US Navy s Plan to Defeat China in War

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China’s navy is catching up to the U.S., but  while China’s naval capability has come a long   way from the Third Taiwan Crisis, its apparent  strength is not all it seems… Here’s why.   Here are two of the most powerful countries in the  world. Both China, the fourth-largest country in   terms of land area, spanning approximately 3.7  million square miles, and the United States,   which is the third-largest country by land  area, covering about 3.8 million square miles,   are major economic powers with substantial global  significance. China has the world's second-largest  

economy with a GDP of approximately $18.1  trillion in 2022. The United States, however,   has the largest economy globally, with a GDP  of about $25.46 trillion in 2022. Ok, so the US   has got China whipped when it comes to land area  size and economic success, but what about military   power? Well, here’s where it gets scary… China aims to position itself as a significant   global military power and has set its sights  on achieving global dominance by 2049.   Right now, China's air force ranks second  globally, just behind the United States,   which possesses the most formidable air  force strength. According to reports,  

the United States operates approximately  10,000 more air platforms compared to China.   In terms of total aircraft strength, China is  listed as having 3,260 aircraft in service,   while the United States boasts an impressive fleet  of 13,233 aircraft. This substantial difference   emphasizes the United States' superior air power  and its larger operational aircraft count.  

But what about sea power? One of the markers of a superpower   is the ability to project maritime power over  long distances. States which have been able   to do so have enormous influence in regional  or world affairs and can exert huge leverage   over their less capable rivals. It is therefore  not surprising that as China’s wealth has grown,   it has invested heavily in its ambitions  to create a blue water navy that it hopes   will one day challenge the US Navy  for supremacy, at least within the   waters of its immediate neighborhood. But how close is China to that goal? What   is the state of US-China strategic competition  at sea and how is the United States planning to   maintain its lead on the world’s waterways? What  technologies and weapons is the US Navy developing   to adapt to the growing power of China’s  People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)?   You may have heard reports that China now has  the world’s largest navy. There are 355 ships   in its fleet as of December 30th, 2021. The  Chinese brass is keen to expand that number.   It plans to increase its fleet size to 420  ships by 2025 and 460 ships by 2030. These  

figures do not cover the additional 85 patrol  combatant ships and other small ships capable   of bearing anti-ship cruise missiles. China’s  countless fishing boats have also acted as a de   facto maritime militia, harassing vessels from  other countries in international waters.   China’s navy has numbers, but here’s  the bad news: it is increasing in   the quality of its ships as well. China was seen putting its new naval muscle   to use in the summer of 2022 following a visit  by then-House Speaker Nancy Pelosi to Taiwan.   For several days after Pelosi left, Chinese ships  and aircraft demonstrated their military potential   in the waters off Taiwan. This show of force  would have been inconceivable 25 years earlier,   in the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995-6.  At that time, when Taiwan was set to hold its  

first direct presidential election and became a  fully-fledged democracy, the Mainland launched   several missiles across the Taiwan Strait,  prompting the United States to send two carrier   battle groups into the area. China had no choice  but to back down in the face of such pressure,   but the Chinese leadership never forgot the  incident. To them, it recalled the “Century of   Humiliation,” a time in the 19th and early 20th  centuries when China repeatedly found itself at   the mercy of foreign powers. Since the Chinese  leadership considers Taiwan a rogue province,  

continued American and allied military support  for the island reminds them of those times.   After the crisis, China resolved to never let  such a scenario happen again and took steps to   increase its naval power. This was a deviation  from the norm. With only a few brief exceptions,   China has never historically been a sea power. It  has traditionally focused its military resources   on maintaining a large army capable of defending  its vast land borders. Up until very recently,   this was the objective of the Chinese brass. However, with China’s continued problems with  

Taiwan and its containment within the natural  barrier of the First Island Chain – a string   of islands off China’s waters which stretch from  Japan to Indonesia, the Chinese leadership decided   that only by becoming a sea power would China take  its rightful place as a true global superpower.   With its growing economic might, especially since  it joined the World Trade Organization in 2001,   China finally had the chance to make  a play for naval prominence.   Included in China’s new naval assets are three  aircraft carriers. China’s naval brass plans   to increase that number and bring its carrier  force up to five by 2030, with more to come   after that. The PLAN also aims to increase  its submarine force by building 10 ballistic   missile submarines by the same year. While China’s naval capability has come   a long way from the Third Taiwan Crisis, its  apparent strength is not all it seems. China  

may have more vessels in its fleets than any other  country, but that is because most of its ships are   still small. Aside from the number of ships,  one way to measure a state’s naval power is   through the combined tonnage of its fleets. Tonnage is the measurement of a ship’s weight.   The PLAN’s total combined tonnage as of 2020  is between 1.8 and 2 million tons. The US Navy,   though, stands at 4.6 million tons. The reason why tonnage matters is because small,  

low quality vessels do comparatively little  in an actual naval confrontation. The United   States could build many more smaller boats  if it wanted to, but it instead focuses on   sturdier vessels with advanced offensive and  defensive weaponry and robust transit options   for Marines to stage amphibious assaults. While many American policymakers have called   for the United States to build more ships and  restore the navy to Cold War-level fleet sizes,   no one in Washington is calling for an imitation  of China’s fleet composition. Small patrol boats   and other irregular craft do the US Navy no  good in its global mission to maintain secure   and free navigation on the world’s oceans. China has closed the tonnage gap since the time  

of the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis,  when the United States had a total   tonnage lead of over four million, but  it still lags significantly behind.   China’s navy has other problems. Two of its  much-publicized aircraft carriers are older   models that use a STOBAR (Short Take-Off But  Arrested Recovery) system to launch its planes.   China’s third aircraft carrier, the Fujian,  uses a more modern catapult system comparable   to those used by the US Navy’s carriers, which  allows it to launch its onboard planes faster.   The Fujian is therefore a significant step  in China’s technological capability.  

However, how would China be able to launch  its planes without pilots to fly them?   China has a serious shortage of trained naval  aviators, and the Fujian and its successors will   add to the stress, both in the number of pilots  these new carriers will demand and in teaching   them how to use the catapult system. Overall, the PLAN is many decades behind   the US Navy’s institutional knowledge and  experience. Case in point: it lacks a fighter   made specifically for training carrier pilots.  The current aircraft of choice is the JL-9G,   a single-engine, twin-seat plane that is  incapable of simulating emergency landings   on a carrier’s flight deck because  it is too light and slow. So far,   the PLAN’s attempts to create an adequate training  aircraft have fallen short of satisfactory.   Establishing programs for cadet naval aviators  has also proven difficult for the PLAN.  

This lack of institutional knowledge and  experience makes sense, given China’s history   and its only recent move toward sea power.  Unfortunately for the Chinese leadership,   institutional knowledge doesn’t  come as easily as new ships do.   China might have made progress at a  rapid pace, but in a confrontation   between carrier groups as they currently  stand, the United States would still have an   overwhelming advantage, for a few reasons. First, the United States has many more advanced  

fourth-generation and fifth-generation fighters  to call upon. America’s arsenal includes not only   carrier-based planes, but land-based F-22s that  would fly from Japan to lend a hand in a real   battle. China’s most advanced fighter on the other  hand, the J-20, cannot be launched from a carrier,   and it is unclear if it can rival America’s  F-22 and F-35 in air-to-air combat.   Meanwhile, upgraded Tomahawk cruise  missiles and submarines would also pose   significant threats to the burgeoning Chinese  carrier force, although we do not have good   knowledge of the extent of China’s electronic  warfare capabilities which could potentially   counter such ship and submarine-fired  missiles if they are advanced enough.   Another area that the PLAN significantly lags  behind the US Navy in is submarines, which was one   of the reasons why Beijing made such a big protest  about the AUKUS submarine sharing agreement.   China currently has a fleet of 56 submarines.  Six of them are ballistic missile submarines  

with payloads capable of reaching the United  States’ homeland. Another six are nuclear-powered   attack submarines. The bulk of the fleet, 44,  are diesel-electric attack submarines.   This is where China’s navy is at its most  pronounced disadvantage and lags the furthest   behind. Experts believe that China’s current  main submarine, the Shang class, is only on   par with 1970s Soviet-era designs, and China has  not invested as much in anti-submarine warfare   as in other parts of its naval buildup.  It has tried to close the gap recently,   equipping its newer surface ships with more  sophisticated sonars. China has also introduced   its new Yu-8 missile-launched torpedo and KQ-200  maritime patrol aircraft. Even so, these are  

comparative baby steps in actually defeating  the formidable American submarine force.   China may also be able to deploy more submarines  in its immediate waters, but it is still at a   severe disadvantage in submarine-to-submarine  warfare. A comparison of the engineering of   the two navies’ underwater vessels will paint  a clearer picture of why the US Navy still has   a decisive advantage in undersea warfare. The United States uses nuclear-powered submarines   which are faster, capable of diving deeper, and  have a longer range than the submarines China   uses. China’s diesel-electric based submarines  have one advantage – when running on electric   power, they are quieter than nuclear submarines.  However, these vessels cannot run on electric   power for long. They have to either surface or pop  up a snorkel to recharge their electric batteries  

and run on diesel power for the duration of that  operation. At that point they are significantly   noisier than nuclear subs, and far more vulnerable  to attack. Meanwhile, nuclear submarines   can stay quiet and deep for months on end. Although the range and duration of operations  

would not necessarily be as important for  the Chinese in a confrontation with the US   Navy because hostile encounters would take place  near Chinese waters, the depth, stealth ability,   and operating times of the American (and allied)  nuclear submarines would help to defeat China’s   strategy of overwhelming enemy naval forces  with a rain of anti-access/area denial ballistic   missiles. These projectiles currently pose  a severe threat to American carrier groups   and surface ships operating too close to China’s  waters. Submarines, on the other hand, are much   harder to detect, and the US Navy’s advantage  in underwater operations allows the United   States to threaten the Chinese mainland. As with aircraft carriers, China intends to build   new next-generation submarines. By 2030, it could  have between 30 and 40 nuclear-powered submarines.   Whether it will have the institutional know-how to  recruit and train competent submariners may be a   more difficult matter to determine. China’s current underwater deficiencies  

notwithstanding, it is still eager to flex  its submarine muscle and has begun keeping   at least one of its nuclear-armed ballistic  missile submarines at sea at all times, with   “near-continuous” patrols into the hotly contested  waters of the South China Sea, making things more   difficult for the United States and its allies and  the waters of the region more dangerous. It is a   sign of what the PLAN seeks for the future. As things stand now, though, China tacitly   acknowledges its disadvantages in maritime warfare  and relies mostly on a defensive strategy to   mitigate the threat that the US Navy poses. At the  heart of this strategy are its various classes of   land-based short and medium-range ballistic  missiles. These missiles, based in mainland   China and on its illegally-built artificial  islands in the South China Sea, pose a serious   threat to American surface ships operating in the  waters of the First Island Chain. Most formidable  

is its vast stockpile of short-range missiles,  effective at distances up to 1,000 kilometers.   The U.S. Department of Defense estimates that  China has between 750 and 1,500 of these, and   they pose a menacing threat to Taiwan and every  American base in Japan and South Korea, too. China   also has between 150 and 450 medium-range and  80 to 160 intermediate-range ballistic missiles,   respectively. These missiles can reach American  ships and assets much further away from China’s   mainland. Some of them are capable of hitting  Guam, the largest base in the region. China is  

currently building more ballistic missiles in an  attempt to exert leverage over progressively more   distant areas of the Indo-Pacific region. Additionally, although the PLAN is not currently   capable of defeating the US Navy in a head-to-head  confrontation, China would have the advantage of   operating near its territory in any real conflict.  No one on either side expects a Midway-style   battle on the high ocean. This reality means  that the American supply lines would be much   longer and more vulnerable to Chinese missile  ballistic attacks – the tyranny of distance.  

China would also be able to concentrate all of  its naval assets in a confrontation with the   United States, where in contrast, the latter has  global commitments. Policymakers and war planners   in Washington have long sought to concentrate  resources in the Indo-Pacific region to counter   China’s expansionism, but bureaucratic and  international resistance have often thwarted   those plans, with Vladimir Putin’s invasion  of Ukraine putting even more pressure for   the United States to maintain military forces in  Europe at high levels. Between these commitments,   China’s sheer number of assets, the tricky supply  situation, and China’s continued buildup in   quality and quantity, the US Navy cannot rely on  maintaining its traditional superiority forever,   and the stakes are getting higher. Many experts  warn that slowly, but surely, the United States   is losing its traditional military advantage in  the Indo-Pacific region, and the cost of victory   in any potential confrontation with China has  become much higher than even a decade ago.   So what is the United States doing to  ensure it keeps its edge at sea in a   time of growing competition? No American naval strategy in the   Indo-Pacific region would come independent of  the considerations of its allies, especially   Japan. So what would be their contributions to the  naval balance of power in the Indo-Pacific?   Japan recently announced that it would spend 2%  of its GDP on defense by 2027, lifting traditional   post-World War II restrictions to build a  military capable of offensive operations.  

A new aircraft carrier, the country’s first since  World War II, is included in those plans. Even so,   decades of minimal defense spending and the loss  of institutional know-how will not be overcome   so easily. Some American policymakers and national  security experts fear that the benefits of Japan’s   renewed commitment to its military will only show  up well after 2027, when China’s capabilities will   be even higher than they are today. Other American allies in the region,   like Taiwan and the Philippines, are not nearly  as capable. South Korea has a strong army,   but is not in a position to play a  robust role in a sea confrontation   with the growing strength of the PLAN. This reality means that the increasingly  

precarious situation will remain intact for  the time being, with the overwhelming share   of the Indo-Pacific’s defense burden  falling on the United States.   One of the items on the US Navy’s immediate  horizon is to arm its Zumwalt-class destroyers   with hypersonic missiles by 2025. Tests  of some ship-fired devices are currently   scheduled for late that year. This weapon, called  the Intermediate-Range Conventional Prompt Strike,   is a non-nuclear missile with a  glide vehicle exceeding Mach 5   and a range over 1,700 kilometers. The US Navy is also experimenting with   ship-fired laser weapons that could act as a much  better line of defense against China’s big arsenal   of ballistic missiles. The Navy received its  first HELIOS (high-energy laser with integrated  

optical-dazzler and surveillance) system in  the third quarter of fiscal year 2022 and has   requested $35 million worth of them in its 2023  budget. The HELIOS system is ideal for countering   anti-ship missiles and can do so cheaply, because  lasers do not require stockpiles of ammunition   which can be expensive to manufacture and  transport. HELIOS instead uses power from   the ship itself and does not require a separate  energy magazine, making each shot extremely cheap.   The US Navy hopes that such cheap laser shots  will one day effectively nullify the much more   expensive missiles they would be targeting. HELIOS is currently designed for integration on   Burke and Arleigh-class ships, but the Navy  is planning to adapt it elsewhere.   Unlike with hypersonic missiles, the United  States currently leads China in laser technology,   but China is proceeding apace with its own plans.  As drones and missiles get more sophisticated,  

laser countermeasures will only be  more important in the future.   The Navy had been experimenting with railguns  – electromagnetic projectile weapons – for more   than a decade, but suspended the program in 2021  in favor of hypersonic missiles. Suspension does   not mean permanent consignment, however, and the  Navy might pick the program back up. Like lasers,  

railguns have the advantage of not needing  to carry as big of an ammunition magazine,   since their projectiles are not launched with  gunpowder or fuel, but electromagnetic power   that can be generated from the host ship. Drones are also set to play a big part in future   naval operations, including drone ships and  submarines, such as the experimental Orca,   which will have a range of 6,500 nautical  miles and be able to run alone for several   months. The Navy plans for Orcas to  be capable of anti-submarine warfare,   with MK-46 or MK-48 heavy torpedoes. They are even  being designed to carry anti-ship missiles.  

Unmanned ships and submarines would at the very  least be expendable targets for China to send its   heavy stockpile of ballistic missiles at, reducing  the high American casualties they would otherwise   cause and permit the United States to grow bolder  as the Chinese deplete their stockpiles. As we   have seen in the war in Ukraine, ammunition  gets depleted quickly in a modern conflict,   ammunition which is often expensive to make,  with its precision instruments and advanced   electronics. Any cheaper drone which can exhaust  China’s advanced munitions would be worth its   weight in gold for the American naval brass. China is also keen on developing unmanned   submersibles, signaling that this will be a  burgeoning area of competition between the two   rivals in the Indo-Pacific region. Drone carriers,  unmanned ships, and unmanned submersibles are  

not the only aspects of science fiction that  are quickly becoming a reality, however.   Jetpacks are one of the more unusual ways that the  US Navy is planning to maintain its maritime edge.   Since their inceptions, the Navy and Marine Corps  have been designed to work together. Supporting  

amphibious operations is one of the Navy's most  important missions. One of the ways the Navy is   planning to continue with this tradition  is by experimenting with jet suits.   The jet suits the US Navy and its ally the  Royal Navy is experimenting with and can reach   speeds of 85 miles per hour and altitudes  of 12,000 feet. The US Navy was evidently   inspired by the Iron Man movies. The “Iron Man” suits are powered by five   gas turbine jet engines and weigh about 75  pounds when they have full tanks. Jet fuel,  

diesel, or even kerosene are all acceptable  fuels. A test of a similar jet suit by the   Royal Marines showed that these devices can  be operated with a high degree of precision,   enabling a wearer to take off from a speedboat  and land on the deck of a much larger vessel.   Although these prototype iron man suits  are noisy, there would be less of a need   for stealth in any real world situation that  they’d be used in. If naval combat gets to   the point where one side is trying to board  the enemy’s ships, stealth is long gone.   The iron man suits could also support amphibious  operations, with US Naval vessels launching   Marines at targeted areas. Imagine hundreds of  them storming toward a shore. They would be much  

harder to target than helicopters or landing  craft. Already, paramedics in Great Britain   have used the jet suit to reach difficult places,  and firefighters are also interested in the suit’s   ability to help them access hard areas rapidly.  Though the world isn’t quite ready for it yet,   we probably aren’t too far away from a world where  swarms of marines decked out in iron man suits   will take to the skies at low altitude. Because a naval confrontation between the US   Navy and the PLAN would occur in the comparatively  confined waters of the First Island Chain and not   on the high seas, the iron man suit could prove  an effective method of projecting force.  

The US Navy remains the world’s premier maritime  fighting force, but as China’s wealth and power   continues to grow, and as the PLAN continues to  modernize, the United States must continue to look   for ways to push the envelope, with innovations  that we might find hard to believe now. China   wants to break out of the First Island Chain  and have more of a voice in the waters of the   world. The United States wants to contain China  within the waters close to its territory. Whoever   holds the edge in the technology race will come  closest to achieving their respective goal.   But what do you think? In a battle between the US  and Chinese Navy - who would win? Let us know in   the comments and don’t forget to subscribe for  more military analysis from military experts.

2023-06-09

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