighter with CCAs to essentially   create a joint warfare capability controlled by a  single pilot. The collaboration between the U.S.  

Air Force and the U.S. Navy on this project  also can’t be underestimated – it shows that   both military branches understand that they’ll  be using the NGAD in tandem during operations.  Worse yet for Beijing, there are even more  examples of how the PLAAF doesn’t measure up   to the U.S. Air Force. Take pilot training.  The United States has clear criteria in place  when it comes to choosing and training its   pilots. Anybody who applies must be educated to  at least the Bachelor’s degree level and must   pass a Single Scope Background Investigation. The  applicant must also be between the ages of 18 and   33 when they apply, with height restrictions  also in place depending on the type of   aircraft the prospective pilot wishes to fly. Assuming the applicant meets the criteria,  

they’re placed into an officer training  program, such as Officer Training School or   the Air Force Academy, where they complete  an 8.5-week program. Next comes about   a year spent in Undergraduate Pilot Training,  or UPT, toward the end of which the prospective   pilot is assigned to an aircraft. After completing  UPT, the pilot then spends up to a year continuing   their flight training in their assigned aircraft,  with the exact time taken varying depending on   the aircraft and the pilot’s capabilities. And only then does the pilot get assigned   to a squadron and location. All told, this amounts to more   than five years of training – including  the completion of a relevant bachelor’s   degree – demonstrating just how seriously  the U.S. Air Force takes its pilot training.   They’ll then have to meet NATO’s requirement of  flying at least 15 hours per month, adding up to   180 hours per year, which you could consider  as a continuation of the pilot’s training. 

China’s approach isn’t as clear. That’s partially because, as is the case   with much of the country’s military, the PLAAF  doesn’t make its training criteria publicly known.  However, we know that they lag behind the U.S. As  The Eurasian Times pointed out in a 2022 article,  

the PLAAF lost around 2,000 of its pilots  between 1960 and 2020, with at least 30 of   those being test pilots. It’s also engaging in a  strategy in which it’s hiring Western pilots to   train its recruits, which mirrors its copying  of American training procedures. Again, China   is playing catch-up by relying on what already  exists to form the basis of its training program.  But China is accelerating those training  programs. Or at least trying to.  In July 2022, Le Monde reported on the first  PLAAF cadets trained in the J-10 – a Chinese   fighter-bomber – who had earned their wings in  three years instead of the previous standard of   six years. This may not be the positive news that  the PLAAF wants to claim it to be. While it claims   that “the proportion of tactical training, such  as multi-aircraft combat and live-fire operations,   has been increased” during this three-year  program, the fact that China is speeding   up at all suggests that it’s trying to get more  pilots in planes quicker than it previously had. 

A sign of desperation? Perhaps, though it’s also telling that this is   far from the first time the PLAAF has changed its  pilot training over the last couple of decades. In   2011, it switched from a previous program, which  took 10 years to complete, to a four-phase program   taking six years. The 2022 Le Monde report shows  that, at least when it comes to bomber training,   it’s since switched to a three-year program. That  inconsistency could cause issues down the line,  

even if the switches are due to refinement  and improvement of its pilot training.  There’s also the experience issue to consider. Since 1990, the U.S. Air Force   has engaged in multiple wide-scale conflicts,  including The Gulf War, The War on Terror,   and the War in Iraq. It’s also been involved in  countless smaller operations, with one of the  

most recent being its involvement in operations  targeting the Houthi insurgents in the Red Sea.  As for China – the PLAAF hasn’t  been involved in a single major   military operation in the same period. It runs plenty of military drills,   but China’s pilots have no real combat  experience. Combine that with inconsistent   training and you get an Air Force staffed with  flyers who are likely less capable than their   American equivalents. The U.S. has an analytical  learning process in place in which it examines its   performance in previous conflicts to determine  how it can improve in the future. Those lessons  

form the doctrines, strategies, and procedures  all branches of the U.S. military have in place.  China doesn’t have that approach.  Instead, Air University claims,   the PLAAF operates on “Mao’s theory of the weak  contender fighting a stronger adversary through   deceit and deception.” While fine in theory,  transforming that concept into an executable  

strategy may be beyond the PLAAF’s reach. So, where would all of this leave China   in a fight against the U.S. Air Force? The answer is that Beijing would be in a bad   position, not least because it simply wouldn’t  ever be fighting the U.S. Air Force alone.   America’s development of joint warfare tactics  during the Gulf War – and its refinement of those   tactics ever since – means that China would face  combined military operations that involve aerial,   naval, and on-ground strategies. This joint  warfare expertise would come to bear in a   direct conflict, as a fight between the U.S. and  Japan would likely center on the South China Sea,  

East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. Combining  its naval and aerial prowess with cooperation   from the countries hosting American bases in the  Indo-Pacific would give the U.S. a major edge over   China. Add America’s embrace of aerial tanks and  in-flight refueling – giving it the territorial   coverage advantage – and both China’s navy  and its air force would likely find themselves   fighting a war in which it’s increasingly  penned in by coordinated American attacks.  Add the fact that the U.S. Air Force is four  times the size of the PLAAF in terms of assets,   has better-trained and more experienced pilots,  and is already working on a sixth-generation   fighter while China is still stuck in the fifth generation and it seems you have a pretty clear victor. 

But we’d like to hear your thoughts on this matter? Have we at the Map Pack team underestimated the PLAAF’s capabilities and China’s ability to defend itself within the South China Sea? Or, is the U.S. primed to achieve aerial dominance in short order during a conflict, setting the stage for its military to defeat China in a conventional war? Feel free to share your opinions below. Thanks for watching and take care out there!

2024-08-28

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