Shocking Truth Behind Russia's Weapons Industry COLLAPSE
“Russia’s weapons production has increased dramatically.” “Russia’s defense industry gears up for a long war.” “The scale of Russia’s rearmament has NATO worried.” These are just some of the headlines that flooded the internet as Russia’s weapon industry saw a boom in 2024 instead of the doom many Western experts had predicted. Of course, no one can fault the writers behind these
articles, as one look at the figures coming out of Moscow paints a picture of a thriving war machine that has made an almost miraculous recovery – factories running at full tilt, assembly lines churning out artillery shells, tanks, and missiles at an unprecedented pace. In the artillery department, Russia has even bested the U.S., producing about 250,000 shells per month, which is nearly three times the quantity the U.S. produces for Ukraine. And that’s combined with Europe! However, beneath the glossy reports and the numbers that seem to defy expectations, whispers of resource shortages, outdated technology, and rampant corruption tell a far different story.
Russia’s weapon industry might’ve been propped up by sheer force of will and held together by desperate measures and hollow propaganda, but it is, in fact, teetering on the edge of collapse. And the truth is that this industry was always going to fail, no matter how much the Kremlin tried to mask its decay. After all, no empire can thrive on a foundation of rot. But why is Russia’s weapon industry failing so badly? And what deeper forces are driving it toward inevitable collapse? Keep watching to find out. To understand just how different reality is from what is being portrayed, let’s first look at the propaganda coming from the Kremlin and then gradually peel back its layers and examine the crumbling foundations of Russia’s weapon industry. According to the Kremlin, Russia’s weapon industry has never been stronger. The historic increase in Russia’s military expenditure alone should serve as proof. In 2022, Russia adopted an expenditure plan that allocates
$600 billion for national defense, security, and law enforcement between 2022 and 2025. About $75 billion was planned for 2022 and $84 billion for 2023. In 2024, a record-high pre-planned military expenditure was introduced, with reports pointing to a $140 billion figure. This would mean that 35% of all government spending in 2024 was directed toward fueling the military machine – an enormous commitment that, on the surface, signals Russia’s determination to sustain its military power. With all this money pouring into the defense sector, it shouldn’t be surprising that the official data on arms production coming from the Kremlin also paints a picture of tremendous success. According
to Russia’s Ministry of Digital Development, Communications, and Mass Media, in 2023 alone, the production of armored vehicles in Russia increased threefold. For drones, it increased twofold. “In communications equipment, weapons, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance – more than fivefold growth.” Those were the exact words of Russia’s Prime Minister, Mikhail Mishustin, at a meeting discussing the needs of Russia’s armed forces. He added that the volume of production of armor protection items also increased threefold, which was good news for all the Russian soldiers fearing they would be sent into battle ill-equipped and vulnerable, like many of their predecessors in this conflict. To keep up with these intense production volumes, the Kremlin has reportedly engaged over 360 enterprises, commissioning approximately 37,000 units of various equipment.
This has allowed another 520,000 employees to be involved in the defense sector, pushing the limits of production capacity. The result? Russia’s weapon industry is not only fulfilling its quotas, but it’s doing so ahead of schedule. That is if you believe a word of the official reports coming from the Kremlin. Remember, that’s the same Kremlin that presented mind-blowing figures regarding mass mobilization in Russia – 137,000 troops in August of 2022. Another 170,000 soldiers in December of 2023, and plans to mobilize another 400,000 before 2024 ends. On paper, all these figures paint a picture of an unstoppable and ever-growing military force. Yet,
beneath the surface of these impressive numbers lies a different story – one of the poorly chosen, poorly equipped, and poorly supported troops used by the Kremlin as nothing more than cannon fodder. Older people. Disabled people. Convicts. These are just some of the groups conscripted to swell the ranks, revealing a disturbing reality behind the grandiose figures. Russia’s weapon arms industry is no different. However, to be fair, Russia’s approach of quantity over quality has allowed
the defense industry to flood the battlefield with an impressive array of weaponry, ammunition, and equipment. As for how these performed on the said battlefield, that’s a story for later. Strictly number-wise, the Ukrainian battlefield is expected to see the following equipment in 2024: 800,000 units of 122-millimeter ammunition for barrel artillery 500,000 122-millimeter rockets for the BM-21 “Grad” multiple-launch rocket system 17,000 220-millimeter rockets for the BM-27 Uragan self-propelled multiple-launch rocket system 1,500 tanks and 3,000 other armored vehicles These figures become even more concerning when compared to those from previous years. For instance, only 33,000 122-millimeter rockets for the BM-21 were manufactured in 2023, which means their production is expected to skyrocket by 1,415%. Again, that’s if you choose to believe the Kremlin-controlled figures. We must keep emphasizing where these figures are coming from, as it’s pretty easy to get lost in all the numbers, also losing sight of their reliability. As previously noted,
the Kremlin’s numbers serve a single purpose – to bolster a narrative of strength while disregarding the deeper issues like quality control and inefficiency. But is projecting power the only reason why Russia is seemingly putting all its resources into weapons production? In a word – no. The truth is that Russia needs the weapons industry to survive. Even before the war in Ukraine started Russia was incapable of exporting other high-value-added products like cars or cell phones. Weapons have always been a cornerstone of Russia’s export industry, which was spearheaded by oil and gas exports. But now, when most of the world wants nothing to do with Russian
goods and natural resources due to sanctions and geopolitical tensions, weapons are practically all Russia has. As of 2024, Russia’s defense industry employs an estimated 3.5 million people, which accounts for 20% of all manufacturing jobs in Russia. All the tanks, planes, and ammunition manufactured, together with military pay and compensation for dead and wounded soldiers, directly contribute to Russia’s gross domestic product, or GDP, figures. In other words, the
war in Ukraine is single-handedly driving Russia’s economic growth. But what about arms exports? Are the weapon production figures reflecting a booming export sector as well? The answer is a resounding “no.” However, the reasoning behind this answer is multifaceted. On the one hand, Russia can’t afford to sell virtually any weapons, as it needs all its production for its own military needs. With the ongoing conflict in Ukraine depleting resources and driving up demand for armaments, the domestic priority is to ensure that the Russian military is well-equipped and has ample supplies. This is especially vital when you consider the billions of dollars Ukraine is receiving from its Western allies in military aid. On the other hand, even if Russia wanted to sell weapons in bulk, it wouldn’t
be able to. Why? Because hardly anyone would rush to buy them. But how is this possible? After all, we’re talking about the producer of arguably the most famous assault rifle in the world – the AK-47. The country that, alongside the U.S. and France, contributed to nearly two-thirds of the global major weapons exports between 2019 and 2023? Well, you see, once your weapons actually get battle-tested while the whole world is watching and fail spectacularly, their reputation can tarnish rather quickly. And that’s on top of the sanctions that reduced the number of countries purchasing major Russian arms from 31 in 2019 to 12 in 2023. Among these countries, India and China lead the pack, with $5 and $3.1 billion, respectively according to data acquired between 2019 and 2023. However, even these two major importers significantly reduced the amount
of weapons they purchase from Russia in 2023. For comparison’s sake, India imported $405 million worth of major weapons in 2023, a 62.5% decrease from the $1.08 billion spent in 2022. Similarly, China spent $372 million on Russia’s weapons and equipment in 2023, while their imports almost reached $600 million in 2022 – $580 million, to be exact. So, how poorly do Russia’s weapons have to
have performed in order to keep these and other countries away? The answer is glaringly obvious in the field. Even during the first year of war in Ukraine, when the weapons used were supposed to be new and fresh, showcasing Russian military prowess, the country’s equipment saw some excessively high failure rates. Take Russian missiles as an example. According to the Pentagon, these missiles experienced 20% to 60% failure rates in the first month of the conflict alone. In this context, failure was defined as the inability to successfully launch the missile or hit the intended target. Out of these faulty missiles, cruise missiles performed the worst, with
air-launched cruise missiles having the lowest kill rates. There have even been reports that some of the roughly 1,100 missiles Russia launched in the first month of the invasion managed to hit the target but forgot about another crucial part – actually exploding. The Pentagon explained this phenomenon as a result of both quality control issues and fusing problems. Still, in their March 25, 2022 report, the Pentagon officials warned Russia still had about 50% of their missile inventory available. And despite the high failure rates and performance issues observed,
such a high amount of the remaining stockpile still represented a substantial threat. Well, by May 10 of that year, this threat all but vanished, as the Pentagon reported that Russia had almost depleted its missile inventory. Unsurprisingly, Russia was no longer eager to shoot off what little remained left and right, given the abysmal performance and dwindling stockpile. So, the missile use continued at a significantly reduced rate. Now, the performance of the Russian missiles is disastrous in and of itself. However, it reaches a whole new level when you consider all
the praises the Russian military lavished upon their missile technology before the conflict. Former Deputy Prime Minister, now the Director General of the State Corporation for Space Activities “Roscosmos,” Yury Borisov, described Russia’s hypersonic missiles as “high-precision,” claiming they “can be used to eliminate military targets, such as parked vehicles, arms depots, command posts, infrastructure targets“ with the error probability of “just a few meters.” He added that these missiles, primarily referring to the likes of the Bal, Bastion, Iskander, Kalibr, Kh-101, and Kinzhal missiles, “can travel hundreds of kilometers and have next to zero CEP.” CEP
refers to “circular error probability,” which measures the radius within which a missile is expected to land around its target, indicating its precision. So, a missile with a CEP that’s close to zero is supposed to always hit its intended target with remarkable accuracy. However, the war in Ukraine proved that these praises were nothing more than wishful thinking. Although to be fair, even pre-war reports had hinted at the possibility that Russia’s missiles might not live up to their lofty claims. For example, in 2017, Igor Rozin, a Russian military journalist, reviewed “Russia’s most devastating sea, ground, and air missiles.” When talking about the Kalibr naval cruise missile, he said that it had “an accuracy of 30 meters,” which is roughly 100 feet.
When discussing the Kh-101 air-based missiles, he described them as being able to “eliminate targets up to 5,500 kilometers (or 3,400 miles) away with an accuracy of 5 to 50 meters,” which is 16 to 164 feet. Now, 5 meters might not be too much, but 50 is certainly quite far from the supposed near-zero CEP. In fact, 50 meters is not even close to the precision needed for high-value targets. This sort of expectation vs. reality gap is, without a doubt, one of the leading reasons why Russia’s weapon industry is failing so badly. However, it’s far from the only one. With this in mind, let’s dive into the factors contributing to the downfall of the Russian defense sector. To start,
let’s expand upon the first reason we mentioned. Russia’s weapons in practice simply can’t match the expectations on paper, which has led most of the country’s arms importers to rethink their purchases. Even if you know little about the technicalities of weaponry, think about it logically. How did a country once touted as the second-biggest military power in the world fail to quickly defeat Ukraine, a nation with drastically fewer resources and a smaller military? Russia’s propaganda was so effective that even Western commentators saw Kyiv falling rather quickly.
After all, Russia’s claims and previous military actions, like its swift victory in Georgia, mighty intervention in Syria, and its aggressive posture in Crimea, had set a precedent for rapid success. But let’s look underneath the surface. At 26,900 square miles of area, Georgia is a tiny country, almost 10 times smaller than Ukraine. Plus, at the time of Russia’s invasion in 2008, it had a minuscule army of under 30,000, which was additionally poorly organized. As for Syria,
Russia was up against a fragmented opposition rather than a unified, well-organized military force. That’s not to mention that the Syrian insurgents’ air capabilities were almost non-existent, and practically all Russia did in the country was launch air strikes. According to Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, the country’s air force, RuAF, had delivered 71,000 strikes on the supposed terrorist infrastructure in under a year and a half. Finally, in Crimea, the situation was markedly different as well. The annexation in 2014 was largely unopposed, characterized by a swift, well-coordinated operation that relied heavily on local support and covert tactics rather than a full-scale military engagement. The Ukrainian forces in Crimea were relatively few – between 5,000 and 22,000 – and lacked the capability to mount a significant defense against the Russian forces, which were able to leverage both military superiority and the element of surprise effectively. In other words, the combat conditions encountered by the Russian military in Ukraine were far more challenging than any they had previously experienced. For the first time, the Russian military actually had to rely on its full
array of conventional forces in a prolonged and high-intensity conflict against a well-organized and determined adversary. This exposed the limitations of Russia’s weaponry, tactics, and logistical support that had previously been masked by less demanding scenarios. That’s why Russia failed on almost every front in Ukraine. It failed to claim any substantial victories. Make and maintain significant territorial gains. Achieve air supremacy. Defend its naval assets in the Black Sea against a country with no navy. Land. Air. Sea. Fail. Fail. Fail. With this in mind, why
would any serious prospective buyer want to invest in Russian weaponry that has proven ineffective in a high-stakes conflict? The failures of the Russian military across multiple fronts not only undermined its own capabilities but also cast doubt on the reliability of its arms. But let’s take the buyers out of the mix. Let’s say Russia is strictly producing weapons to sustain its war efforts and, thus, its economy. Even by these standards, Russia’s weapon industry would still be considered a failure. Why? Because its products simply cannot match the sophisticated Western arms. And since countering – and even surpassing – Western weaponry is a key objective for Russia,
it’s easy to conclude that it’s all for nothing. All the pompous claims, grand military parades, and inflated statistics mean nothing when Russia’s weapon industry ultimately falls short of producing large-scale targeting systems, precision-guided munitions, and heavy-strike long-range drones. Take the Sukhoi Su-57 stealth fighter jet as an example. This project was initiated back in 1999 under the guise of a revolutionary advancement in stealth and multirole capabilities. Marketed as Russia’s answer to the Western Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II, the Su-57 promised to deliver unparalleled superiority with its stealth features, advanced avionics, and supersonic cruise capabilities. And then, over 20 years passed, and all Russia
had to show for these ambitious promises was a handful of Su-57 prototypes. In December 2019, just a year before the aircraft would be officially launched, the first serial Su-57, bort number “01 blue,” crashed some 70 miles from the Dzyomgi Airport in Khabarovsk Krai during the final stage of its factory trials. The reason? A control system malfunctioned at an altitude of 26,000 feet. As a result of the malfunction, the aircraft entered a rapid spiral descent, causing the pilot to eject at an altitude of about 6,500 feet. This crash was emblematic of the broader challenges facing Russia’s defense industry, where ambitious projects frequently struggle to deliver on their lofty promises. For an aircraft that was supposed to rival the best Western fighters,
the Su-57’s troubled development and operational hiccups illustrate the gap between Russia's aspirations and its practical achievements in defense technology. To this day, only 22 serial Su-57 jets have been manufactured, and reports have yet to come out about their operation in a real combat scenario. In contrast, the U.S. has built over 1,000 F-35s, which are actively used and tested in various theaters of operation around the world. However, as much as Russia wants to beat its Western opponents, one simple fact remains true – the country’s weapon industry is failing miserably without Western-made parts. As Foreign Policy puts it, “Russia’s war machine runs
on Western parts.” Now, you might wonder – how is this possible if over 50 countries, including most of Western nations, imposed sanctions on Russia? Well, Russia has managed to find a workaround, relying on a network of third-party countries and intermediaries to source the crucial components they need. This has led to multiple calls to increase funding for oversight agencies and punish those who facilitate these indirect transactions with multibillion-dollar penalties similar to those issued to banks for money laundering and terrorist financing. This also means Russia’s
weapon industry is practically running out of time. And in a high-stakes game, time is of the essence. The increasing difficulty in acquiring critical components will likely eventually force Russia to either drastically reduce its production capabilities or seek alternative methods to bolster its defense sector, with both options posing significant challenges to the survival of Russia’s weapon industry and, thus, economy. But how dependent on Western components is Russia’s
arms production truly? Unique 2023 Ukrainian resources titled “Components in the Aggressor’s Weapon” and “Instruments of War” hold the answer to this question. That answer is 3,638 different Western components in 134 distinct weapon systems. In other words, Russia’s military is about 70% to 90% dependent on Western-made components. Take the Shahed-238 unmanned aerial vehicle, or UAV for
short, as an example. With the help of Iran, their source country, Russia has started producing these drones domestically, aiming to manufacture at least 6,000 units by the end of 2025. To achieve this goal, Russia will need electronic components from Western and other foreign countries like Canada, China, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the U.S. Even when Russia tries
to deploy new types of weapons, such as the Kh-69 and Zircon missiles, they can’t do it without Western-made components. In fact, these systems require even more sophisticated and specialized technologies that can only be sourced from Western nations. Therefore, finding a way to fully prevent Russia from accessing Western-made components would undoubtedly spell doom for the country’s arms production. For now, Russia’s still getting away with sourcing Western-made counterparts, with a June 2024 report by the Royal United Services Institute, a London-based think tank, disclosing, “Despite the diligent efforts of many civil servants, backed by the political will to disrupt Russia’s military-industrial output, there is little to show for it.” However, even the “little”
damage that Western sanctions have done to Russia shouldn’t be underestimated. Sweeping Western sanctions have undoubtedly pushed Russia’s weapon industry to the brink of collapse, although they did fail to push it over entirely. As a result of these sanctions, the Russian military-industrial complex is facing severe delays, rampant costs, and substantial operational inefficiencies. The
result? The Russians have been cutting corners more and more, jeopardizing the long-term quality of the weapons they produce. So, in 2024, it might seem that Russia has managed to outwit its Western adversaries through sheer volume of production. But most of the weapons being produced in heaps in Russian factories have virtually no chance of maintaining the standards necessary for modern warfare. Not now. Not ever. But Western sanctions aren’t the only ones to blame for the abysmal output of Russian arms factories. How the Kremlin treats its factory workers also has something to
do with it. Remember – we are talking about the same Kremlin that has favored the “meat grinder” military strategy throughout the duration of the war in Ukraine – sending wave after wave of soldiers with little regard for their survival or well-being. And if that’s how the Kremlin treats frontline soldiers – the very people tasked with achieving military victories – just imagine how it treats the factory workers hidden behind the scenes. Sure, these factory workers are well-paid, with machinists and welders reportedly earning more money than white-collar managers and lawyers in Russia. However, Russia’s soldiers are also well-paid, and yet they are still treated as
expandable assets. In arms production, this means introducing six-day work weeks with 12-hour shifts, rushing employees through the training process, and even resorting to forced labor to meet the deadlines. For instance, Kurganmashzavod, the Russian manufacturing facility producing the BMP-2 and BMP-3 infantry fighting vehicles, has brought in convicts to fill the labor shortages. These prisoners, often with little to no experience, are thrown into the
production process under grueling conditions, all in the name of speeding up output. However, it’s important to note that the responsibility for these cruel actions doesn’t lie solely with the management. The Russian government was the one to crank up the pressure, with Dmitry Medvedev, former president and current deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia, touring the factory in 2022 and warning the management about the potential criminal charges that come with failing to meet production deadlines. Medvedev’s message was clear – the Kremlin demanded results, regardless of the human cost. This leads us to the underlying reason why Russia’s weapon industry is on the verge of collapse and why this was always going to be its fate – the systematic challenges embedded within its military-industrial complex. Simply put, this complex is failing due to a
deeply flawed system of state-run monopolies, corruption, and inefficiencies. This systemic failure is rooted in Russia’s resistance to embrace free-market capitalism, which has stunted innovation and productivity in the defense sector. On the one side, the U.S. maintains a partnership between the government and private companies. For instance, Washington renewed its fighter jet fleet through a competitive bidding process, awarding the F-35 contract to Lockheed Martin after an open contest between private companies like Boeing. Sure, this system has its own drawbacks, including cost overruns of $400 billion seen in the F-35 program. However, it has also driven the
U.S. to produce some of the most advanced weaponry in the world. Decades of competition among private firms have incentivized innovation and efficiency, leading to cutting-edge technologies like stealth fighters, precision-guided missiles, and drones. And then, there’s Russia. A country where the defense industry operates strictly under state monopolies and centralization, continuing a legacy from the Soviet era. Communism might’ve fallen a long time ago, but Russia has certainly not embraced free-market principles. Instead, the state maintains control over most
industries, including defense, through massive conglomerates like Rostec, established in 2007 to consolidate over 700 arms companies. The logic behind Rostec was to eliminate inefficiencies through centralized control, but this has only compounded the problem. Now, there are more inefficiencies in Russia’s weapon industry than ever before. This also has to do with the people put in charge of the country’s defense industry. Instead of fostering competition, Russia’s President Vladimir Putin’s approach was to replace communist ideologies with pragmatic technocrats, or “siloviki,” who are mostly ex-KGB agents just like him. Of course, this includes the
CEO of Rostec Sergey Chemezov, who is a former KGB colleague of Putin. By 2014, Rostec had reduced its workforce to 443,000 employees from 788,000 in 2008. However, despite these cuts, Rostec managed to achieve an even greater monopolization of the defense sector. For example, the United Aircraft
Corporation, under Rostec’s control, is the only manufacturer of Russian fighter jets. In the U.S. on the other hand, there’s a diverse array of contractors like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Raytheon. Another glaring example of inefficiency within Russia’s military-industrial complex is Almaz-Antey, Russia’s leading missile manufacturer. This corporation is directly owned by Russia’s Ministry of Finance and led by another silovik, Viktor Ivanov. In 2017, its subsidiary, NPO Novator, managed to produce only 60 Kalibr missiles in six months, an abysmally low output given that Russia fired over 1,200 missiles in just one month of the Ukraine war. This mismatch
between production capacity and battlefield needs reveals the inability of Russia’s monopolistic defense industry to meet modern demands. However, no systematic challenge has plagued every aspect of Russian society like corruption. And there’s no doubt about it – corruption and cronyism also permeate every inch of the military-industrial complex. That’s how the late Yevgeny Prigozhin,
Putin’s former ally, and his catering company were appointed to provide food to Russian soldiers, bypassing traditional systems. And that’s how the same Russian soldiers ended up with expired food while risking their lives for their country. According to Russia’s former Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Kozyrevm, corruption – paired with the fear of actually telling Putin about it – has transformed Russia’s military into a “Potemkin military.” If you’re unfamiliar with the term, “Potemkin military” refers to a military force that, on the surface, appears formidable and well-prepared but is hollow and dysfunctional in reality. The term originates from Grigory Potemkin, a Russian nobleman who supposedly built fake villages along the route of Empress Catherine the Great’s journey to Crimea to impress her with the region’s prosperity. And that’s all Russia’s
weapon industry is – a carefully constructed façade that’s beginning to crumble. And let us tell you, once this façade finally caves in, it will take the Russian economy with it. After all, this economy is now fully militarized, and much of its industrial capacity is dedicated to defense production. When the defense sector falters, the effects will ripple through the
entire economic system. Renaud Foucart, a senior lecturer in Economics at Lancaster University, perhaps put it best: “Russia’s economy is now completely driven by the war in Ukraine – it cannot afford to lose, but nor can it afford to win.” If Russia achieves victory, the staggering costs associated with rebuilding and maintaining control over a conquered Ukraine would be insurmountable for an already weakened economy. Conversely, if Russia loses, it risks not only the collapse of its military-industrial complex but also the loss of the very driving force behind its economic stability and growth. Now, it’s time for you to do
the talking. Head to the comments section below and let us know whether you believe doom is the only option for Russia’s weapon industry. And if so, how long do you think it will take before this complex collapses under the weight of its decay? We’re looking forward to reading your predictions. Now go check out Why ALL Russian Weapons Are So BAD! or click this other video instead!
2024-10-04 17:04
