China’s navy is catching up to the U.S., but while China’s naval capability has come a long way from the Third Taiwan Crisis, its apparent strength is not all it seems… Here’s why. Here are two of the most powerful countries in the world. Both China, the fourth-largest country in terms of land area, spanning approximately 3.7 million square miles, and the United States, which is the third-largest country by land area, covering about 3.8 million square miles, are major economic powers with substantial global significance. China has the world's second-largest
economy with a GDP of approximately $18.1 trillion in 2022. The United States, however, has the largest economy globally, with a GDP of about $25.46 trillion in 2022. Ok, so the US has got China whipped when it comes to land area size and economic success, but what about military power? Well, here’s where it gets scary… China aims to position itself as a significant global military power and has set its sights on achieving global dominance by 2049. Right now, China's air force ranks second globally, just behind the United States, which possesses the most formidable air force strength. According to reports,
the United States operates approximately 10,000 more air platforms compared to China. In terms of total aircraft strength, China is listed as having 3,260 aircraft in service, while the United States boasts an impressive fleet of 13,233 aircraft. This substantial difference emphasizes the United States' superior air power and its larger operational aircraft count.
But what about sea power? One of the markers of a superpower is the ability to project maritime power over long distances. States which have been able to do so have enormous influence in regional or world affairs and can exert huge leverage over their less capable rivals. It is therefore not surprising that as China’s wealth has grown, it has invested heavily in its ambitions to create a blue water navy that it hopes will one day challenge the US Navy for supremacy, at least within the waters of its immediate neighborhood. But how close is China to that goal? What is the state of US-China strategic competition at sea and how is the United States planning to maintain its lead on the world’s waterways? What technologies and weapons is the US Navy developing to adapt to the growing power of China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)? You may have heard reports that China now has the world’s largest navy. There are 355 ships in its fleet as of December 30th, 2021. The Chinese brass is keen to expand that number. It plans to increase its fleet size to 420 ships by 2025 and 460 ships by 2030. These
figures do not cover the additional 85 patrol combatant ships and other small ships capable of bearing anti-ship cruise missiles. China’s countless fishing boats have also acted as a de facto maritime militia, harassing vessels from other countries in international waters. China’s navy has numbers, but here’s the bad news: it is increasing in the quality of its ships as well. China was seen putting its new naval muscle to use in the summer of 2022 following a visit by then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan. For several days after Pelosi left, Chinese ships and aircraft demonstrated their military potential in the waters off Taiwan. This show of force would have been inconceivable 25 years earlier, in the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-6. At that time, when Taiwan was set to hold its
first direct presidential election and became a fully-fledged democracy, the Mainland launched several missiles across the Taiwan Strait, prompting the United States to send two carrier battle groups into the area. China had no choice but to back down in the face of such pressure, but the Chinese leadership never forgot the incident. To them, it recalled the “Century of Humiliation,” a time in the 19th and early 20th centuries when China repeatedly found itself at the mercy of foreign powers. Since the Chinese leadership considers Taiwan a rogue province,
continued American and allied military support for the island reminds them of those times. After the crisis, China resolved to never let such a scenario happen again and took steps to increase its naval power. This was a deviation from the norm. With only a few brief exceptions, China has never historically been a sea power. It has traditionally focused its military resources on maintaining a large army capable of defending its vast land borders. Up until very recently, this was the objective of the Chinese brass. However, with China’s continued problems with
Taiwan and its containment within the natural barrier of the First Island Chain – a string of islands off China’s waters which stretch from Japan to Indonesia, the Chinese leadership decided that only by becoming a sea power would China take its rightful place as a true global superpower. With its growing economic might, especially since it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, China finally had the chance to make a play for naval prominence. Included in China’s new naval assets are three aircraft carriers. China’s naval brass plans to increase that number and bring its carrier force up to five by 2030, with more to come after that. The PLAN also aims to increase its submarine force by building 10 ballistic missile submarines by the same year. While China’s naval capability has come a long way from the Third Taiwan Crisis, its apparent strength is not all it seems. China
may have more vessels in its fleets than any other country, but that is because most of its ships are still small. Aside from the number of ships, one way to measure a state’s naval power is through the combined tonnage of its fleets. Tonnage is the measurement of a ship’s weight. The PLAN’s total combined tonnage as of 2020 is between 1.8 and 2 million tons. The US Navy, though, stands at 4.6 million tons. The reason why tonnage matters is because small,
low quality vessels do comparatively little in an actual naval confrontation. The United States could build many more smaller boats if it wanted to, but it instead focuses on sturdier vessels with advanced offensive and defensive weaponry and robust transit options for Marines to stage amphibious assaults. While many American policymakers have called for the United States to build more ships and restore the navy to Cold War-level fleet sizes, no one in Washington is calling for an imitation of China’s fleet composition. Small patrol boats and other irregular craft do the US Navy no good in its global mission to maintain secure and free navigation on the world’s oceans. China has closed the tonnage gap since the time
of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, when the United States had a total tonnage lead of over four million, but it still lags significantly behind. China’s navy has other problems. Two of its much-publicized aircraft carriers are older models that use a STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Arrested Recovery) system to launch its planes. China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian, uses a more modern catapult system comparable to those used by the US Navy’s carriers, which allows it to launch its onboard planes faster. The Fujian is therefore a significant step in China’s technological capability.
However, how would China be able to launch its planes without pilots to fly them? China has a serious shortage of trained naval aviators, and the Fujian and its successors will add to the stress, both in the number of pilots these new carriers will demand and in teaching them how to use the catapult system. Overall, the PLAN is many decades behind the US Navy’s institutional knowledge and experience. Case in point: it lacks a fighter made specifically for training carrier pilots. The current aircraft of choice is the JL-9G, a single-engine, twin-seat plane that is incapable of simulating emergency landings on a carrier’s flight deck because it is too light and slow. So far, the PLAN’s attempts to create an adequate training aircraft have fallen short of satisfactory. Establishing programs for cadet naval aviators has also proven difficult for the PLAN.
This lack of institutional knowledge and experience makes sense, given China’s history and its only recent move toward sea power. Unfortunately for the Chinese leadership, institutional knowledge doesn’t come as easily as new ships do. China might have made progress at a rapid pace, but in a confrontation between carrier groups as they currently stand, the United States would still have an overwhelming advantage, for a few reasons. First, the United States has many more advanced
fourth-generation and fifth-generation fighters to call upon. America’s arsenal includes not only carrier-based planes, but land-based F-22s that would fly from Japan to lend a hand in a real battle. China’s most advanced fighter on the other hand, the J-20, cannot be launched from a carrier, and it is unclear if it can rival America’s F-22 and F-35 in air-to-air combat. Meanwhile, upgraded Tomahawk cruise missiles and submarines would also pose significant threats to the burgeoning Chinese carrier force, although we do not have good knowledge of the extent of China’s electronic warfare capabilities which could potentially counter such ship and submarine-fired missiles if they are advanced enough. Another area that the PLAN significantly lags behind the US Navy in is submarines, which was one of the reasons why Beijing made such a big protest about the AUKUS submarine sharing agreement. China currently has a fleet of 56 submarines. Six of them are ballistic missile submarines
with payloads capable of reaching the United States’ homeland. Another six are nuclear-powered attack submarines. The bulk of the fleet, 44, are diesel-electric attack submarines. This is where China’s navy is at its most pronounced disadvantage and lags the furthest behind. Experts believe that China’s current main submarine, the Shang class, is only on par with 1970s Soviet-era designs, and China has not invested as much in anti-submarine warfare as in other parts of its naval buildup. It has tried to close the gap recently, equipping its newer surface ships with more sophisticated sonars. China has also introduced its new Yu-8 missile-launched torpedo and KQ-200 maritime patrol aircraft. Even so, these are
comparative baby steps in actually defeating the formidable American submarine force. China may also be able to deploy more submarines in its immediate waters, but it is still at a severe disadvantage in submarine-to-submarine warfare. A comparison of the engineering of the two navies’ underwater vessels will paint a clearer picture of why the US Navy still has a decisive advantage in undersea warfare. The United States uses nuclear-powered submarines which are faster, capable of diving deeper, and have a longer range than the submarines China uses. China’s diesel-electric based submarines have one advantage – when running on electric power, they are quieter than nuclear submarines. However, these vessels cannot run on electric power for long. They have to either surface or pop up a snorkel to recharge their electric batteries
and run on diesel power for the duration of that operation. At that point they are significantly noisier than nuclear subs, and far more vulnerable to attack. Meanwhile, nuclear submarines can stay quiet and deep for months on end. Although the range and duration of operations
would not necessarily be as important for the Chinese in a confrontation with the US Navy because hostile encounters would take place near Chinese waters, the depth, stealth ability, and operating times of the American (and allied) nuclear submarines would help to defeat China’s strategy of overwhelming enemy naval forces with a rain of anti-access/area denial ballistic missiles. These projectiles currently pose a severe threat to American carrier groups and surface ships operating too close to China’s waters. Submarines, on the other hand, are much harder to detect, and the US Navy’s advantage in underwater operations allows the United States to threaten the Chinese mainland. As with aircraft carriers, China intends to build new next-generation submarines. By 2030, it could have between 30 and 40 nuclear-powered submarines. Whether it will have the institutional know-how to recruit and train competent submariners may be a more difficult matter to determine. China’s current underwater deficiencies
notwithstanding, it is still eager to flex its submarine muscle and has begun keeping at least one of its nuclear-armed ballistic missile submarines at sea at all times, with “near-continuous” patrols into the hotly contested waters of the South China Sea, making things more difficult for the United States and its allies and the waters of the region more dangerous. It is a sign of what the PLAN seeks for the future. As things stand now, though, China tacitly acknowledges its disadvantages in maritime warfare and relies mostly on a defensive strategy to mitigate the threat that the US Navy poses. At the heart of this strategy are its various classes of land-based short and medium-range ballistic missiles. These missiles, based in mainland China and on its illegally-built artificial islands in the South China Sea, pose a serious threat to American surface ships operating in the waters of the First Island Chain. Most formidable
is its vast stockpile of short-range missiles, effective at distances up to 1,000 kilometers. The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that China has between 750 and 1,500 of these, and they pose a menacing threat to Taiwan and every American base in Japan and South Korea, too. China also has between 150 and 450 medium-range and 80 to 160 intermediate-range ballistic missiles, respectively. These missiles can reach American ships and assets much further away from China’s mainland. Some of them are capable of hitting Guam, the largest base in the region. China is
currently building more ballistic missiles in an attempt to exert leverage over progressively more distant areas of the Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, although the PLAN is not currently capable of defeating the US Navy in a head-to-head confrontation, China would have the advantage of operating near its territory in any real conflict. No one on either side expects a Midway-style battle on the high ocean. This reality means that the American supply lines would be much longer and more vulnerable to Chinese missile ballistic attacks – the tyranny of distance.
China would also be able to concentrate all of its naval assets in a confrontation with the United States, where in contrast, the latter has global commitments. Policymakers and war planners in Washington have long sought to concentrate resources in the Indo-Pacific region to counter China’s expansionism, but bureaucratic and international resistance have often thwarted those plans, with Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine putting even more pressure for the United States to maintain military forces in Europe at high levels. Between these commitments, China’s sheer number of assets, the tricky supply situation, and China’s continued buildup in quality and quantity, the US Navy cannot rely on maintaining its traditional superiority forever, and the stakes are getting higher. Many experts warn that slowly, but surely, the United States is losing its traditional military advantage in the Indo-Pacific region, and the cost of victory in any potential confrontation with China has become much higher than even a decade ago. So what is the United States doing to ensure it keeps its edge at sea in a time of growing competition? No American naval strategy in the Indo-Pacific region would come independent of the considerations of its allies, especially Japan. So what would be their contributions to the naval balance of power in the Indo-Pacific? Japan recently announced that it would spend 2% of its GDP on defense by 2027, lifting traditional post-World War II restrictions to build a military capable of offensive operations.
A new aircraft carrier, the country’s first since World War II, is included in those plans. Even so, decades of minimal defense spending and the loss of institutional know-how will not be overcome so easily. Some American policymakers and national security experts fear that the benefits of Japan’s renewed commitment to its military will only show up well after 2027, when China’s capabilities will be even higher than they are today. Other American allies in the region, like Taiwan and the Philippines, are not nearly as capable. South Korea has a strong army, but is not in a position to play a robust role in a sea confrontation with the growing strength of the PLAN. This reality means that the increasingly
precarious situation will remain intact for the time being, with the overwhelming share of the Indo-Pacific’s defense burden falling on the United States. One of the items on the US Navy’s immediate horizon is to arm its Zumwalt-class destroyers with hypersonic missiles by 2025. Tests of some ship-fired devices are currently scheduled for late that year. This weapon, called the Intermediate-Range Conventional Prompt Strike, is a non-nuclear missile with a glide vehicle exceeding Mach 5 and a range over 1,700 kilometers. The US Navy is also experimenting with ship-fired laser weapons that could act as a much better line of defense against China’s big arsenal of ballistic missiles. The Navy received its first HELIOS (high-energy laser with integrated
optical-dazzler and surveillance) system in the third quarter of fiscal year 2022 and has requested $35 million worth of them in its 2023 budget. The HELIOS system is ideal for countering anti-ship missiles and can do so cheaply, because lasers do not require stockpiles of ammunition which can be expensive to manufacture and transport. HELIOS instead uses power from the ship itself and does not require a separate energy magazine, making each shot extremely cheap. The US Navy hopes that such cheap laser shots will one day effectively nullify the much more expensive missiles they would be targeting. HELIOS is currently designed for integration on Burke and Arleigh-class ships, but the Navy is planning to adapt it elsewhere. Unlike with hypersonic missiles, the United States currently leads China in laser technology, but China is proceeding apace with its own plans. As drones and missiles get more sophisticated,
laser countermeasures will only be more important in the future. The Navy had been experimenting with railguns – electromagnetic projectile weapons – for more than a decade, but suspended the program in 2021 in favor of hypersonic missiles. Suspension does not mean permanent consignment, however, and the Navy might pick the program back up. Like lasers,
railguns have the advantage of not needing to carry as big of an ammunition magazine, since their projectiles are not launched with gunpowder or fuel, but electromagnetic power that can be generated from the host ship. Drones are also set to play a big part in future naval operations, including drone ships and submarines, such as the experimental Orca, which will have a range of 6,500 nautical miles and be able to run alone for several months. The Navy plans for Orcas to be capable of anti-submarine warfare, with MK-46 or MK-48 heavy torpedoes. They are even being designed to carry anti-ship missiles.
Unmanned ships and submarines would at the very least be expendable targets for China to send its heavy stockpile of ballistic missiles at, reducing the high American casualties they would otherwise cause and permit the United States to grow bolder as the Chinese deplete their stockpiles. As we have seen in the war in Ukraine, ammunition gets depleted quickly in a modern conflict, ammunition which is often expensive to make, with its precision instruments and advanced electronics. Any cheaper drone which can exhaust China’s advanced munitions would be worth its weight in gold for the American naval brass. China is also keen on developing unmanned submersibles, signaling that this will be a burgeoning area of competition between the two rivals in the Indo-Pacific region. Drone carriers, unmanned ships, and unmanned submersibles are
not the only aspects of science fiction that are quickly becoming a reality, however. Jetpacks are one of the more unusual ways that the US Navy is planning to maintain its maritime edge. Since their inceptions, the Navy and Marine Corps have been designed to work together. Supporting
amphibious operations is one of the Navy's most important missions. One of the ways the Navy is planning to continue with this tradition is by experimenting with jet suits. The jet suits the US Navy and its ally the Royal Navy is experimenting with and can reach speeds of 85 miles per hour and altitudes of 12,000 feet. The US Navy was evidently inspired by the Iron Man movies. The “Iron Man” suits are powered by five gas turbine jet engines and weigh about 75 pounds when they have full tanks. Jet fuel,
diesel, or even kerosene are all acceptable fuels. A test of a similar jet suit by the Royal Marines showed that these devices can be operated with a high degree of precision, enabling a wearer to take off from a speedboat and land on the deck of a much larger vessel. Although these prototype iron man suits are noisy, there would be less of a need for stealth in any real world situation that they’d be used in. If naval combat gets to the point where one side is trying to board the enemy’s ships, stealth is long gone. The iron man suits could also support amphibious operations, with US Naval vessels launching Marines at targeted areas. Imagine hundreds of them storming toward a shore. They would be much
harder to target than helicopters or landing craft. Already, paramedics in Great Britain have used the jet suit to reach difficult places, and firefighters are also interested in the suit’s ability to help them access hard areas rapidly. Though the world isn’t quite ready for it yet, we probably aren’t too far away from a world where swarms of marines decked out in iron man suits will take to the skies at low altitude. Because a naval confrontation between the US Navy and the PLAN would occur in the comparatively confined waters of the First Island Chain and not on the high seas, the iron man suit could prove an effective method of projecting force.
The US Navy remains the world’s premier maritime fighting force, but as China’s wealth and power continues to grow, and as the PLAN continues to modernize, the United States must continue to look for ways to push the envelope, with innovations that we might find hard to believe now. China wants to break out of the First Island Chain and have more of a voice in the waters of the world. The United States wants to contain China within the waters close to its territory. Whoever holds the edge in the technology race will come closest to achieving their respective goal. But what do you think? In a battle between the US and Chinese Navy - who would win? Let us know in the comments and don’t forget to subscribe for more military analysis from military experts.
2023-06-09