Why America’s Air Force Will DESTROY China’s
In a hypothetical war between China and the United States, there's no question that both country’s air forces would play a massive role. Establishing aerial dominance is key to winning conflicts in the modern age and that’s demonstrated in the Ukraine war, in which Russia has failed to maintain a strong aerial presence over Ukraine. That’s forced it to take a ground-based approach, which has arguably led to the war becoming far more protracted than it otherwise would have been. With aerial superiority, which Russia should have achieved through sheer numbers alone, its ground forces would have much better support as they try to take Ukrainian territory. Neither China nor the U.S. would want to make the same mistake. So, in a battle between the two nations’ air forces, who would come out on top? Let’s start by looking at the numbers. For that, we turn to Global Firepower,
or GFP, and its PwrIndex scoring system. Each year, GFP takes the top military nations in the world and compares them across a range of categories, including manpower, land power, naval power, resources, logistics, and, of course, airpower. According to its ratings, the United States leads the pack with the world’s strongest military. China isn’t far behind – it came third
in the 2024 rankings – but it’s clear that the U.S. has a slight advantage from the offset. Homing in on the two countries’ air forces, the United States is a long way ahead of China. GFP says that the U.S. has 13,209 aircraft compared to China’s 3,304, meaning it
has around four times the equipment. The numbers get a little closer when comparing fighter jets, with China having 1,207 versus America’s 1,854. That gives us some insight into China’s approach to an aerial war, as over a third of its fleet is fighter jets. Still, no matter where you look, the U.S. comes out on top in sheer numbers. It has 525 more dedicated
attack craft and 668 more transports. The latter would prove crucial in a war, as they provide the United States with a greater capacity to send troops into China. The United States also has far more trainer aircraft, coming in with 2,648 versus China’s 402. Again, this highlights a key difference between the American and Chinese approaches to their air forces – one that would play a key role in a war and that we will revisit later. The U.S. also has 606 aerial tanks –aircraft dedicated to aerial refueling of
other planes – versus China’s 10. And on the helicopter front, the United States has 5,737 regular choppers and 1,000 attack helicopters versus China’s 913 and 281 respectively. Already, it’s clear to see that the United States has the advantage in terms of pure numbers: It has more of everything. Crucially, these numbers offer some insight into the strategies the two countries would employ in an aerial battle. China clearly favors fighters, likely because these aircraft can serve multiple roles ranging from air-to-air and air-to-ship battles to running missile and bombing campaigns on land-based targets. The U.S. still exceeds
China’s asset numbers in this area, and it’s clear that both believe that any conflict in which they engage would have a heavy naval element. The right fighters can be key to victory in a naval battle as they can support destroyers and similarly large ships while doing a lot of damage themselves. Beyond that, though, we see the U.S. has far more transports than China, which gives it a greater capacity to send troops into a territory. That would serve the U.S. well if it needed to invade China as part of a war, in which it would be aided by its 11 aircraft carriers and the many overseas military bases it maintains. Speaking of strategy, let’s dig a little deeper into that area, starting by looking at the Pacific Air Force’s, or PACAF’s, Strategy 2023 document. In it, the PACAF highlights the aerial strategy it believes
China would take if conflict were to arise in the Indo-Pacific region. The PACAF notes that China has focused on developing an anti-access strategy combined with aerial-denial capability, with its intention being to prevent U.S. forces from entering the Indo-Pacific if China decides to launch an attack. Key here is that this strategy doesn’t focus on China attacking the United States. Rather, China aims to keep the U.S. at bay so that it can focus its attacks on
territory that it wants to take, such as Taiwan. With that in mind, the PACAF claims, China’s approach to an aerial war would be to focus its attacks on U.S. air bases in the Indo-Pacific. Missile barrages launched from Chinese military bases, naval vessels, and aircraft would aim to destroy these bases to limit the U.S. response. And the PACAF has several of those bases. According to the numbers put out directly by the Anderson Air Force Base, PACAF has 45,000 civilian and military personnel serving in nine military bases in the Indo-Pacific, along with several smaller facilities. These bases include several in Hawaii and Alaska – neither
of which is likely to be targeted by a Chinese attack due to their distance from Beijing – as well as bases in Japan, South Korea, and Guam. Combined, those bases host about 340 attack and fighter aircraft, with an additional stock of 100 deployed aircraft that are in constant rotation between the various locations. These craft include three of America’s seven F-22 fighter squadrons, along with both of the C-17 transport units that are active outside the United States. These bases would be China’s first targets in almost any war it starts, be that one with the United States or a war with a country that the U.S. wishes to protect. To counter Chinese missile barrages, the PACAF says, the U.S. Air Force has developed an “agile
combat strategy,” that’s designed to complicate targeting for Chinese military planes. This strategy includes diversification of base defenses to include “additional camouflage concealment and deception, infrastructure hardening, and active defense capabilities.” Non-kinetic solutions are also high on the PACAF’s agenda, with investments being made into electronic warfare, lasers, and high-powered microwaves intended to disrupt Chinese targeting in the event of conflict. Aircraft shelters are also a priority, with PACAF likely hoping that these shelters would protect its craft and people from Chinese missiles. PACAF’s document also highlights the crucial
role that America’s allies would play during an Indo-Pacific conflict. Japan, Australia, Singapore, and South Korea are all mentioned as nations that would enhance the PACAF’s maintenance and refueling capabilities, with the PACAF also noting that agreements are in place with all four countries. It’s also worth noting that these countries collectively host 201 of America’s 750 overseas military bases. So, we start to see the approaches China and the United States would take to the aerial aspect of a conflict. For China, it’s all about deterrence and securing the Indo-Pacific as quickly as possible. Its
initial strategy would be the launch missile barrages at as many American bases as possible, with Guam, Japan, and South Korea being the most likely targets. Its goal would be to cripple America’s ability to respond quickly by not only taking out as many of the 340 fighter and attack aircraft that the PACAF has stationed in its overseas bases but also destroying any bases that are capable of offering maintenance and refueling capabilities to any aircraft that survive. By contrast, the immediate U.S. strategy would focus on defense. PACAF’s investments in camouflage, deception, and shelter technology aim to protect as many of its aircraft and people from the initial Chinese missile barrage. From there, the PACAF would mobilize and, working together with the U.S. Navy, counterattack against China’s aggressive approach. Of course, a Chinese attack would also trigger the launch of more vessels and aircraft into the Indo-Pacific.
This is where America’s overseas allies would really come into play. America’s goal would be to essentially pin the Chinese air force into a battle within the Indo-Pacific, likely centered around the South China Sea. It would combine the U.S. Air Force with the U.S. Navy to slowly push China back into its own territory while barricading
itself off from Chinese attack by creating a combined aerial and naval border. Japan, South Korea, and Australia would play key roles here. Not only would the American bases installed in these countries essentially serve as conduits through which the U.S. could
transport equipment and troops, but they would be key points in the barricade that the United States forms around China. After all, each is at threat if China starts trying to take territory in the Indo-Pacific, which is why they have cooperative military agreements in place with the United States in the first place. Which country would come out on top during the early weeks and months of a battle would depend on how well the PACAF’s defenses against China’s missile barrages hold up. Assuming the PACAF manages to keep a large portion of its bases operational, China would face another problem: It’s a long way behind the curve when it comes to what the Military Review calls “Joint Warfare.” The People’s Liberation Army Air Force, or PLAAF, has undergone rapid development that has often undermined its tactical capabilities. Military Review notes this when discussing what it calls the “second period,” of the PLAAF’s development, which lasted between 1956 and 1990. Prior to this period, China built a military with 60,000 soldiers and 800 pilots,
focusing on volume ahead of strategy within the PLAAF. The “second period” saw China being heavily impacted by a cultural revolution, which saw many of the key players in the PLAAF purged from their positions due to suspicions relating to their political reliability. Essentially, the PLAAF was put on pause, at least in terms of developing its tactical nous. By contrast, the “second period” saw the U.S. Air Force gain invaluable combat experience
during the Vietnam War, upon which it refined its tactics and developed the groundwork for the joint warfare capabilities it would exhibit during the Gulf War. For the U.S., the Air Force no longer played a supporting role. It would become an active player in combined military operations, working alongside the Navy and ground forces in operations. China’s approach still saw the PLAAF serve a supporting role while grappling with a loss of leadership during the purges.
Fast-forward to the Gulf War and China starts to see the U.S. Air Force’s – and overall American military’s – focus on joint warfare in action. The U.S. Air Force essentially integrated with its Navy and ground forces to play a key role in the coalition victory. This was demonstrated during the first days of Operation Desert Storm. On January 17, 1991, U.S. Navy ships stationed in the
Red Sea and Persian Gulf launched Tomahawk cruise missiles at Baghdad. That action triggered an entire night of U.S. Air Force attacks. Fixed-wing aircraft combined with attack helicopters launched precision strikes against military installations and communications equipment in Baghdad. The F-117
was one of the stars of the show – its Tomahawk missiles proved so effective that they shut down Baghdad’s electrical systems to the point where they knocked out CNN’s live feed of that attack. In a single night, the coalition’s joint warfare strategy had practically overwhelmed Iraq’s aerial defenses and air force. The coalition obtained aerial superiority within the first week of Operation Desert Storm. China, like many other nations, saw this and realized the siloed PLAAF would be no match for America’s refined joint warfare tactics. It needed
to play catch-up, which would require extensive training in joint operations. This realization triggered what Military Review calls the “third period” of the PLAAF, in which it sits today. And China still hasn’t caught up. There are several examples, with one of the most important being China’s lack of focus on in-flight air refueling. If you remember GFP’s figures from earlier, you may recall that the U.S. has 606 aerial tanks compared to just 10 for China. That demonstrates China’s lack of understanding of the role that in-flight refueling plays in supporting its air force. It also partially explains why China has been building artificial island
chains within the South China Sea. In addition to Beijing’s efforts to use its artificial islands to exert its control over this vital waterway, these islands serve as military bases that not only host aircraft but provide landing points from which they can refuel. China believes it can use these islands to extend the range of its aircraft without investing in aerial refueling technology to serve the same purpose. But the United States doesn’t agree.
That’s not to say the U.S. doesn’t see value in maintaining bases from which it can launch attacks and handle refueling. The many it has established in the Indo-Pacific demonstrate that. But with its heavy investment into aerial tanks, the U.S. Air Force extends its capabilities both in terms of
how long its planes can stay in the air and how far they can travel before they need to land. In simple terms, America’s planes can stay in the air longer and conduct more complex joint operations because they can be refueled in the skies. China’s planes need to land at military bases to refuel, perhaps even making them targets for American missile barrages coordinated by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force. Joint warfare in action.
Through this strategic analysis, we begin to see how China and America’s aerial approaches would differ if they were to fight one another. For China, the evolution away from using the PLAAF in a supporting role has been slow and is arguably incomplete. We see this in its lack of aerial tanks, with Beijing instead focusing on building bases on artificial islands to enable its planes to cover a large portion of the Indo-Pacific. That demonstrates the intention to use the PLAAF as both a defensive force and for regional attacks – China’s scope doesn’t appear to stretch much beyond that. The U.S. enhances its regional presence through its military bases in Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Guam, enabling it to create a naval barricade that keeps China within the South and East China Seas. However, that naval approach extends into far more advanced joint warfare tactics. The U.S. would use its Navy to not only
conduct missile strikes – as seen on the first day of Operation Desert Storm – but also to support the U.S. Air Force as it engages in precision strikes on Chinese territory. Beijing’s artificial islands would be obvious first targets, limiting the PLAAF’s range in the process. It’s also notable that the U.S. has 11 aircraft carriers – further extending its reach in the Indo-Pacific –
as well as many aerial tanks to enable in-flight refueling. Add America’s large number of aerial assets into the mix and you have the makings of a quick-hitting strategy in which the U.S. coordinates its attacks across multiple branches of its military to quickly devastate China. The U.S. Air Force isn’t solely a supporting arm of America’s military. It’s fully integrated, meaning it’s fluid enough to switch between support and attack as needed while working jointly with the other arms on coordinated regional attacks. That refined strategy would give the United States the edge over China in an aerial battle and, as it was in Operation Desert Storm, would likely be the key to an American victory.
So at this point, we can see that the U.S. Air Force trumps the PLAAF in two departments. For all of the modernization the PLAAF has undergone, it’s still vastly underpowered when compared to the U.S. Air Force in terms of sheer number of assets. The U.S. has around four times the number of aircraft, making it capable of essentially “clogging up” the skies and overwhelming China’s aerial combatants. Combine that with far more refined joint warfare
strategies, which would make heavy use of the U.S. Navy, America’s overseas bases, and its in-flight refueling capabilities, and you get planes that stay in the air longer and conduct more complex operations. China is lagging. And that trend only continues when you look at equipment.
In January 2011, the maiden flight of the Chengdu J-20 multirole stealth fighter took place. The aircraft, which is China’s first fifth-generation fighter and only the third to ever be created, entered into service at some point between 2018 and 2020, though Beijing has still only built two prototype versions of the plane. Nevertheless, it’s an impressive piece of kit. It has a blended fuselage and a low radar cross-section. The prototype’s engine – the Saturn 117S – is supplied by Russia and is capable of generating 32,000 pounds of thrust. However, China will likely replace this engine in the production model with a pair of WS-10G turbofan engines that generate 30,000 pounds of thrust and are made in Shenyang. Regardless, these engines give the J-20 a top speed of 1,304 miles per hour, which is just shy of Mach 2. It also has a service ceiling of 59,055 feet and a range of around 2,100 miles.
It's an extremely impressive multirole stealth fighter. The J-20 also stacks up fairly well with its U.S. Air Force equivalent, the F-35. Though the F-35 has better stealth capabilities than the J-20, owing to its smaller size and lower radar cross-section, the J-20 comes out on top in terms of speed and its ability to disrupt supporting aircraft. The J-20 also has supercruise. This feature allows it to fly at high speeds without engaging its afterburners. The F-35 doesn’t have that, meaning its use of afterburners
could give its position away in situations whereas the J-20 would be able to stay hidden. However, the J-20 has disadvantages of its own, with the main one being the lack of a cannon. The National Interest suggests that this means China doesn’t anticipate using the jet in a dogfighting capacity, with its likely role being to conduct bombing runs and missile assaults before using its speed to rapidly exit a conflict zone. Regardless, these quibbles about which is the better jet are less important than what the J-20 represents to China. It’s Beijing’s step into the fifth-generation fighter space, and it’s supposed to show that China’s aerial assets are reaching parity with those the United States can deploy.
But there are two problems with that representation. The first is that, as impressive as the J-20 may be, it still doesn’t appear to be in active production. There are only two of these jets in service, with both being prototype models. China is still tinkering away at the jet, which means it may be several years before we see it become a key part of the PLAAF. The U.S. doesn’t have that problem with the F-35 – it already has
630 F-35s and it plans to purchase 1,800 more. China is being forced to play catch-up again. Even if the J-20 proves to be the superior multirole fighter – which is already debatable – China’s production of this jet is so far behind the U.S. and its F-35 that it’s almost rendered moot. But that’s not the biggest issue the PLAAF faces with the J-20. While Beijing is trying to get its fifth-generation fighter off the ground, the United States is already working on the sixth generation. In 2014, the U.S. initiated the Next Generation Air Dominance Program, or NGAD. Planned to enter service in 2030, NGAD is a highly classified program, though we do know that it represents the United States shifting away from the concept of a singular aerial platform to one that involves multiple systems working in tandem. Think of it as an
extension of the joint warfare concept, only isolated to a specific collection of aircraft. “Collection” is the appropriate word here. The U.S. Air Force demonstrated the NGAD program in September 2020 with a full-scale flight, which showed that the approach combined a manned sixth-generation fighter jet and an array of collaborative combat aircraft, or CCAs. These
are unmanned supporting aircraft – essentially more complex drones – that form a network with the manned jet, allowing a pilot to not only use the jet they’re piloting but also to control CCAs in real-time as the situation requires. Each NGAD fighter jet is anticipated to cost $300 million, with that high cost being part of the reason the U.S. Air Force intends to deploy CCAs. They’ll give it the option of lowering risk by having fewer pilots in the air, while still
maintaining a threat because each pilot commands multiple assets. The CCAs are expected to carry advanced sensors, as well as be equipped with electronic warfare packages designed to disrupt any aircraft the fighter engages. They’ll also be stocked with munitions – ideal for supporting the main fighter in aerial engagements. And there’s more.
In the spirit of America’s joint warfare tactics, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy have announced they’ll be collaborating on what they call the “four fundamentals” of CCA drones. That announcement came in September 2023, with the goal being to ensure that all CCAs – regardless of which arm of the U.S. military produces them – will be interoperable, meaning they’re capable of performing alongside multiple weapons systems. To ensure that, the U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy want every CCA to have common communication links, aircraft architecture, ground-control segments, and autonomy architecture. Brigadier General Dale White, who’s the Program
Executive Officer for fighters and advanced aircraft in the U.S. military, explains: “We do have those four focus areas that allow us to leverage the interoperability that we think we need for a CCA because this is not just a single-service solution, and we know that going in.” Ultimately, the goal of this collaboration is to ensure that the CCAs being developed as part of NGAD aren’t only compatible with America’s sixth-generation fighter. They should also work alongside the latest F/A XX fighters as well as ideally being compatible with the existing aircraft in the U.S. military’s fleet. What does all of this have to do with the U.S. Air Force being capable of beating China?
It once again shows how different the U.S. approach is. China is not only playing catch up on the joint warfare front, but it’s also lagging when it comes to equipment. As it works toward getting its fifth-generation J-20 in the air, the United States is already deep into the development of a program that will not only lead to the launch of its first sixth-generation fighter but will enable it to support that fighter with CCAs to essentially create a joint warfare capability controlled by a single pilot. The collaboration between the U.S.
Air Force and the U.S. Navy on this project also can’t be underestimated – it shows that both military branches understand that they’ll be using the NGAD in tandem during operations. Worse yet for Beijing, there are even more examples of how the PLAAF doesn’t measure up to the U.S. Air Force. Take pilot training. The United States has clear criteria in place when it comes to choosing and training its pilots. Anybody who applies must be educated to at least the Bachelor’s degree level and must pass a Single Scope Background Investigation. The applicant must also be between the ages of 18 and 33 when they apply, with height restrictions also in place depending on the type of aircraft the prospective pilot wishes to fly. Assuming the applicant meets the criteria,
they’re placed into an officer training program, such as Officer Training School or the Air Force Academy, where they complete an 8.5-week program. Next comes about a year spent in Undergraduate Pilot Training, or UPT, toward the end of which the prospective pilot is assigned to an aircraft. After completing UPT, the pilot then spends up to a year continuing their flight training in their assigned aircraft, with the exact time taken varying depending on the aircraft and the pilot’s capabilities. And only then does the pilot get assigned to a squadron and location. All told, this amounts to more than five years of training – including the completion of a relevant bachelor’s degree – demonstrating just how seriously the U.S. Air Force takes its pilot training. They’ll then have to meet NATO’s requirement of flying at least 15 hours per month, adding up to 180 hours per year, which you could consider as a continuation of the pilot’s training.
China’s approach isn’t as clear. That’s partially because, as is the case with much of the country’s military, the PLAAF doesn’t make its training criteria publicly known. However, we know that they lag behind the U.S. As The Eurasian Times pointed out in a 2022 article,
the PLAAF lost around 2,000 of its pilots between 1960 and 2020, with at least 30 of those being test pilots. It’s also engaging in a strategy in which it’s hiring Western pilots to train its recruits, which mirrors its copying of American training procedures. Again, China is playing catch-up by relying on what already exists to form the basis of its training program. But China is accelerating those training programs. Or at least trying to. In July 2022, Le Monde reported on the first PLAAF cadets trained in the J-10 – a Chinese fighter-bomber – who had earned their wings in three years instead of the previous standard of six years. This may not be the positive news that the PLAAF wants to claim it to be. While it claims that “the proportion of tactical training, such as multi-aircraft combat and live-fire operations, has been increased” during this three-year program, the fact that China is speeding up at all suggests that it’s trying to get more pilots in planes quicker than it previously had.
A sign of desperation? Perhaps, though it’s also telling that this is far from the first time the PLAAF has changed its pilot training over the last couple of decades. In 2011, it switched from a previous program, which took 10 years to complete, to a four-phase program taking six years. The 2022 Le Monde report shows that, at least when it comes to bomber training, it’s since switched to a three-year program. That inconsistency could cause issues down the line,
even if the switches are due to refinement and improvement of its pilot training. There’s also the experience issue to consider. Since 1990, the U.S. Air Force has engaged in multiple wide-scale conflicts, including The Gulf War, The War on Terror, and the War in Iraq. It’s also been involved in countless smaller operations, with one of the
most recent being its involvement in operations targeting the Houthi insurgents in the Red Sea. As for China – the PLAAF hasn’t been involved in a single major military operation in the same period. It runs plenty of military drills, but China’s pilots have no real combat experience. Combine that with inconsistent training and you get an Air Force staffed with flyers who are likely less capable than their American equivalents. The U.S. has an analytical learning process in place in which it examines its performance in previous conflicts to determine how it can improve in the future. Those lessons
form the doctrines, strategies, and procedures all branches of the U.S. military have in place. China doesn’t have that approach. Instead, Air University claims, the PLAAF operates on “Mao’s theory of the weak contender fighting a stronger adversary through deceit and deception.” While fine in theory, transforming that concept into an executable
strategy may be beyond the PLAAF’s reach. So, where would all of this leave China in a fight against the U.S. Air Force? The answer is that Beijing would be in a bad position, not least because it simply wouldn’t ever be fighting the U.S. Air Force alone. America’s development of joint warfare tactics during the Gulf War – and its refinement of those tactics ever since – means that China would face combined military operations that involve aerial, naval, and on-ground strategies. This joint warfare expertise would come to bear in a direct conflict, as a fight between the U.S. and Japan would likely center on the South China Sea,
East China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait. Combining its naval and aerial prowess with cooperation from the countries hosting American bases in the Indo-Pacific would give the U.S. a major edge over China. Add America’s embrace of aerial tanks and in-flight refueling – giving it the territorial coverage advantage – and both China’s navy and its air force would likely find themselves fighting a war in which it’s increasingly penned in by coordinated American attacks. Add the fact that the U.S. Air Force is four times the size of the PLAAF in terms of assets, has better-trained and more experienced pilots, and is already working on a sixth-generation fighter while China is still stuck in the fifth generation and it seems you have a pretty clear victor.
But we’d like to hear your thoughts on this matter? Have we at the Map Pack team underestimated the PLAAF’s capabilities and China’s ability to defend itself within the South China Sea? Or, is the U.S. primed to achieve aerial dominance in short order during a conflict, setting the stage for its military to defeat China in a conventional war? Feel free to share your opinions below. Thanks for watching and take care out there!
2024-08-28 17:52
