It was 1976 and as offshore oil drilling was slowly reaching new depths the semi-submersible drilling platforms often referred to as Oil Rigs were also evolving quickly and as with any emerging technology and industry, with considerable hazards but massive rewards for many parties involved. At a reported cost of 120 million dollars, Ocean Drilling and Exploration Co. Inc or ODECO out of New Orleans would commission the world's largest semi-submersible platform of the time period, The Ocean Ranger. Semi-submersibles,
a much more stable platform for drilling, a solution to the drill ship's lack of stability. Don't let the look of these platforms fool you though as often times they're portrayed in media movies and tv all as stationary structures with a foundation reaching all the way to the seabed there are some examples of these, but many times they're semi-submersible marine vessels essentially a ship but with hulls underwater and all you typically see is the superstructure above. Traveling long distances is also no issue being moved via heavy lift ships tugboats and for more local positioning many even have their own propulsion system via thrusters in the hulls, also capable of riding atop the waves at a shallow draft like a surface vessel if necessary. The most common type of semi-submersible drill rig is the rectangular platform atop massive columns that reach down to two hulls or pontoons. The hulls submerged well below the water line maintaining a deep draft with each pontoon divided into multiple massive ballast tanks, their levels of water controlled by the pump room which regulates flow into out of and between them keeping the platform balanced upright and in the worst case scenarios can act as an anti-healing system by design they can maintain a position so deep beneath the water line that when managed properly the platform is inherently much more stable than typical vessels at much shallower draft by comparison making precise operations like steady deep drilling possible laid down by mitsubishi heavy industries out of hiroshima japan in 1976 the mobile offshore drilling unit or modu ocean ranger made its maiden voyage in june of that year taking it from the shipyards of japan to the waters off the alaskan coast the ocean ranger would be the largest at the time at nearly 400 feet in length 262 feet wide and 337 feet high featuring a hella deck crane lifeboats and capacity for up to roughly 100 crew with eight columns atop two pontoons it would be capable of operating in a maximum of fifteen hundred foot depths the approximate deepest of the time period with well drilling operations capable of a maximum 25 000 feet deep into the ocean floor the odeco company also considering it unsinkable moored by 12 45 000 pound anchors each fastened to one length of three and a quarter inch chain and another length of three and a half inch wire rope for redundancy giving this a breaking strength of approximately 1.2 million pounds per anchor mooring laid out
in a pattern radiating outward three to each corner of the platform the chains stored in massive chain lockers at the bases of each four main columns with openings near the top to dispense and retract the chains the vessel operating in many locations like off the coast of ireland the bering sea gulf of alaska the coast of new jersey and more throughout its life in november of 1980 the ocean ranger would arrive in the hibernia oil fields as they're known an oil-rich location off the coast of newfoundland the grand banks area of the north atlantic although this is an incredibly dangerous job no secret there at the same time it's commonly held that these types of platforms are designed specifically to weather even the roughest seas doing so however obviously requires skill and seafaring and more crucially a crew specializing in these platforms unique ballast control systems contracted by mobile oil the platform had been drilling in the hibernia oil field successfully for the past year odeco crew is responsible for the platform and mobile crews responsible for the well and drilling operations with a crew of 84 on board 68 canadian citizens 15 u.s citizens and one british citizen the master captain clarence house a u.s citizen held a master's license of self-propelled vessels but prior to joining odeco in 1981 for the past 10 years had worked in non-mariner positions for previous employers having been assigned to the ocean ranger only on a temporary basis just 19 days prior to february 14th although important to note the master is actually not in command only being responsible for training and supervision of ballast control operations the loading of deck cargo general marine related maintenance and crew safety training odeco and mobile organize these platforms command structure such that the positions of tool pusher and drilling foreman outranked the captain just like so many oil drilling companies are known for many processes certification standards working conditions and just day-to-day operations are often outside of what local provincial or even federal jurisdictions require often making attempts to keep issues or incidents internal or within the company so to speak above the law or above reproach are the phrases that come to mind when discussing many of these major oil companies this culture of course permeating down throughout all ranks the tool pusher the senior most odeco team member and highest ranking officer on board mr kent thompson a u.s citizen with 15 years drilling experience had certifications in well control rig management and other related specializations the drilling foreman a mobile employee there to represent mobile's interest and essentially the tool pusher's mobile oil counterpart mr jack jacobson a canadian citizen with 16 years related drilling experience many crewmen held multiple roles supporting this complex vessel both as an industrial installation and seafaring structure operating in roughly 260 feet of water off the coast of newfoundland the ocean ranger was one of three rigs moored and actively drilling in the hibernia oil field the other two being the 367 foot long zapata ugland roughly 19 miles from the ranger and the 296 foot long said co 706 nine miles away each platform's support ship remaining on standby roughly one to six miles away from their assigned rig the hibernia oil filled nearly 200 miles off the coast near st john's weather forecast by mobile oils newfoundland oceans research and development corporation or nordco predicted that by early a.m sunday
conditions were likely to deteriorate with winds of 60 knots and seas of up to 24 feet on their way due to a disturbance coming northward from the gulf of mexico the disturbance considered weak at first but intensifying rapidly as it approached newfoundland and the grand banks are roughly 35 knots the storm reached the hibernia oil fields by 2 30 a.m sunday february 14 with winds of about 30 knots nothing too concerning at this point the ocean rangers pontoons currently had an approximate 80-foot draft which put the ballast control room at roughly 28 feet above the water line these platforms having instilled such a high level of confidence over the years withstanding many major storms in the past meant drilling operations would continue and remain a priority unless waves reach a magnitude that vertical travel or heave of the vessel exceeds 15 feet it takes an incredibly strong storm to stop drilling essentially ceasing operations being a last resort the winds and swells intensifying throughout the day and the forecast updated at 1 30 pm by nordcode that by 8 30 pm wind speeds would reach 90 knots and swells 35 feet in height along with poor visibility snow and throughout the night swells increasing to upwards of 46 feet more than enough time and forecast for preparations to be made by 6 58 pm after hours of battling worsening conditions the storm living up to predictions the ocean rangers tool pusher kent thompson reported by a satellite phone to jim counts odeco's shore-based drilling superintendent the tool pusher's boss that the ranger had ceased drilling operations and disconnected as the winds had reached 65 knots with the platform heaving to upwards of 22 feet the other platforms disconnecting earlier ceasing drilling operations a few hours prior the ranger having demonstrated in the past its capability of continued drilling and weather conditions too severe for its smaller counterparts before now having disconnected due to weather only once in its 5-year lifespan standard procedure also dictated rigs d ballast and raised their draft five feet or more after disconnecting in severe weather a procedure that the ocean ranger was discovered later to have also never followed in fact on february 6 just over a week prior the platform suddenly began to list six degrees to port when taking on fuel from its supply ship six degrees and a structure like this is significant taking on fuel from the supply ship the ballast control operator on duty at the time was relieved by the ship's master captain house midway through the process captain house for some reason when attempting to pump out tank 14 assuming for balancing while fuel filled tank 12 instead switched its c chest valve to the wide open position the valve that opens tank 14's fill directly to the surrounding ocean water filling it rapidly the six degree list was so concerning and happened so suddenly much of the crew had started prepping at lifeboat stations senior ballast control operator rathbun called from his bunk to resolve the situation quickly realized the issue took over for captain house and corrected it this narrowly averted disaster raised red flags with odeco superintendent jim counts who agreed with the ocean rangers tool pusher kent thompson the captain house was unfit for his position aboard the platform captain house agreeing as well as he reportedly didn't even want to be there anyway however no parties would take action to replace him in the near future further enforcing the impression that odeco had been filling this position and potentially others like it with temporary figureheads only to comply with u.s coast guard regulations at roughly 7 pm sunday february 14th the sedco 706 was hit by a massive wave even larger than those already battering the oil field that day at 70 to 80 feet high this wave was high enough to even wash over the top of their helidek destroying a small shed on the platform and tearing away multiple pieces of equipment it also caused damage to one of the sedco's longitudinal beams underneath the platform a major structural element and thus the sedco debalasted raising their draft from 80 feet to 75 ft and would ride out the storm the zapata ugland also hit by a similar wave at roughly the same time was quote jarred severely but did not sustain any considerable damage at roughly 7 45 pm the ocean ranger was struck by a similarly large wave but sustained what the crew perceived was only minor damage the ballast control room on the ranger about 28 feet above the water line in its current configuration utilized four portholes also known as port lights for viewing outside conditions and more importantly the vessel's only visual cue as to its draft depth the draft markings on each of the four corner columns this was essentially the operator's draft gauges using a search light to eliminate the markings at night porthole number four had been shattered imploded into the control room from the force of this monster wave each porthole containing a deadlight cover for use during rough conditions closing and fastening these steel plates ensures portholes don't become an entry point for water if compromised however there were no standing orders policies or training in place for their use on the ocean ranger or biodeco in general by this time and they were fully opened at the time of impact only being closed after the damage was done if at all regardless of the deadline covers investigators concluded these portholes should be able to withstand such forces and the ballast control room's position combined with these weak portholes was a fatal flaw in the rake's design water from the massive wave blasted into the ballast control room via porthole 4 and all over the valve control panel the control panel not made to be watertight however operators in their superiors showed little concern with nearby supply ships overhearing the ocean rangers two-way radio chatter first from senior ballast operator mr wrath button that the panel is wet working on it and getting shocks off of it had the cover off high powered cables in here and replies from tool pusher ken thompson we'll get some guys in there and get it cleaned up don't get anybody injured or killed they're damaged soon after updates from rathbun everything is fine and we're picking up glass mopping up water tidying up cleaning up water and broken glass another voice a few moments later all valves on the port side were opening by themselves there are valves operating or closing or opening witnesses overhearing these conversations on the supply ship radios were conflicted as to their exact times nor did they realize their significance in the moment as they were understandably preoccupied with the safety of their own vessels in the ongoing hurricane force conditions along with the control room's ship based communications equipment being rendered inoperable the reason they were now using two-way radios to communicate with other areas of the vessel the ballast control panel had also been either fried due to water soaking it inside and out or power was otherwise cut to some portions of it by personnel to prevent electrical hazard either way it was inoperable with only a few indicator lights left flashing judging by the conversations overheard the only way for personnel to get the impression that quote valves were opening and closing on their own would be via the indicator lights left flashing on the control board back and forth from red to green and vice versa at 8 45 pm while these events transpired drilling foreman second in command on the ranger and mobile representative mr jack jacobson had a 14 minute long conversation via the satellite phone with mobile's shore based superintendent mr graham amidst this conversation jacobson reported 50-foot high seas and that a port light had been broken in ballast control but that it was not causing any problems and all equipment was functioning normally further cementing into evidence the fact that no one on board the ranger saw it as anything more than a minor inconvenience at 9 pm the ocean rangers supply ship the seaforth highlander roughly 7 miles from the platform at this point received a transmission from the rig inquiring as to the supply ship's status in the storm but giving no signs that they were having issues in any way around this same time the crew had decided to cut power and air supply completely to the console and possibly entire control room when power and compressed air are lost in a system like this valves are forced closed for safety with the pontoon valves closed and power cut to the console the ocean ranger in this state while not ideal is presumed by investigators and those with knowledge in the industry to have been more than capable of riding out the storm at 11 30 pm rick flynn mobile oil shore based radio operator received the regularly expected weather update transmission from the ocean rangers weather observer reporting weather conditions and nothing else nothing to indicate the vessel was experiencing anything of concern however for some unknown reason shortly before 1 am the crew on board the ranger decided to restore air and power to the console it's thought to start affecting repairs either by causing inadvertent short circuits or otherwise tinkering with the controls the inexperienced and untrained crew caused the valves and the bowel pontoon tanks to open immediately flooding the chambers until the vessel reached a 10 to 15 degree bowel heavy list the crew too inexperienced to operate the ballast system and problem solve this now potentially fatal condition even if the control system was working well enough to perform these actions on top of this the list was reaching a degree that some investigators concluded the bow tanks were reaching a point of no return and even in ideal conditions the pumps wouldn't have been strong enough to shift the water and right the vessel as a last-ditch effort a crewman suggested inserting a set of brass actuating rods that had been left in the control room these rods only used for testing while under construction and left on board by mistake when inserted into the control panel solenoids they served only as a way to override all their inputs and force each corresponding pontoon tank valve wide open regardless of switch states this erroneous action was performed as none of the crew involved were experienced enough to protest the decision with the storm still raging outside and waves still massive this list would lower the bowel columns to a height in which the tallest waves could begin pouring their force into the anchor's wide open chain locker quickly filling the voids below another fatal flaw in design and primary link in this chain of failures at 1 am after attempting to call mobile oil's shore base mr graham at his home in st john's to declare an emergency drilling foreman jack jacobson was unable to reach him due to atmospheric interference his call would be relayed via another mobile onshore rep rick flynn via satellite yeah yeah just a second ocean ranger jack are you there why the initial distress call was made only by a private sat phone and only to colleagues rather than 24-hour monitored distress frequencies that would go out to all ships and authorities within range no one will ever know five minutes later at 105 am the rangers standby and supply ship seaforth highlander now approximately eight miles away received a transmission from the ranger requesting it come to a close standby the highlander still unaware of any serious situation asked what the problem was the responding voice seeming reluctant i am requesting to tell you by the mobile foreman that we are listing badly at 109 am a distressed telex message similar to a text message was received by a merisat operator in connecticut mirasat being the satellite phone and telex system these companies were using in the area this message since it seemed to be one of distress was relayed immediately to the us coast guard anyhow however from the royal commission report little warning was given to the mobile oil shore base in fact when the telex went out for help at 109 am it was not in a proper format to depict the urgency of the situation since the word mayday was not used the telex which had no addressee went out of necessity to the marisat operator in connecticut who after checking with the ocean ranger directed it to the u.s coast guard in new york who later phoned it to rcc halifax time would have been saved if the telex had been addressed to rcc halifax the joint rescue coordination center in halifax one minute later ocean ranger radio operator ken blackmore contacted mobile's shore based operator rick flynn once again and requested flynn transmit a mayday call on behalf of the ocean ranger by 1 22 a.m the oil rigs cedco 706 and sapada ugland ordered their supply vessels the bolton
door 15 miles away and norder tor 20 miles away to proceed to the ranger and assist the final transmission from the ocean ranger at 1 30 am radio operator ken blackmore again phones mobile oils shore offices informs them the crew is going to lifeboat stations and requests another may day be sent on their behalf under ideal conditions rescue helicopters were now over an hour and a half away and in the current weather potentially unable to get airborne at all the nearest vessel the ranger's own standby ship the seaforth highlander was steaming towards the platform but still roughly seven miles out the weather not helping to speed up this process either the list now exceeding 15 degrees waves crashing over the bow and the storm's still at full force it's presumed based on the final call the vessel was suddenly and hastily abandoned at 1 30 am the circumstances of the abandonment just as mysterious as the lack of urgency and radio calls this degree of list was such that all lifeboats were either extremely hazardous or impossible to use the bow lifeboat with the bow essentially in the water would have been either underwater or destroyed unusable the two stern lifeboats would have been clearly a dangerous if not deadly fall due to the ocean ranger's tilted condition obvious even to the untrained attempting their use and the life rafts on the upper deck determined to have been completely useless at night anyway due to the ongoing weather conditions and water temperatures most importantly though the ocean ranger was not equipped with survival suits absolutely crucial for evacuation in waters this cold and weather this deadly mist and spray from waves freezing in mid-air it was so frigid without the suits of protection from the water and elements hypothermia setting in after just seconds while the rangers list was slowly worsening it wasn't happening instantly and the rig would end up floating in this state for nearly an hour and a half before ultimately capsizing completely the apathetic attitudes by multiple crewmen in the face of crisis even up to the final call about heading to lifeboat stations yet as rescue efforts and investigations would prove a final seemingly panic induced sudden abandonment with clothing later found ranging from light pork clothes orange work suits to pajamas suggesting to investigators a sort of sudden panic induced confusion amongst all on board as the seaforth highlander approached the ocean ranger still floating in the same state became visible roughly half a mile away at about 2 11 am however several white light beacons could be seen off the briggs port beam some distance from the platform the highlander approached the area where these were emanating and found the lights were attached to life preservers floating on the surface life preservers that were empty the ship was now only about 1200 feet from the ocean ranger with it clearly in sight and still afloat when captain duncan noticed a flare fired into the air off their starboard bow it was approximately 2 14 am at this time and then at 221 a second flare from the same location when the lifeboat originated from briefly came into view in what authorities would later describe as miraculous crewman aboard the ocean ranger had been able to deploy one of its stern lifeboats successfully captain duncan however noticed it was riding very low in the water and at 1200 feet away he would maneuver the seaforth highlander to intercept the lifeboat once in range four deckhands went out onto the aft deck and made preparations with what few tools they had available the lifeboat however now clearly visible showed signs of serious damage it had holes on both sides of its hull from stem to gunnel the men aboard the highlander could see survivors aboard vigorously bailing water and a man in the aft hatch steering as the lifeboat was still somehow moving under its own power the seas though were still not giving way with swells exceeding 60 feet in height and winds still 60 to 70 knots the spray freezing all around as the waves crashed all over the aft deck captain duncan bravely maneuvering the highlander stern first into the storm in order to approach the lifeboat without ramming it and let the lifeboat drift towards them by 2 32 am duncan reported having the lifeboat alongside finally positioned on their port side where they needed it in order to effect rescue the deckhand is now able to see lights and movement inside and some men still bailing out water as it poured in despite their proximity though the deckhands and survivors were unable to hear each other yet through the seas storm and heaving vessels a rope thrown to the man steering in the aft hatch was caught successfully and he attached it securely to a handrail on the lifeboats canopy deckhand jorgensen tying his end to the crash rail on the supply ship a second rope with a life ring was successfully thrown and attached to the bow of the lifeboat by another survivor then it too tied off on the supply ship eight to ten of the thirty plus men aboard began emerging from the hatches but stood on the lifeboats port side gunnel the men were still wearing their hard hats and a handful wearing life preservers and heavier clothing while others were very lightly clothed and still don their work vests all clothing completely unsuited to survival in such conditions the lifeboat now began rolling towards its port side slowly away from the supply ship and within an instant capsized tossing the men standing outside into the violent freezing sea and snapped the lines attached to the seaforth highlander the deckhands leapt into action throwing lines into the water and intended to launch a life raft towards the scattered survivors some life preserver beacons now lit they were clearly visible but the life-raft lines were frozen solid and it took some time to cut free by the time the raft reached them they were completely immobilized by hypothermia unable to board the raft or grab lines in the water well within their reach captain duncan maneuvered again to within 50 or so feet of the capsized lifeboat still attempting rescue if any remained on board also keeping the other supply ships apprised of the situation of survivors in the water supply ship bolton tour had arrived at approximately 2 45 a.m and made visual contact with the ocean ranger approaching the rig closely and inspecting with their searchlights but there was no signs of life or other lifeboats the second of the two stern lifeboats was no longer attached either the seaforth highlander and bolton tour joining up to try and recover the wayward capsized lifeboat now roughly a mile and a half downwind from the stricken platform the platform lifeboat soon to be out of their sight as they gave chase as the supply ship norter tour was approaching the ocean ranger its captain allingham was watching the radar closely when at 3 am radar contact with the rig was completely lost two small blips and appeared briefly at the riggs location presumably the inverted pontoons and disappeared soon thereafter this information was relayed to mobile oils shore offices at about 3 38 a.m with the captains of the vessels assuming it would be forwarded on to search and rescue officials currently mobilizing it would not end up being relayed until 7 35 am however leading rescue authorities in the meantime to operate under the assumption the rig was still upright and proceeding as rescue crews often do as if survivors are still aboard to be rescued the three supply ships by 3 40 am had joined up to continue the rescue effort coordinating their search developing drift plots and concentrating downwind from the ocean ranger's last position however recovering any victims they encountered in the water was proving nearly impossible in the current conditions the first rcc rescue capable helicopter wouldn't be able to take off until 4 15 a.m and oil company helicopters arrived on scene at 4 35 am but were not rescue capable attempting to aid the supply ships only as extra eyes however with the storm raging and ceilings as low as three to six hundred feet comprised of mixed rain and snow the helicopters attempted to search but visibility was near zero over 70 feet and anywhere below this altitude put them at grave risk due to massive waves still reaching these heights below later in their search as the supply ships had spread out to cover more area at 7 00 am the northern tour spotted a capsized lifeboat with a seaforth highlander life ring attached to it after several unsuccessful attempts to recover it captain allingham on their final attempt observed roughly 20 lifeless bodies still strapped inside several bodies suddenly floated out through a gash in the bow one of them washing over the aft deck of the northern tour and was successfully recovered captain allingham stating the lifeboat eventually disappeared into the waves and most likely sank this would be the first of only 22 victims eventually recovered from the ocean ranger with all 84 souls aboard lost the rig however wasn't done taking lives the ocean ranger sank inverted into 260 feet of water crushing the oil derrick tower in the process keep in mind the information of how these events transpired and all the details that unfolded was only pieced together after a years long investigation by multiple agencies canada's royal commission the ntsb the us coast guard and the nearby areas in newfoundland devastated with odeco and their legal team pushing back all along the way on that same morning monday february 15 1982 the storm still raging many search and rescue resources suddenly had to be diverted as the mechanic terezov a roll-on roll-off general cargo vessel of soviet flag was stricken in the nearby area by the same storm and sank at about 5 am with 32 souls lost with only 100 feet of clearance between the bottom of the pontoons and water surface now the sunken ocean ranger was considered a shipping hazard and the decision was made to relocate it further out deeper at sea two divers prepping the pontoons to be floated with cutting and welding tools were killed in a sudden explosion and a week later one more diver was killed reportedly from an object mistakenly dropped at the surface above eventually the platform would be floated towed and buried further out at sea successfully this disaster was down to a number of factors both large and small like severe weather breakdown and chain of command the ocean ranger's flaws and design like chain lockers portholes and other aspects of the ballast control room lack of training and safety by oil rig owners and contractors lack of specific regulation in an industry that was overtly taking advantage of inattentive governments an industry-wide culture of being above the law the list goes on and many changes in safety training and methods would come about as a result of this monumental tragedy a very poignant memorial was unveiled in the city of saint john's in july of 1985 the immortal supporters on patreon get 100 ad-free access to all of these videos and help keep the channel going and a special thank you goes out today to those top tier supporters alex jenny jeremy kat and nathan thanks so much for watching everyone and take care
2022-02-08