A Technological Fix The Adoption of Chinese Digital Surveillance Products in Africa

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okay I think we can begin so welcome  everyone to our Law Tech talk here   hosted by the Law and Technology Centre  I am Marcelo Thompson. I teach here   at the Faculty of Law in the area of law  and technology, regulation of technological   platforms, and I'm most excited to welcome  our speaker for today's talk Mr. Bulelani Jili, who is joining us right now from Kenya where he's conducting his   research. Mr. Bulelani is currently  in Kenya but he is doing uh finalizing his   doctorate uh doctoral work as a PhD fellow at Harvard University where he focuses   on Africa-China relations and issues in this realm from a technological perspective   issues concerning cyber security, development,  ICT development uh internet policy, business law   more generally a law in development and Privacy  Law uh Bulelani is also a visiting fellow at Yale   law school, a fellow at the Atlantic Council, a  cyber security fellow at the Belfer Center, uh   and he's conducting his research in affiliation  also with the China law development project at   Oxford University I see Bulelani has a much more  extensive CV which you can uh surely find   online with reference to his work uh  but I think this is hopefully a good  introduction already to his work and in areas of interest   Bulelani is going to be talking to us about surveillance initiatives in Africa casting a different light on the topic and explaining the dynamics that underpin the   adoption of surveillance to surveillance  in China. The title of his talk is "A   technological fix the adoption of Chinese digital  surveillance products in Africa" so Bulelani is going to speak for let's say 40-45 minutes or a bit less depending on   how much he wants to extend the discussion  but then we are going to open for discussions   with the audience and I'm very thankful for all of  you who are joining us today and I will ask you to   please feel free to send your questions on the  chat for us to engage with them later on   so without further ado let me give Bulelani a  warm welcome thank you very much for joining us Bulelani thank you so much for having me  firstly you know I would like to kind   of thank uh all the organizers of the event  uh those who are within the law school and   beyond the law school and I would also like to  extend my appreciation to the audience members   who are willing to take the time out of their  day to participate in today's discussion and as   stated already that you know a greatly welcome all  questions um you know both uh novel and also old   um uh as we kind of really attempt to kind of  really dissect the general uh nature of the   distribution of Chinese surveillance  technologies into the global South   in summary um you know today's argument  and really contention is interested in   exploring the both the proliferation but also  the adoption of Chinese surveillance Tools in   African countries I'll be mostly relying on kind  of two cases um Kenya and Ethiopia and the trends   um of this uh proliferation I argue really are  contingent on three factors uh China's diplomatic   strategy in the global South um it's technological  ambitions and the kind of growing corporate reach   and power of uh China's major technological  firms and lastly but most importantly   um African uh domestic demand factors and so  in some sense you could argue that both supply   and demand factors are really contributing  to the proliferation and then adoption of   surveillance tools and today's uh discussion  is then really uh organized around three main   points that I would like to kind of get across  uh firstly the reasons behind the driving of   the adoption of digital infrastructure including  surveillance Technologies is really contingent   on the particularities of local environments  which will be further exploded with discussion   um and then also how exactly these systems are  being employed by State and substate actors so how   exactly you know Kenyan authorities South African  or Ethiopian authorities are going about adopting   and then applying these systems will kind of come  out clearly and then lastly what are some of the   local challenges that emerges from the adoption  of these systems particularly in kind of legal   environments that are not necessarily prepared  both for the mass scale of surveillance which then   kind of engender domestic challenges around both  data protection and privacy and so to be clear   um this talk focuses on the procurement and  Adoption of systems it does not presume the   party States exceptional nature and the  distribution of surveillance tools will   seek to obfuscate the broader international market  for surveillance tools and cyber intrusive systems   which involve multiple Western and non-western  actors um rather you know this inquiry into the   proliferation of Chinese public systems in some  sense is really an attempt to understand both   the party States and kind of private firms  geopolitical footprints in the global South   um and uh much of you know beijing's kind of  significant foreign policy activity is now   taking place on the continent and in my broader  work I actually argue that um Africa in many ways   is functioning as the theater or the training  ground for an emerging superpower and drawing   attention to Chinese activity on the continent  in some sense might give us um a prognosticating   mechanism to think more carefully about you know  how China will conduct foreign policy more broadly   um as things uh continue and so accordingly you  know um this investigation into the spread of   digital surveillance Tools in Africa then offers  us a grounded sense for making examinations into   how the party States both Ambitions and corporate  formativities are entangled and are critically   in many ways mediated by local  state and substate access   and so the talk and more broadly my work then  aims to expand and extend our understanding of   kind of local and Global risks like come with  the adoption in these systems while providing   um really greater insights into the kind of client  decision-making processes um which I believe is   kind of critically understudied and examined  in a kind of General uh literature um um and   I should also preface this General uh comment  on the general nature of current discussions   around uh you know Chinese surveillance tools  um really I'd say um across the literature but   also in some uh key policy discussions the general  predilection is to presume uh Chinese intentions   um around the application and Adoption of systems  in the global South um those discussions I think   a keenly marked with presumptions about Notions  of backdoor access or a kind of brand strategy   uh that is interested in further diminishing  say U.S influence in the global South and so   uh while those are kind of key presumptions uh  that my work speaks against and alongside it   it's not directly challenged or worked through  within this presentation but if people wish   to have a kind of more clinical examination  into those kind of presumptions I open it up   um as a possibility of discussion specifically  in the Q a but the presentation thus far is in   some sense uh about grounding our discussion in  a in local context so that way you know uh we   can in some sense align our facts and then kind of  have um a more robust theoretical discussion later   um and so in some sense the size and then the  scope of this talk you know does not in many ways   um permit an exhaustive review of the  global ecosystem of surveillance systems   and proliferation instead as indicated you  know uh primary attention is given to the   both the spread and then the adoption of these  systems in local contexts and the example of   Kenya has been precisely being selected to help  explore how China's growing cyber Footprints   is mediated by local States uh actors and  how how China's diplomatic engagement and   corporate expansion is consistently uh  in dialectical relation with the local   the case of Kenya in particular has been selected  uh not simply because uh of uh the fact of much   of my work being uh conducted in Kenya is that uh  Kenya uh has thus far received the largest number   of ICT loans from Beijing uh in fact Kenya and  Ethiopia the last two really three decades in fact   um have received consistent attention uh as  relates to ICT development from Beijing and   so they become the easiest places both to trace  the involvement of Chinese firms but also of   the party's involvement in the supporting  of Developmental initiatives around the   intersections of development and ICT what is also  most interestingly is that both of them also offer   us an interesting contrast of political and legal  systems um you know Kenya is considered to be   you know a relatively healthy democracy juxtaposed  to Ethiopia who has a more kind of closer system   and it is a diversity political systems that  also then helps us to think more carefully   about exactly how Beijing engages with the  local um in contrasting political environments   um and more importantly um you know I believe that  the talk um in some sense is both a commitment   and an emphasis on kind of African religion  recognizing its salience as a way to kind of go   beyond both myopic representations both of Africa  as a passive recipient and partner in Africa   China relations and so the kind of inquiry is is  really about trying to find activity where it's   been consistently under locked or overlooked um  or simply um ignored so when you we are looking   at uh current work and this includes uh media  coverage um you know uh most discussions about   the distribution of Chinese surveillance tools  and availability platforms consistently you know   scrutinizes uh China's diplomatic activities and  would then ask us questions about the degree to   which the party state with the aid of course of  private firms which is a presumption enables uh   digital autocratic practices across the global  South um you know these accounts you know   speculate um on the level of coordination between  Beijing and its corporate actors uh while the   degree of coordination cannot be empirically fixed  or established Financial incentives in the form   of loans and Aid are used to support African State  procurements and the proliferation of surveillance   tools and so majority of the general discourse  around the space consistently uses uh loans as The   Leverage points but also the beginning point of  how to understand uh beijing's influence um in the   context of Africa but more broadly actually across  the global South as a girl and so accordingly   um several interconnected economic  policies and initiatives that help   um Chinese firms gain overseas infrastructure  development experience are also primary sites of   consideration uh obviously the most prominent one  is the uh go out strategy or of 1995 and much of   a general literature also focuses on this point  as another point of considerable consideration   when we're thinking about beijing's um consistent  activity uh across the global South obviously this   policy in particular was really about Surplus  Capital being lent abroad to create novel   commercial opportunities um for Chinese firms and  the goal of assisting the internationalization of   domestic firms was a part about improving Chinese  brand recognition globally easing Fierce domestic   competition and then exploiting commercial  opportunities made available in part by the   absence of U.S investments in Africa and so the  kind of the time Horizon for this for people to  

really consider is really from about 1995 things  to really honestly to the uh years of the uh early   years of the Trump Administration um which had  a kind of um really a pragmatic shift in terms   of U.S policy on Africa where they moved away from  uh Aid to trade which was the kind of the tagline   um of the Trump Administration and the  kind of the Biden Administration is   um really continued with this line and in some  sense has tried to say uh that we will now be   consistently competing uh with China on the  African continent which you know foreshadows   generally a heating cold war between kind  of both International stakeholders which   again you know um it's worth kind of uh dissecting  and you know I hoped kind of expect some questions   around that line um in the kind of the Q and A  um and so you know while China's surveillance   systems uh are mostly you know confined to its  National borders uh the private firms then make   its surveillance architecture possible or selling  some of these tools to an African customer base   uh more specifically you know firms uh like  Huawei have initially worked to expand internet   connectivity in a country like kenyam but in 2014  they also began selling their Smart City products   um and so huawei's initial involvement in  Kenya has already stated began simply with   internet connectivity activities which  is really something of the early 2000s   um at the time Kenya didn't have a significant  degree of connectivity and Huawei was able to   provide some of the kind of fiber optic cable  infrastructure that was necessary to begin the   digitization process of the Kenyan markets and  then consistently provided support both at the   level of both software and then later on firstly  with hardware and then later on software um and   now you know um Huawei is consistently uh provided  uh infrastructure like Cloud infrastructure which   has become really the kind of the linchpin of much  of the kind of the Kenyan e-government initiatives   and so proponents you know of this move uh  argue that you know public security systems uh   particularly in the context of Kenya provide vital  intelligence to authorities uh who are also acting   as a kind of a deterrent to kind of criminal  activity uh and so that's the the general line   uh of reasoning uh behind uh the adoption of smart  City surveillance systems in the context of Kenya   um uh that is stakeholders both at the level  of the nation-state but also uh substate   actors mostly at the city level um again what is  usually lost in some of these General discussions   is that uh procurement and is taking both at the  national level but also at sub National levels   mostly at the city level where majority of these  systems are being adopted and then installed and   so if you look if you listen to the voices of  say people like Adam Lane who's the deputy CEO   and of government Affairs at Huawei Kenya he  consistently Echoes this General sentiment by   contending and here I quote authorities can  now conduct uh paramedic video surveillance   of nairobi's urban center as well as maintain a  highly agile command and dispatch setup that runs   on satellite-based GPS and software-based  geographic information systems end quote   um and so and so yet you know this sanguine  Outlook does not account for or some of the real   risks of exacerbating established problems like  the misuse of public security systems and debt   stress levels these are obviously two really  kind of key issues at the local level at one   level there's been consistent documentation  of the exploitation of uh you know public   security systems specifically against kind  of political dissidents that example is not   heavily featured in the context of Kenya but is in  its neighboring countries including Ethiopia and   Uganda and another obviously Paramount General  issue is the level of debt stress levels obviously   uh stop being particularly covered yet in the  stock but I definitely open it up to kind of   conversations in the Q a um debts between Africa  and China in some sense has now become one of the   kind of key uh threadlines of discourse um and  Kenya like um almost every other African country   um has a level of debt uh that is in some  sense both worrying but has also been a   general feature of its relations both between  the global North and South but also now between uh South South kind of um relation um and  so continuing with uh with the talk you know   surveillance Tools in some sense in the context  of Kenya uh are then really enlisted uh by the   Kenyan government's primarily as a means to kind  of scale public security capabilities uh National   Security prerogatives and then data security  um the adoption of surveillance tools is made   possible through the sale of Chinese equipment  and soft loans from the China Axiom bank which are   crucial in making the public security platforms  both financially reachable for Nairobi as well as   for other African governments including Uganda  and Ethiopia and so beyond you know companies   like Huawei Chinese companies like vision and  others are also involved in the adoption of   digital surveillance systems in Africa and what is  quite clear is that much of Africa's surveillance   systems are not you know a commitment of Simply  coordination say between Huawei and um and   Beijing but rather the hodgepodge assemblage of  multiple kind of systems that are being procured   from multiple uh private vendors and in 2012 you  know the Kenyan government for example awarded   um Nanjing information technology which is a  kind of a high-tech provider that offers Urban   traffic management and urban governance tools  attender to supply digital surveillance cameras   um the goal of this initiative again was  to augment public security and Intelligent   Traffic Management Systems in downtown Kenya um  and you know according uh to official figures   um the platform cost the government  about 3.8 million US Dollars   um you know the initial uh date of completion  was about uh 2013 um however uh due to delays uh   the project was only completed in April 2014. um  constant power shortages and access to privately   owned buildings for installation purposes were  the Cardinal reasons for uh delays um no less   important the adoption plan for these tools did  not include corresponding data protection measures   to promote uh and maintain privacy rights  rather inadequate planning was done really   before the start of the program which presaged  the delays and then the data policy omissions   and so while Chinese firms promise a technological  fix to traditional problems like say Public Safety   and State security which is made most evidently  clear in some of the promotional materials   that they hand over to the kind of African  government counterparts they really under   deliver in those areas um more pronouncedly  journalistic investigations and digital   rights organizations have consistently raised  concerns about cyber security threats uh digital   surveillance and biometric data collection by  these Chinese surveillance tools these groups   contend that the ubiquitous and under regulated  use of these Technologies in the context of   global South really threatens privacy rights and  needless to say the adoption of digital tools   without robust institutional checks and balances  they believe render citizens more vulnerable to   State surveillance and suppression and it is this  gap between the novel uh digital uh technological   adoption and Regulatory Frameworks of adoption  that then creates the emergence of risks a point   you know that I hope to kind of further elaborate  on as you know both as a talk continue use but   also as a part of the Q a because that's really  where some of my most Salient work I believe um   it's really uh tracking which is the gaps between  the adoption of systems um and the absence of kind   of regulatory Frameworks currently available  in the context both of Kenya but also other   uh Global South countries and so China's you know  oversized role in kind of uh Africa's ICT markets   um and genders a dependency on their products  and expertise uh uh if you're looking really   continentally for example about 70 of Africa's  ICT infrastructure capabilities is built by Huawei   Alone um and then the the rest of the involvement  is really from other kind of Chinese private firms   and so you know digital public security systems  uh are embedded within States driven processes   that are kind of contingent on some of these kind  of public private Ventures um they arrive under   the banner of digital development uh and in some  sense they're really a continuation of and already   established trend of ICT development projects  across uh the global South but in this case in   particular in Kenya and the use and effectiveness  of these tools though nominally operated by and   for the purposes of the Kenyan government are  heavily Reliant also on Chinese contractors to   operate the public security platforms uh in fact  an audits done in 2018 by the auditor General's   office found that uh senior staff sent over by the  Kenyan government to China to learn how to operate   some of these public security systems in fact  do not acquire the necessary training um instead   the staff spend time inspecting the parts of the  system to be delivered and during that visit no   attempts were really made to learn or teach how to  operate the system and for this reason questions   remain about Kenya's means to operate and maintain  its public security systems and what is more the   technical matters having to do with the upkeep of  the system I'll then also managed by contractors   the national uh police commission who are tasked  with the response ability of operating the system   here locally had not developed really the capacity  to even work the control room and so to exasperate   these matters the manual language of the control  room was in fact in Chinese in the early years   um and most kind of kind of Kenyan civil servants  um you know use English as usually the kind of   language of General instruction and so most of  the digital surveillance cameras installed within   say uh nairobi's Central business district  have also stopped working months after they   were installed and what is even more worrying  is that they were limited security protocols   for accessing the system um this unfortunate  circumstances then also increase the possibility   of unauthorized access or the launching of uh  malicious code on the server by unwarranted   um users and so these are some of the really  current challenges um with this system here   and so the you know uh the lack of evidence that  approves the public security system's ability to   truncate crime does not get to the promotion of  the public security platform thus far in Kenya   uh for example uh just using the example of Huawei  again you know about a stock they've installed   about 9 000 cameras uh also in the CBD area of  Nairobi which supports about 195 police stations   um and yet within those given areas of the  adoption of those systems um crime rates have kind   of continued to rise and so really there's no way  in which one could in the most simple sense really   draw direct correlation between the adoption  of public security systems and the reduction of   crime yet you do see a growing nature of General  challenges in the procurement of these systems   um and so in fact in the case you know of of  Kenya but also you know in the case of other   African countries this has become um say an  obvious Trend at least to some of us who are   you know carefully looking into some of the  general Prime data that's being made available   by the National Police Services uh you know  I've I've consistently tried to ask actually   the National Police Services if they're willing  to have an interview about this General challenge   that they've generally kind of refused to kind  of have a conversation about it but um Adam Lane   uh again the deputy CEO of government Affairs at  Huawei Kenya has consistently circumvented some   of these concerns by simply contending um that  Huawei quotes uh huawei's role is to develop   install deploy and maintain the technology  according to the requisite and request of   the National Police Service and the National  Police Service is responsible for operating it   and using it according to their policies which  are in line with the national law end quote   um this framing I argue is rather reductive  if not completely misleading it rests somewhat   simplistically on an All or Nothing approach to  the responsibility of challenges and some negative   outcomes of the adoption of these systems the  argument obviously draws attention to the behavior   of the National Police which I think is important  and some of my above comments have already but it   really says nothing about the consequences of the  sale of these systems or whether regulations are   necessary to mitigate negative outcomes although  it is obviously true that the adoption of these   systems has scaled the state's capabilities  both to so they are citizens but also to Target   citizens and so I believe that this Frame then  really obfuscates systematically some of the   activities that companies have been involved uh in  involved with in doing underground and also simply   then blaming the National Police Service while  not necessarily also looking into how some of the   general challenges are also connected with their  own kind of personal activity um on the continent and so in thinking about some of the local  challenges would you know like to you know   spend some time thinking about some of the data  protection laws that are currently available in   the context of Kenya Kenya currently has  a data protection act uh really since 2019   um and then there was a data commissioner who was  then later installed in 20 in 2020 and really the   data protection act aims to manage and protect  data once it is acquired processed and stored um   the country's Constitution sees privacy obviously  as a fundamental right and as it stands there are   no kind of clear regulations as to how for example  Kenya's biometric databases or facial recognition   technologies will be used or how the data will be  vetted there are no means to audit the algorithms   that empower the facial recognition technologies  that have been installed across the city and   including the airports and in November you know  the appointment of the data commissioner has not   resulted in kind of the kind of consistent rollout  of means of regulating uh some of the both kind of   digital and non-digital surveillance cameras that  have been kind of installed across narrow beam   and so thus far it seems as though that there  are no real clear plans to deal with uh kind of   the growing nature of surveillance uh and you know  this lack of saying of of clarity but also really   the absence of auditing uh these surveillance  systems only then generally exacerbates some   general uh anxieties about the use of the  surveillance systems by local stakeholders   and the growing adoption at argue of kind of  Chinese surveillance tools both in Kenya but more   generally on the continent and the US's ambition  to mitigate the channel spread all these tools   I believe is in some sense encouraging a general  bifurcation of the world and in some sense staging   Africa and the global South generally as a theater  for a dispute uh between China and the US this   General division between uh what I call procurers  and non-procures of Chinese surveillance systems   does not actually support U.S interest or really  the health and inclusive posture of the kind of  

international liberal order it kind of crucially  further ignores also the real political challenges   and financial motivations behind the procurement  of some of these systems as a kind of already   highlighted uh you know the primary reasons uh  for their procurement in the context of say Kenya   is really for the promotion of at one level  dealing with traditional challenges like crime   and Terror and then the more broader level some of  the digital infrastructure gaps that Mark the very   beginning of the digitization of the economy  um and this particular point this particular   last point that I made I believe suggests that  it's a national observers can then not afford a   really a parochial approach and message to the  risks posed by some of these Technologies the   message shared uh with the world must in some  sense speak to you know some of the challenges   confronting African leaders and partners and  you know working with African authorities to   build digital infrastructure uh and implementing  data protection measures and addressing some of   the kind of traditional challenges like crime  it's definitely one way people can kind of   go forward and policies you know I believe you  know that meet local stakeholders specifically   local Global South stakeholders uh is critical in  kind of making inroads and making changes foreign and you know and I will try and at least  end you know this talk on this one final   notes and then you know I hope you know  there are questions in abundance you know   in giving you know an intelligible account of  China's expanding geopolitical Footprints you   know it is Salient to underscore party State  Ambitions and activities in Africa uh while   also Illuminating how these aims are mediated  by you know local States and substate actors   um digital surveillance tools on the continents  are consistently listed as a way to kind of   ameliorate Social Challenges and developmental  challenges but also there are way to index and   catalyze uh development and indeed while these  Ambitions on the first on the surface are very   laudable by African governments uh with that  the kind of requisite checks and balances these   systems seem to consistently pose risks uh to  civil liberties uh particularly in a region that   is consistently struggling with challenges  at the intersections of governance policing   and crime and and so I argue that work must  then be done to drive the maturation of legal   measures to mitigate some of the negative  consequences that are clearly a derivative   of the intensification of surveillance  practices uh that are connected to domestic it is also important to kind of have  a more proportional posture to how uh   Global and local forces are mediating and  creating an outcome uh that is exacerbating   traditional challenges on the continent  so I leave it there and I hope you know   to you know have some more of a  live discussion with some of you okay uh thank you so very much I really enjoyed  uh your presentation and uh the more complex   landscape that you have outlined there that uh uh  explains uh the more simplistic account that we   often find uh both in relation uh to Africa's  uh uh demands and concerns and in relation to   uh China's uh International uh Ambitions and  and intentions and uh I would be more than   happy to entertain questions by the audience  and I really I would really encourage you all   to please uh ask your questions in the Q a box so  that we can see them and address but while I wait   for you uh uh I will kick off our discussions  here with some questions uh to bully learning   really really enjoyed your presentation and  the first thing that I would like uh to know   uh from you um is uh is the following uh not in  our approaches to the topic we tend to think of   uh African countries as developing countries uh  but the Assumption uh on the other hand seems   to be that China is the developed One China  that China is a fully developed uh uh Global   power whereas the reality is also more complex in  this respect and you have outlined there are many   challenges uh that uh local regulatory systems  face in relation to how projects don't work well   the absence of a fully developed regulatory  landscape for instance in relation to privacy   and data protection and you explain how the US  is just a coming uh into uh this whole uh uh   scenario with a different approach now treating  questions as a matter of of Trades than rather   than simply as Aid seeing that there is the  needs to uh out compete China in its relations   with Africa uh this has been going on though for  a while from a Chinese perspective engagement with   uh with African countries uh and what was uh in  the uh in the past years is that in China itself   uh only more recently uh we have uh developments  uh in in the Privacy area for instance only now we   have a data protection landscape uh fully in  place uh and in in other areas as well right   algorithmic regulation and uh that e-commerce laws  right these are all recent constructions in China   the rule of law as it is today is a more recent uh  phenomenon uh in China and it's important nuanced   one uh in China as well as we understand now in  your view uh does this help to explain in part uh   why the the offering of these services to attend  uh local demands which as you explained very well   is not only a national thing it's at it right it  comes from the national level from the local level   and from from public and private actors uh as well  but can the absence offer regulatory landscape of   course be explained in part from uh uh African  countries on a development trajectories and and   the fact that they still a lot of work to be  done but can it also be explained in part uh   by the absence of the very possibility that uh  a Chinese companies or the Chinese government   uh itself uh could offer a model uh to uh  uh uh Inspire to provide a justifications   and and a framework for African countries to  implement policies in in this regard as well   sure for sure I I completely agree that in  some sense you know the absence of uh robust   regulatory uh environments is really simply  contingent in part because of the General State   of countries you know African countries  developmental you know uh place but also   um they themselves have not necessarily you know  um uh really thought through some of the general   kind of uh outcome and consequences of the general  procurement of these systems um and so in some   sense it's it's about you know date developmental  stage it's also in part because uh Chinese you   know stakeholders themselves uh you know have  not necessarily advocated for regulation although   um in funny enough now in quite most kind of some  of the most recent meetings that I've been able   to attend and they have been actually speaking  about uh the necessity of kind of data policies   um but also you know I would argue  you know on more generally you know   um you know this is not a general unique feature  you know even in the context of the United   States you know uh you know you know alphabetic  regulation for example is something that's new uh   you know I was literally sitting on a conversation  about kind of AI regulation in the context in the   United States this very weak um uh and so in some  sense you know uh you know one can't you know give   um a unique attribution to this particular  challenge to China or Africa or the United States   um my work in particular and part is interested  in the gap between uh regulation and adoption   and pop because I think it creates an unnecessary  challenge for African countries who are interested   in an inclusive development whilst simultaneously  that General gap for some odd reason also seems   to be um a consistent launch pad for other  kind of inquiries specifically inquiries that   presume Chinese intentions in development in the  context of of Africa uh that General gap for say   you know the uh cyber security community in the  United States uses it as a way to presume Chinese   intention about say malice intention about you  know exacerbating uh you know civil liberties as   a way to promote uh what is believed to be kind  of you know uh Democratic backsliding right but   that is kind of the The prominent um line of  discourse in the context both of kind of the   American Media but also um in the context of some  some policy spaces within the context of the US   um and so that gap for me in some sense  is both important to kind of understand   locally World simultaneously also to  realize that that Gap in some sense   um is also really a fantastic image that's  structuring this course in the context of the   United States and that's some kind of important  kind of really work through as to why does it   have so much inertia in the kind of American  public imagination thank you very much uh any any   further questions if not I'm going to keep asking  here uh would anyone like to uh type something   if you if you do please a few absolutely  free really welcome at your questions um this uh presentation our discussion here has uh focused on   surveillance and concerns with surveillance  concerns uh with the idea that the intentions   of China may be to export uh in authoritarian  model of governance even though as you highlighted   a different uh countries in Africa are then  conflated uh perhaps in a a unit dimensional   approach that says all them right as as seeking  to absorb this same practices where the political   environments as you know very well are so  so diverse between countries and themselves   and the idea of surveillance on the other hand is  not something that is and needs to be necessarily   approached from uh a dimension of authoritarianism  surveillance is at the very origins of the modern   nation state you cannot have State Building if  you don't have any form of surveillance practices   in place you give example of law enforcement  practices it is a necessity that surveillance   Technologies are in place uh so perhaps the  the the great question to to be asked uh it's   a question of extent of what of proportionality  which you know very well of what practices are   acceptable or not acceptable uh from both public  and private actors we are just seeing this week   uh this past week has been a busy one with the  introduction of artificial intelligence tools   right being made available uh to the public and  as we use those Technologies we have learned the   ourselves to this universe right releasing our  personal attributes there and a reinforcement   learning processes in machine learning they  depend on the evaluation of of feedback or on the   appraisal feedback Authority how people interact  with the system and how the system learns depends   basically on the evaluation of of the inputs and  all these we're seeing the development and this   is just like right that we're just a a poking our  faces there at this whole new universe which is   unfolding uh here and this is just the beginning  of something very very large that that will be   developing uh from now on which is uh a reality  where the private sector is well in the private   sector in developed economies are not only shaping  how these systems are going to unfold but also   shaping how our identities are expressed within  and recognized within uh these systems which is   a much larger issue of uh of of surveillance as  well right um so uh to what extent do you see uh   uh issues of of surveillance as a necessity uh  uh that African countries uh generally uh have   to put in place practices to to develop their uh  our own communities to ensure order in ways that   some countries right uh have uh uh relied on for  the development of their own uh systems as well   yeah for sure I I guess we kind of hear  that and I think I could probably be on   to it in kind of a two-pronged approach  um I say definitely firstly if one is   thinking about surveillance as a modernist  invention uh you know one can uh trace it   um you know really all the way back to the  invention of the general modern prison which   functions in some sense is a it's a place both  of uh uh incarceration but also as a place to   make social observations of prisoners as a means  to ensure both correction and social intervention   um and that is you know a general argument that  is kind of found within kind of for Kodi and   literature quite consistently right that like  you know uh the emergence of surveillance as   an instrument of Correction uh and discipline um  is important parcel about a modernist project you   know a pursuit of ever correction but correction  contingent important parcel on surveillance   um and so that journal kind of literature  in itself is generally suspicious   both of of not necessarily surveillance  but of Correction right so like uh the the   normative making of human behavior as a as the  centrality um uh of say for kodian scholarship   um and you know much of my own personal work  in some sense is really interested in giving   a genealogy of surveillance so you know it  moving from effectively uh a place of you   know uh social uh correction at least a means of  social correction all the way to now where it's   really at the center of kind of economic activity  um obviously uh and the kind of the current age   uh surveillance is is really about once again and  you know public recordings wouldn't be surprised   but how in some sense is really about training  us on both how we how we understand our once but   also how the system at least how the album can  also help us discover our own wants and and so   um and in that sense um surveillance has  consistently functioned as um a way of   correcting or at least socially intervening in  the making of human uh behavior and activities   uh the differences is that it kind of moved from  the social to the more economical um um and so now   we kind of really have to kind of take a more kind  of critical inventory of how you know surveillance   um in particular structures our economic activity  and you know the you know there's a series of   kind of plethora of examples um uh that now  within some kind of I'd say more in the kind   of economic anthropological literature that's  really kind of interested in in how you know   products like you know Siri or Amazon home uh or  in a dialectical relationship between ourselves   and the product and how in some sense you know  us sharing our um our our wants and our tastes   uh is in some sense training the product to  train us on how to go about making consumption   and so in some sense we're in a dialectical  relationship between the product and ourselves   um and that is you know Central um and you  know the and then in in some sense trying   to think more carefully about the proportionality  of surveillance in the context of Africa you know   um you know and I I probably should have maybe  stressed this um ever more in my presentation   you know uh uh you know for example you know  the Kenyan government goes about procuring   um huawei's uh kind of safe City product in 2014  and this is right after one of the largest kind   of uh terrorist um kind of Acts in Kenya in 2013  um a very popular and kind of Highly commercial   Mall uh was attacked by some you know an Islamic  terrorist group they killed about uh 69 um people   and so the government in some sense wanted to  kind of expanded surveillance capabilities to   really kind of keep track both of crime and Terror  activities on the continent and so I mean in the   country and you know and in kind of individual  African countries have kind of have taken on   surveillance really as an instrument to kind of  correct for uh crime and Terror and so you know   the activity of surveillance within that context  seems warranted and I I bet that most particular   people don't necessarily um Flinch at the idea  of surveilling for the sake of public security   um what I particularly point to is that uh  these Ambitions of surveillance are actually not   supporting public security but at the very least  the surveillance systems that have been protruded   thus far seem not to be supporting some of those  Ambitions and so the the failure of those systems   to me uh renders more interesting questions about  uh the nature of the procurement of these systems   well simultaneously uh the acts of unwarranted  surveillance is really not connected to African   governments rights but this course is usually  saying China is doing downwards it's surveillance   um uh and so in in that sense uh you know how  one empirically establishes and warrants its   surveillance from the party is is an at one level  a mythological question at another level it's a   part of kind of consistent speculative exercises  within the policy realm to kind of justify you   know uh General policy postures on the party um  you know uh uh but you know that General kind of   speculation I I consistently say it doesn't  necessarily in any way negate uh uh local   activities and wants so for example you know um  some of my own personal work uh with you know kind   of local local stakeholders here in Kenya has  really been about uh bolstering cyber security   capabilities uh and also privacy capabilities  regardless of whether it is warranted and on   warranted uh surveillance from uh other you know  National actors um and and so you know attribution to me he seems to be uh the uh the linchpin  of speculation but also really not necessary   for kind of local actors who are interested  in promoting uh privacy and civil liberties   yeah no I really appreciate your uh your uh  your presentation in in your uh answers uh   and we have one final uh question here which  I think speaks to uh the points that uh that   you were uh engaging with uh right now uh  on uh whether uh countries are afraid uh of   uh uh Licking uh data uh to China uh using uh  their uh surveillance tools I think that plays   uh within uh well within the the broader set of  concerns that we see uh internationally and with   your presentation uh tends to share the more uh  uh complex slides uh on uh just one brief point   before I I leave it to you uh to uh to answer  I I I I totally uh agree with your uh uh uh   articulation of the question of of surveillance  there in the in the light of of the panoptical of himself and the idea that surveillance doesn't  need to be seen purely as a form of discipline   but increasingly surveillance is also something  that it becomes a necessity to enable autonomy as   well to enable a development to enable people to  organize their societies and and alter their uh   their own uh lives and that increasingly this uh  recursiveness this dialectic that you talk about   between the individual and technology is also a  dialectic between the public and the private and   as we see the private increasingly the private  realm the private domain increasingly acquiring   power in ways that challenge National orders  and and got the governance of our societies   uh it's it's not possible to think that we  can respond to these developments without   developing at the same time capabilities uh  to deal with that that entail some degree uh   uh uh of acquisition of technological tools and  and and and and and empowers uh to address uh   challenges which are mounting uh challenges uh  and which are just uh beginning but let me just   uh defer uh to the point here and then we come  back uh to the question uh uh and then we come   back just to wrap up because we are a bit beyond  uh our time uh would you like uh uh uh uh to uh   answer uh this uh concern that has been expressed  here that uh uh local uh uh companies and and   countries may be afraid uh with the uh that their  data may be may be leaked through the use of   Chinese Technologies for sure for sure for sure  you know this is a kind of a serious empowerment   um issue um and there are you know some examples  some in Africa that kind of uh greatly illustrate   this point um a couple of years ago the  African Union found you know bugs in some   of the you know uh Cloud infrastructure that  they procured uh both from Huawei and other   kind of Chinese technological companies uh  which directly pointed to you know a leakage   uh of data flowing back directly to China and so  um that point stands um the general issue is when   um it moves Beyond from this one example to  a presumption of kind of systematic kind of   presumptions of consistent data leakages um  and then from data leakages then connecting   it to a presumption of uh coordinated if it's  between kind of Chinese private firms and kind   of the party States and so while you know much  of my work in particular is interested in really   establishing say you know African Coalition and  local activities as relates to the the adoption   of these systems you know I don't necessarily use  sides of the fact that like some challenges do   emerge from it and one and some of the challenges  are at the level of Simply gaps locally wealth   meeting some of the general challenges of you know  uh of a cyber security nature and as I've already   stated that like uh you know in addressing this  General challenge attribution is not necessary   uh but it is necessary uh in the realm of kind of  uh foreign policy makers who are interested in how   do we nicely then respond to you know a state who  we believe to be systematic to surveilling others   um you know whether it's systematic is  um is something that does not necessarily   empirically available to us thus far it might  actually never be empirically available to us   and so much of kind of both the intersection of  both foreign policy but also kind of cyber uh   really cyber strategy globally then needs to  be able to act in the absence of attribution   um and you know some of my own General  Consulting work specifically with say   you know American stakeholders within the  space has been about well what does it look   like to develop a foreign policy strategy  and posture that doesn't necessarily uh   um need attribution um and so yeah I'll leave  it there unless the person is not satisfied   you know we can further kind of excavate some  of my responses excellent thank you so much   we've benefited immensely from your presentation  and discussion and thank you so much for joining   us I'd like to thank as well the participants  for uh for uh joining us and for uh sticking   with us at you at the end and bullelani I really  look forward to welcoming you to uh to Hong Kong   and to continuing our conversation uh I wish you  all the best in the continuation of your of your   projects uh there in Kenya and I very much look  forward to seeing you soon okay thank you so much   thank you so much everybody have a  great day you too bye bye thank you

2023-03-28

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