Aris Roussinos: Inside the nationalist militia on Ukraine’s frontline

Aris Roussinos: Inside the nationalist militia on Ukraine’s frontline

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Hello and welcome to UnHerd. I'm Freddie Sayers. As you can see, I'm not in the studio, I'm on the road, but I wanted to break off to talk to our correspondent, Aris Roussinos – who has just come back from the frontline in the Donbas, in the eastern part of Ukraine and is now in the safety of his hotel in Dnipro – to get a sense of what he's experienced. Hi, Aris. Hi, Freddie. Thanks for having me.

So, tell us what first of all you've been doing for the past few weeks. I spent a week on the frontline in the Donbas, which is obviously the main area of operations in the war in Ukraine currently, living with Right Sector who have now been incorporated in the Ukrainian army. We can talk about who Right Sector are in a minute, but the situation in the Donbas for the Ukrainians is very bad, simply. I think everyone got

overconfident after the Russian failures and losses in the early phases the war, the retreat from Kyiv and Kharkiv and Izyum, and Chernihiv. In the Donbas, the Russians have massed all their troops, all their artillery, in a relatively small area. And that's allowed them to achieve total dominance over the Ukrainians. They vastly outnumber them, have vastly more

materiel. Their artillery – it's an artillery war, both groups just hammering each other at long distances, distances of a few kilometres. The Russians are just destroying the Ukrainians where they're dug in trying to defend fixed positions. Just driving around towns like Bakhmut, which is now a frontline town in the Donbas, you see on the hillsides above, they're just wreathed in smoke. You see the flashes, the impact of cluster munitions as the Russians are just hammering the Ukrainians. So I have a couple of questions about that. The first is on the

strategic side, does that mean that the Russians were initially overstretched with that full encirclement strategy all the way from Kyiv round to almost Odesa and that they've decided that was unachievable, and that they've refocused purely on the Donbas using all their military? Is that what you understand to have happened? Pretty much. I remember us was talking about this a few months ago, and we said that the Russians had two basic options in the war. The first was to encircle Kyiv and overthrow the government there. The second was to limit themselves to the Donbas where the majority of the best Ukrainian forces are based and have a smaller encirclement, just destroy the Ukrainians where they are, and then seize the whole of the Donbas region, which is Ukraine's industrial heartland. In the early phase of the war, the Russians made very fast advances in the opening days but they did overstretch themselves. They outran their

logistics trail. The terrain of northern Ukraine – thick pine forests, narrow little roads – was perfectly designed for the Ukrainian defenders just to go up to the Russian flanks, hit them with the light anti-tank weapons supplied by the West, fighting a kind of guerrilla war. So the Russians basically gave up on that strategy. They pulled out of northern Ukraine, and they refocused all their efforts in Donbas. There are other fronts. There's fronts in Kharkiv, there's fronts in the south, near Mykolaiv, but the majority of Russia's effort now is going towards the Donbas, and they've been, frankly, very successful.

So does that mean they're inside those two provinces of Donetsk and Luhansk, or does the Donbas extend beyond that? So the Russians, since 2014 have had control of around half the Donbas region. The Ukrainians have been fighting Russian-backed separatists – basically local Ukrainians who identify as Russians – for control of that region. But since the current phase the war broke out, the Russians have made major advances in the Donbas region. So Mariupol, famously, was one of the major towns of the Donetsk region. The

Russians have taken that with major devastation. In Luhansk, the Russians control around 95% of the province now. The Ukrainians only really have a toehold in the city of Severodonetsk. And as we see the Russians are nearly in absolute control of that city itself. So the Ukrainians are being pushed

out slowly, but they are being pushed out of the whole Donbas region. What is so interesting here is that had this been the Russian strategy from the beginning, the whole global reaction would have been very different, because in the eyes of the West, those two provinces were already in a complicated civil war/Russian-backed conflict anyway. So if all they had done was redoubled their efforts to win that conflict, and expel Ukrainian forces from those two provinces, it doesn't seem at all likely that the West would have reacted so strongly. The whole situation would have been very different.

Yeah, I think there's a great deal of truth to that. Politically, it's impossible for any Ukrainian government to cede their sovereignty or sense of control over the Donbas region. But the reality as we're seeing is that it is going to be very difficult for them to hold on to it. If the Russians had concentrated their resources in the way they're doing now, from the very beginning, just in the Donbas region, we'd have been seeing these gains a lot earlier, and maybe the West's reaction would have been different in terms of their commitment to sending military supplies and equipment. You talked about how the Russians are making advances within the Donbas. But is the other side of the story not

still how surprisingly slow those advances are? If the entire amassed ranks of the Russian Armed Forces are now focused on those two small provinces, just pummeling what remains of the Ukrainian forces out there, why are they not doing it faster? Are these huge amounts of Western arms being shipped to Ukraine making a difference? I think there's two things there. The first is in the early phase of the war, Russia famously lost huge numbers of troops and equipment. Northern Ukraine became a tank graveyard of Russian equipment. They completely switched around their model of operations in a way that preserves their own forces as far as possible, limiting their own casualties while inflicting maximum casualties on the Ukrainians. So instead of trying to push through in this quick armoured Blitzkrieg, it's much easier, and much safer for the Russians just to completely eradicate the Ukrainians in their positions, just to completely demolish them at long range using their artillery, and then just drive in over the wreckage when the Ukrainians are forced to pull out. So the Russians are limiting their own casualties fighting in this way – except when it gets into urban fighting, like in Severodonetsk – and inflicting the maximum amount of destruction on the Ukrainians. In terms of the

Western supply of weapons, at the beginning of the war, obviously, we saw all the famous Western supplies of anti-tank munitions like the NLAWs and the Javelins, which did a great job in the enclosed forests of northern Ukraine, where the Ukrainians could get up close to the Russians from the flanks without being seen, and just destroy Russian convoys. The terrain in the Donbas is completely different. It's wide open steppe. Very little cover for the Ukrainians to fight and to hide, and these weapons just don't have the range. It's a

long-range war. It's a war primarily of artillery. When you're there, just the raw nonstop artillery is constant, primarily Russian. And the Ukrainians are outmatched. They're outranged by the Russians. So what they're begging for now, the Ukrainians are just begging for expedited deliveries of supplies of modern, Western, long-range artillery that allows them to at least match the Russian firepower. But that's not actually coming. So the Western arms deliveries are getting a lot of publicity, but in terms of its actual numbers and effectiveness, it isn't matched by the scale of fighting in the Donbas. So if what you're saying is right, and the mismatch is so clear, what happens going forward? Project that for us – how many more weeks before the Russians have complete control of the Donbas provinces and some kind of crucial line will be reached? I think I'd be very wary of making specific predictions. I

think a lot of predictions made earlier in this war didn't come to pass famously. I think the best way of saying it is that this summer is going to be very hard and very bloody for the Ukrainians in the Donbas, and, at the moment, there seems to be nothing to stop a major Russian success. Let's talk about what you've been doing for the past few weeks. So you've been embedded within one of the militia groups that are attached to the Ukrainian army in an official capacity and their name is Right Sector. Who are they? Okay, so Right Sector are a Right-wing – it's in the name Right Sector – nationalist militia, formed in 2014. Take

part in the Maidan Revolution, they're initially a coalition of various nationalist groups. I joined them on their first mission since they've become formally absorbed into the Ukrainian army just a couple of weeks earlier as a special forces unit tasked with harassing the advancing Russian troops. So they're not holding fixed trench positions like the regular Ukrainian army or like the territorials that are fighting out there, but they're are kind of mobile defence force, moving around Russian positions, harassing them, firing mortars at them, trying to hit them from the flanks and the side, and to relieve the pressure from the Russian forces. The militia, they're actually called the Ukrainian Volunteer Corps, or D-U-K, or DUK in Ukrainian. Not all the fighters within DUK are members of the Right Sector party. So even some of the most prominent people within DUK I was hanging out with and talking to, they're not members of the Right Sector party.

Okay, so give us a sense of a typical mission that you've been going out on with this group. So I went on a couple of missions with the DUK fighters and both of them were harassing Russian positions that were encroaching on the regular Ukrainian army. So what they do is, days in advance, they'd send out a small reconnaissance team with little quadcopter drones to find out where the Russian positions were, identify a list of targets. Then they infiltrate a mortar section with a large 120 millimetre mortar, a very big, powerful weapon. They'd be hiding out in the countryside in

no man's land, what they call the grey zone. It's an area of contested control between the Russian and Ukrainian forces. They'd be living out there surreptitiously, until the moment came to strike. We'd go with them and in the space of just a few minutes, as quickly as they could, they'd hit the target they identified with 12 rounds, and then scoot off at high speed in the SUVs and go and create a new position. So it's harassing the Russians, it's a kind of semi-guerrilla warfare, hidden in these little wooded copses in the endless steppes of Ukraine. So going there, they were always hiding

under trees because of the omnipresent Russian drones. As soon as you get there, you have to drive at high speed, because you're in Russian view driving on the roads there, Russians are almost everywhere around you. As soon as you get there you park up under trees, the drones can't work out exactly where you are. They fire their mortar, and then they leave. It sounds incredibly retro, doesn't it? This is the kind of mission and the kind of warfare – minus the drones – that people were doing literally 100 years ago in the First World War. Yeah, one of the commanders I spoke to, Tuman – who's a really interesting guy, he'd served in the French Foreign Legion, he'd served in Mali in the French Foreign Legion, he was living in Provence before the war broke out, he came back on the last Ryanair flight to Kyiv – he said, this war is like the beginning of World War One. Before the trench positions had

been firmly established, when it's still a war of movement, but both sides were beginning to bring up their artillery in huge numbers, and just hammer away at each other to allow a single breakthrough. So there's a political party attached to this regiment, is that right? Yeah, so Right Sector is also a political party, it's primarily a political party, and DUK was formed as the as the armed militia of Right Sector, following the Maidan Revolution. And what sort of political party is it? Do you know what their programme is? Of course, the question on everyone's lips is, are they Nazis, are they neo-Nazis? Are they nationalists? Are they ultranationalists? Where do they fall on that kind of spectrum? They're not Nazis. They're not fascists. They are a conservative, maybe national-conservative, Right-wing nationalist militia. So they're nationalist in the

sense that all Ukrainians are now nationalists, in that they believe that Ukraine is a state, that Ukrainians deserve their own state, that they shouldn't be under Russian rule or under Russian domination and that Ukrainian sovereignty is worth fighting for. So even very liberal Ukrainians that I know are now overtly nationalist in the current context. But the party itself, its programme: there's been a lot of academic work done on Right Sector's political beliefs. They're just fundamentally national-conservatives. They're not much further to the Right, if at all, then say the governments of EU countries like Poland or Hungary or whatever.

How are they different from, as you described them, your liberal Ukrainian friends? What marks them out as Right wing at all in that sense? They have a fundamentally conservative ethos. I suppose the way of framing it is they draw their heritage from Ukraine's early-20th century nationalist movement. Its legacy is very strong in western Ukraine, where a lot of the Right Sector activists come from, following the traditions or ideals of Ukraine's 20th century nationalist movement, so Bandera and people like that. But in terms of their actual

political programme it's fundamentally just conservative. So Right Sector, have a very lurid, gruesome reputation. I'm sure we'll get lots of comments about this, but in Russian propaganda, Right Sector have always been used, since the Maidan Revolution in which they played a huge role, as evidence of a Nazi or fascist takeover of the Ukrainian state by these scary Right-wing radicals. In actual fact, they're conservatives. What does conservative in a Ukrainian-nationalist context mean? So that means not very keen on immigration, I'm guessing, not especially keen on LGBT rights and movements, and suspicious of Western decadence. Are these the sort of ideas? To give an example, Right Sector are eurosceptic. Their platform

is eurosceptic; they distrust the EU. They don't like EU integration. One of their fighters was very keen that I wrote down that the official platform of Right Sector is anti-LGBT, we don't support LGBT, but other Rights Sector activists, I met this one guy, Fransuz who is adamant, he was always very clear to point out that, "Look, I'm a liberal. I support LGBT. I have gay friends", all this kind of stuff. So there's diversity within the actual group in terms of political beliefs. I think fundamentally, when you talk to

the fighters, like I say, most of them aren't members of the Right Sector movement and they just joined because they saw it as the easiest way to get some training to go to the front and go and kill Russians. Right Sector has less administrative bullshit, basically, than modern, regular armies. It has a more kind of freewheeling, anarchic style, in terms of the interaction of the fighters and their leadership. Most of the fighters I talked to are actually fundamentally apolitical. They're conservatives, but they're not political activists, and don't have any strong Right-wing views. Attitude to Jews, Jewish people? Did you hear any talk about that? Not one thing, not one. Quite the opposite: they go out of

their way to say like, "We're not anti-semitic, we're not racist", all this kind of stuff. And yet, some of them have tattoos of swastikas, the words SS, the Wolfsangel, which is another SS insignia. What's that about if they're not Nazis? You met people, and you've posted on social media images of people, with those kinds of tattoos. What are we supposed to make of that? I think the best way to frame it was Fransuz, who's one of the senior Right Sector, or DUK, figures rather, I was talking to, said, "Look, this guys, this will look badass. We'll look

like, scary bad boys at the front fighting the Russians." Obviously, these symbols have very different meanings in the West. But Right Sector fighters and activists were perplexed at what they saw as a Western journalistic obsession with what to them are essentially fripperies, like patches. You could walk to a shop in Kyiv or Dnipro where I am now, and buy a Black Sun t-shirt. It's very hard to explain it to a Western audience that would be perhaps naturally very sceptical of these ambiguities. But the taboos on these symbols don't

exist in the same way in Ukraine as they do in Western Europe. The people who are wearing them are generally not Nazis. They just think it looks edgy. Just to push back a bit here, Aris, you're describing – I think your phrase was "freewheeling" and "anarchic". This is a group of heavily-armed militia. The West is providing

increasingly sophisticated arms via the Ukrainian government to these people. They want to be badass and edgy. They have some – however much they believe it –they are wearing Nazi tattoos. It's not wild to be uncomfortable about this. It seems like a bit of an unsettling situation, doesn't it? I can see that. The first thing to say is obviously in the first place it's only a minority, a very small minority of fighters who wear these symbols. And within that minority, if you talk to them, you ask them about their political views, they're adamant: "No, no, I'm not a Nazi. I'm not Right wing." I was

living with these guys for some time, having quite in depth political conversations on those topics. A lot of them, frankly, were more liberal than me. The initial taboo in the West following the Second World War about Nazism and its symbols, was based on Nazi Germany invading other countries, killing its population, trying to annex territory, all this kind of stuff. In the context of a war where Russia is doing exactly that, it seems a disproportionate response to fixate on, "Oh this patch is a bit..."

I'm actually not asking now about the insignia and about the Nazi imagery so much as the general atmosphere, as you describe it, is young people who are wanting to be edgy, who have an anarchic and freewheeling approach to warfare, and who are being heavily armed in part by us. And it is outside the norms of warfare, for at least recent decades, to have that kind of equipment and such amounts of agency in groups that are so untethered to a responsible central government. Is that not quite a worrying situation? What happens to them after the conflict? What happens to them if they don't like what the Ukrainian government is saying? At what stage do all of these heavily-armed freewheeling anarchic militias – whether or not they're Nazis – become a major problem for Ukraine? We'll see what happens after the war is all I can say. We don't know how the war is going to end. So there are a lot of

potential paths for Ukraine to go down, depending on the outcome. But in terms of their relationship with the state, Right Sector and the DUK have been absorbed into the Ukrainian army. The DUK fighters, they're all complaining about the increased amount of bureaucracy and paperwork they have to deal with now they're part of the Ukrainian army. The Ukrainian army has embraced them. And one thing we've seen over the course of the war is this tremendous outpouring of volunteerism. It's not just Right-wing militias. There are all sorts of local

defence militias, anarchist militias, militias with a kind of Left-wing ethos as well, apolitical fighters forming their own local defence forces, volunteers bringing supplies to the front. The Ukrainian state before the war – and this is one of the major problems for Ukraine – was quite weak, quite badly run, it had limited capacity. It's working at full capacity now, trying to keep the country running and fight off the Russian invasion, and to allow it to do so there has been a tremendous outpouring of volunteeristic war effort from across the country. Aris, give us a sense of the more human side. So you've been

living within this Right Sector group. You've been out on the front line. Give us a sense of who you've been meeting and introduce us to some of the characters.

Yeah, sure. So I spent most of my time with DUK with one section who are a group of eight to ten fighters, who are tasked primarily with providing security on missions during the frontline to the mortar team, to the drone section. They're a good bunch. They were normal guys. Most of them were friends from a city called Vinnytsia in central Ukraine who joined up at the start of the war, and had left behind ordinary civilian lives, good lives. There was a guy who's the beekeeper and mead brewer. He looked exactly like a kind of Hackney hipster with a

long topknot and long beard. Really lovely, gentle guy. There was a girl called Athena who's 22, from an impeccably middle-class Ukrainian family. Her dad was a surgeon. She was a poet and professional English translator before the war, spoke flawless English with a really posh British accent. Her family is quite interesting, isn't it? Athena – her real name's Anna – but Athena is a perfect example of the ambiguities and complexities of the Ukraine war. Her husband is a Russian dissident. While we were there,

he was fighting in the surrounded Severodonetsk pocket with an elite Ukrainian unit fighting against the Russians. He's from Siberia. Her family are Russian-speaking. Her uncle is a senior officer in the Russian army. And yet, she has a very strong Ukrainian identity and she'd basically given up her middle-class life in central Ukraine to to go and fight for it. So she has no contact with her uncle, I guess, or her husband's family? Those kinds of divided families – did she say anything about what that means? I think that's quite a common story. Obviously, the Soviet Union only broke up 30 years ago. So some families went

towards a kind of Russian identity. There were ethnic Russians in Ukraine, ethnic Ukrainians who identified as Russian. There's another guy, Kuts, who is a very striking character visually, with the kind of shaved Cossack haircut. So there's a range within that small group then of more metropolitan – it sounds like Athena was more, you described her as almost a hipster-style person, compared to someone who is quite deep into folk and pagan imagery and more nationalist ideas. Is that fair then, it's a sort of coalition? Yeah, I'd say that's fair. I think you have to remember in

Ukraine, I think you can be a nationalist hipster in a way that doesn't quite exist in Britain, or in America. So going back to Kutz, his primary source of income, he was a traditional swordsmith. He'd make beautiful sabres, medieval longswords and so on, which we'd talk about at great length. Someone like Athena, who has an ordinary middle-class life in central Ukraine, she is also a nationalist. She's openly a nationalist, she believes in the idea of Ukrainian state. So, is your sense that some of these people are deriving meaning from this? Has it become a philosophical movement or a kind of return to something more primal? Talk to us about what you sense on a human or philosophical level.

I suppose on one level, it's going to be a self-selecting group. So if you're going to join a nationalist militia, fighting the Russians in Donbas, you're already going to be inclined towards a certain passion for Ukraine's history and folklore, culture, and so on, because that's what you're fighting for. Kuts would say – there was a guy called Daina who'd say this all the time – that we're fighting for Ukraine's culture, for the land of Ukraine, for it's beautiful territory. But also, we're fighting for our traditions, folklore, belief, all this kind of stuff. I think when you ask them their politics, the single most common answer you get is we are a modern Cossack Sich, like a modern Cossack kind of warband. And they see what they're doing now as being in line with Ukraine's centuries-long history of volunteers coming together to fight foreign occupation.

What's interesting listening to this from an outsider is the contradiction of it, because the effect of the Russian invasion then seems to be working both ways. In a sense, it is pushing Ukraine towards the West, and homogenising the Western bloc. But in the opposite sense, some of what you're talking about, about a return to a nationalism, about greater focus on folk traditions, almost seems like an entrenching of a rebellion against Western norms, against internationalism and urban dominance and globalism and whatever else. Do you sense that that, that although it seems that Ukraine is becoming more Western through this process, in a sense it's becoming less so? Yeah, I think there are really interesting ambiguities here. So, go to a city like Kyiv or Dnipro where I am now, and you could be in Shoreditch or Hackney. People are dressed the

same, they listen to the same music, they have the same tastes as anyone in any Western European city. And the Maidan Revolution, a lot of it was people literally waving EU flags, wanting to absorb themselves in a Western European mindset rather than being part of the post-Soviet Russian-dominated sphere. At the same time, the effect of everything that's fallen out since Maidan – the first war in the Donbas, especially the war now – has been a revival of interest in Ukraine's culture. The vyshyvanka – kind of embroidered smocks or shirts, traditional folk peasant dress – so many people who wouldn't have worn such an overtly folkloric outfit in the past, people have them. There's a special vyshyvanka day. You walk down the street, you see shops selling this kind of traditional folkloric peasant dress. As

people get back into the sense of what it means to be Ukrainian, I think, the war with Russia, the whole eight years of conflict of one form or another with Russia, has led Ukrainians to reassess and reinterpret its age-old – what is essentially a folk peasant culture. So I think there are strong parallels in a modern context with classic 19th century, early 20th century nationalism, where a lot of it was based on reviving and reinterpreting these ancient folk traditions. But it's happening in a modern context. There's a dance music song by a group called Probass Hardi, which is omnipresent in Ukraine. It's become a symbol of resistance, it's always used in videos of fighting the Russians, blowing up Russian tanks. And it starts off with this West Ukrainian folk singing. It's

overtly very, very rooted in this Ukrainian peasant culture. Well, the song that won the Eurovision Song Contest was a folk song wasn't it? Rapping, wearing the vyshyvanka I was just talking about, in a song that also alludes very strongly to this kind of rich folk, peasant culture. And Ukraine does have a very rich peasant culture. Russians mock them, Ukrainians, as these kind of backward country bumpkin cousins of the great Russians. But I think Ukrainians have reassessed what it means to be Ukrainian, and begun to take greater pride in their folk peasant roots. Do you almost get a glimpse of a different future that might be replicated elsewhere, spending time there? That, in a sense, of course at one level this is a battle of great power blocs requiring huge amounts of money and technology and sophistication, but in this other sense, there's a disengagement from that global macro picture and a digging down to a more local identity. Do you think we might see that

elsewhere? Do you think an unexpected outcome of all this might be a different approach towards these local identities? Yeah, I do. It's something I think about quite a lot. On the one hand, obviously, the war in Donbas is going very badly for Ukraine. But on the other hand, I think there is something positive that could come out of this. So I was talking before about the huge volunteeristic aid effort and everyone volunteering to help the Ukrainian state, that they now have a greater sense of personal identity, they have a greater personal stake in their Ukraine than was the case before the war. Ukraine's politics before the war: it had the had the outward trappings of liberal democracy but in fact political power was just the plaything of various oligarchs. Now,

Ukrainians are actually involving themselves through all these volunteer aid efforts, through all these kinds of things in making their country work. I think that's one interesting path forward for Ukraine. The other is I think Ukraine has tremendous potential, not just for itself, but for the European Union as a whole. Just yesterday, the EU

Commission said they will fast track Ukraine as a candidate member, candidate country. It's got a big population, about 40 million people. It's a huge country. It's absolutely vast. I can't stress how big it is. And it just seems empty. Its land is so rich in resources, the richest soil in the world. I

think the EU will gain more from closer relationships with Ukraine or Europe will gain more from a close relationship with Ukraine than Ukraine will actually get from a close relationship with Western Europe. I think there is genuinely something really inspiring about spending time with these people who've given up their ordinary lives. It's not like these people were living in post-Soviet drudgery before – they had good lives, they were doing cool things, things they enjoyed. And they've given them up to go and fight for their country, to fight for their homes, families, the country that they love. And I think there are things that the rest of Europe can learn from that. You're probably going to be accused of having gone loco, I suspect now, and that both makes you scandalously Right wing because you're friends with people who are in a Right wing militia, and also scandalously establishment whitewashing because you're just signing up to the Western narrative that there are no Nazis in Ukraine, etc, etc. So you may well be

attacked from both sides on this. Maybe a good project for you next would be to embed with the Russians and see how you feel about them? Would you do that for us? I'll think about it. It's something we should maybe think about. We're interested in understanding both sides of this conflict and trying to get to the human, real sense of what this actually means, rather than the cliche, black and white headlines that we read elsewhere. So thank you, Aris, for that really fascinating

talk. And we'll see you back home safely, I hope. Thank you. That was UnHerd's Aris Roussinos reporting from Dnipro in Ukraine. He's just been out there for two or three weeks,

partially embedded within a Right-wing militia group fighting for the Ukrainian army against Russian positions in Donbas. No one else, as far as we know, has had that kind of access. No other journalist has been embedded in that kind of situation. So to hear from him, and to hear his first-hand experience, really provided a new perspective. Easy, I'm sure

to criticise, and no doubt, in the comments, people will avail themselves of that opportunity. I think it's important to try and remember the human angle here, which is that whatever the political complications and the big influences in each direction, as he described it for us quite powerfully there, these are individuals who have complex, contradictory stories. And it's not that easy to dismiss or embrace them all as a single unit. So we look forward to hearing his next report. I suggested there maybe we should see what's going on on the Russian side. I'm not sure if they will be happy to have one

of our journalists embedded, but I will find out and we'll let you know. Thank you for tuning in. This was UnHerd.

2022-06-19 17:11

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