4680 Teardown Analysis // DBE: Big Risks & Big Rewards + Patent Landscape
Welcome back everyone! I’m Jordan Giesige and this is The Limiting Factor. Of everything that Tesla unveiled at Battery Day, their Dry Electrode coating process was the most risky. Many experts didn’t expect a Dry Battery Electrode coating process, or DBE, to be mastered this side of 2025.
And, if it doesn’t work out for Tesla, it could throw a wrench in the 4680 battery cell ramp because it’s at the heart of the 4680 production system. However, with great risk can come great rewards, which is why Tesla decided to take the bull by the horns and attempt to commercialize DBE. It has a number of advantages for cell production, cell chemistry, profitability, and the environment. Now that we have teardown information from UC San Diego showing that Tesla’s early production cells were using DBE, but only on the Anode and not the Cathode, it leaves a lot of questions. This doesn’t align with what Tesla advised at Battery Day, or the expectation of industry experts.
So today, I’m going to cover what DBE is, the global patent landscape for DBE type technologies, what the benefits are, why it’s so difficult, and what happens if Tesla isn’t able to fully master DBE in time for a 2023 production ramp. Before we begin, a special thanks to my Patreon supporters and YouTube members. This is the support that gives me the freedom to avoid chasing the algorithm and sponsors. As always, the links for support are in the description. Additionally, this entire series wouldn’t have been possible without the battery cell provided by Gali of HyperChange and Corey Coddington who delivered the battery cell to UC San Diego.
At UC San Diego, Shirley Meng organized funding for the teardown as the Zable Endowed Chair in Energy Technologies in Jacobs School of Engineering. And finally, Weikang Li spent many hours working on the teardown and answering my questions. So, a big thanks to everyone involved! To kick things off, what’s a Dry Battery Electrode and how does it improve battery cell manufacturing? To understand that, we need to start by understanding a conventional, wet electrode manufacturing process and its weaknesses. The cathode and anode electrodes in a battery cell consist of a metal foil and active, energy storing material.
With a wet process, the active material is coated to the metal foil in a four step process. Dry active material powder which also contains binding agents and conductive carbon, is mixed into a solvent to form what’s called a slurry. Then, that slurry is painted to the metal foil to form a thin active material layer. Next, the slurry is dried in ovens that can be up to 100 meters long. And finally, the electrode is calendared, or compressed, to achieve the correct porosity and thickness. The wet process has a number of drawbacks.
First, it’s slow. You can only produce material as fast as you can dry it. Second, the drying lines run at 50 to 160 degrees Celsius.
Given that the drying lines are 100 meters long, it’s like running an oven that’s the length of a football field, which is capital intensive and uses a huge amount of energy. Energy of course means cost and CO2 emissions. Second, when the dry powder is mixed with the solvent, the binder dissolves into the slurry. When the slurry is dried, the solvent comes out of solution to bind the electrode together. In a perfect world, that binder would only coat where two particles meet, but it doesn’t. The binder coats haphazardly, sometimes binding two particles together, and sometimes coating the active material particles.
That means the binding strength is weaker than it could be and that the bonder blocks lithium ions from entering and exiting the active material particles, which slows down charge and discharge rates. The third drawback of a wet electrode process is solvent recovery. The solvent recovery process is a small chemical processing plant that recovers waste gases from the drying lines. The recovery process is different for the cathode and anode because they use two different solvents. The cathode uses N-Methyl-2-pyrrolidone, or NMP, as a solvent, which is highly toxic and requires a complex process to separate waste NMP from purified NMP for reuse. The anode typically uses water as solvent and the solvent recovery system is therefore much simpler.
I couldn’t find details on this step for a water based process, but I’m assuming it simply involves a condenser and air filters. If you know something about this, feel free to comment below. As a side note, many people asked me how UC San Diego determined that the early production cell was using DBE on the anode but not the cathode. It relates to the solvents and binders typically used in a wet slurry coating process vs a dry process. In a wet process, the binder used on the cathode side, Polyvinylidene fluoride, or PVDF, is soluble in NMP but not soluble in water. On the anode side, Carboxymethyl cellulose, CMC, and Styrene-butadiene rubber, SBR, are used as binders because they’re both soluble in water.
As a side note on the side note, SBR and CMC have different cohesion and adhesion characteristics and so they’re both often used to get the anode to hold together and stick to the current collector. Dry Electrode Processes typically use variants of Polytetrafluoroethylene, or PTFE, as the binder. You might also know PTFE by its brand name, Teflon. PTFE-like polymers and PTFE variants aren’t soluble in water or NMP. So, if you want to know if an electrode uses a dry process, it’s a matter of placing a piece of the electrode in both NMP and water to see if it falls apart. If it doesn’t, and holds together, it was formed using a dry process.
The anode from the Tesla cell didn’t disperse in water or NMP, which means it used a dry process. However, the cathode was able to be dispersed in NMP, which is what you’d expect from an electrode formed with PVDF and NMP in a wet process. Besides the chemical test, there’s also a visual signal that the anode used DBE and that the cathode used a wet process. If we zoom into the anode, we can see spider silk like filaments of a polymeric binder that are characteristic of a dry process. Whereas if we look at the cathode, we can’t see those filaments.
I’ll explain how those filaments are formed in a moment, but for now, the key takeaway here is that UC San Diego was able to get double confirmation, both chemical and visual, that the anode used a DBE process and the cathode didn’t. With the wet electrode coating process out of the way, let’s move onto dry electrode coating. After that we’ll look at how Tesla’s DBE process works, why Dry Coating is so difficult that it wasn’t expected to be commercialized this side of 2025, and the benefits of DBE. First, a paper that was hugely helpful in pulling together this video was by Yongxing Li and titled “Progress in solvent-free dry-film technology for batteries and supercapacitors.” It came out a few months ago so it’s up to date, it was well-written, and contains great visuals.
The paper notes that there are several dry coating methods currently under development. Powder compression, vapor deposition, powder spray, and binder fibrillation. As we can see on the spider charts, powder compression and vapor deposition aren’t really worth covering because they have scaling limitations, and what Tesla needs the most is scalability. Powder Spray and Binder Fibrillation are both very promising due to their high performance in most areas.
The differences between their spider charts are minute and that at the time of this paper, the biggest difference between them was that the maturity of Powder Spray was considered higher than Binder Fibrillation. Now that I’ve released information from the Tesla 4680 teardown, this paper might have to re-estimate Binder Fibrillation to a higher maturity level because that’s the process Tesla’s using. The battery industry’s recognized that Powder Spray and Binder Fibrillation are the way to go and there’s been somewhat of a patent arms race between the two technologies. The top four countries winning the patent race are China and the U.S. nearly tied for first, with Japan third and Germany fourth. China’s split their efforts evenly between Powder Spray and Binder Fibrillation, the US and Germany have mostly focused on Binder Fibrillation, and Japan has focused on Powder Spray.
If we look at it from the perspective of which companies own the patents, the competitive landscape becomes clear. Toyota dominates the Powder Spray patents and Maxwell dominates the Binder Fibrillation patents. Who’s Maxwell? Maxwell is Tesla because Tesla purchased Maxwell in 2019 for their binder fibrillation technology, which they of course called DBE. Let’s move on to how Tesla’s DBE process works, its benefits, and why it’s such a difficult challenge by walking through this flowsheet from a Maxwell patent.
Note that just because this is what’s in the patent, doesn’t mean what we see here will exactly match the process Tesla will use in their factories. I’ll provide an example of this later in the video. The first step is to mix conductive carbon and binder with active materials to form a dry blend.
After the dry blend is formed, the fibrillation process begins. Fibrillation is a process where the dry blend is exposed to shear forces from a Jet-Mill or Screw Extruder to stretch the binder into fine filaments. Based on the Maxwell patent, Tesla is likely using a Jet-Mill. Regardless of whether a Jet-Mill or extruder is used, the fine filaments spun by the Fibrillation process forms clumps of material that contain a matrix that can bind the dry powder together in later process steps.
As you’d expect, not just any binder can be fibrillated to create this matrix. The only binders that work are high molecular weight polymers that can be stretched into long thin strands. And of those polymers, the ones with the best overall set of characteristics are the PTFE or Teflon-like variants mentioned earlier. However, there’s a catch. All commercially relevant lithium ion batteries use graphite in the anode. PTFE variants degrade when used with a graphite anode.
This is because at the low voltages seen in the anode, PTFE starts taking on electrons which causes the chemical structure to break down. When the PTFE binder breaks down, among other things, it no longer serves its function to hold the anode together. How bad is this issue? Maxwell’s own work from 2012 shows a Teflon Latex trial where there was a 20% capacity loss in the first cycle. In light of the PTFE degradation problem, most experts were expecting that, if anything, DBE would be used in the cathode and not the anode. The fact that the teardown showed that Tesla was using a DBE anode and not a DBE cathode is the exact opposite of what was expected. Why might this be? First, starting with the anode.
How might Tesla have solved the PTFE degradation problem? There are two potential options as far as I can tell. The first is straightforward: Tesla is using a PTFE-like polymer that doesn’t degrade at the anode. This would be the best option because no degradation would occur. The second is described by this Bosch patent, where the inventors suggest using multiple binders. Tesla could use a small amount of a PTFE variant to form the dry electrode film.
That PTFE binder would still break down, but then the other binders, which are stable at the anode, would remain to maintain structure in the anode. This wouldn’t be an ideal solution because there would still be some degradation of the anode, but it might be a workable solution. Regardless, either Tesla hasn’t solved the PTFE degradation problem and the cell that UC San Diego tore down was never meant for final production or Tesla’s solved the PTFE degradation problem. Which is most likely? Tesla hasn’t mentioned any issues with the anodic DBE process in earnings calls and I’d be surprised if Tesla bought Maxwell if Maxwell hadn’t solved the PTFE degradation problem at least a basic level, because it’s a fundamental chemistry problem rather than a manufacturing problem.
With that in mind, my view is that the most likely explanation is that Maxwell and Tesla solved the PTFE degradation problem completely or found a workaround. If that’s correct and Tesla has DBE working at the anode, Tesla’s not only solved the electrode that’s more difficult from a chemistry standpoint, but also the electrode that’s more important from a manufacturing standpoint. Why? A viewer of the channel that goes by the username Lifewalk works for a large cell manufacturer and pointed out that it’s more difficult to manufacture a thick anode than a thick cathode. This matters because the electrodes always need to have similar capacity for the battery cell to operate properly, which means that the anode is the limiting factor for increasing electrode thicknesses. You can make a thicker electrode by dual layering the active material with a wet process, but why do that if you can just use a DBE process that can lay down a nice thick anode in one pass that actually has better performance.
We’ll come back to the performance of thick DBE electrodes in a moment. What about the cathode side? Why is it that Tesla isn’t using a dry process on the cathode when, electrochemically, it’s not as challenging as the anode? The only clue we have for this is from over a year ago in the Tesla Q2 earnings call. Elon said that they were having difficulties with calendaring the cathode material because it was denting the rollers. There are a number of potential ways to fix a problem like that, each having different strengths and weaknesses.
For example, changing the design or construction of the roller, changing the temperature of the roller or the dry mix, using more rollers, adjusting the amount of binder and conductive carbon in the dry mix, or through an inert additive to add slip to the dry mix. Regardless, Tesla seemed confident in their ability to solve this problem, citing it as an engineering problem rather than a science problem; science problems being more fundamental. Either Tesla was still working on the dented roller problem in January of this year when the tear down cell was manufactured, they ran into a new problem, or they’ve since solved the problem. I’ll hold fire on speculating here and wait to see what’s in the 4680 cell I ordered from Munro and Associates.
So far we’re only up to the fibrillation step, where the PTFE or PTFE-like polymer is Jet-Milled to stretch it into gossamer threads. Those threads form a matrix around the active electrode material and conductive carbon. After the mixture leaves the jet mill, as I understand, it should look like what we see on screen. It’s no longer a flowable powder, but more like a crumbly clumpy dough. The next step after Mixing and Fibrillation is the dry feed process.
What’s the dry feed process? This image from a Maxwell patent shows that after the dry powder is fibrillated into a dough by the Jet-Mill the dough goes through a roll mill to turn it into a freestanding dry film. This is exactly what Tesla showed in this footage from Battery Day. The powder enters the top of the roller and then exits the roller as a freestanding film. That is, the dry feed process creates a feed of dry, freestanding film. After the dry feed process comes calendaring to achieve the correct thickness and porosity and then bonding the dry feed to the electrode foil with heat and pressure. For these last three steps, based on information from a source inside Tesla, the YouTube channel Cleanerwatt has advised that Tesla’s combined roll-milling, calendaring, and laminating into a more compact machine than we saw in the Maxwell Patents.
This avoids the need to create free-standing film, will reduce machine cost, and will reduce floor space. If you’re curious about that, I’ll link some Cleanerwatt videos in the description. Conceptually each step of the flowsheet is simple, but in practice, it took Maxwell about 15 years to bring the process to a point where it might be commercially viable. Let’s look at the challenges. At the jet-mill stage, if the material isn’t fibrillated at the correct temperature, speed, and pressure the bonding matrix won’t form correctly.
At the dry feed stage, if there’s any gaps in the fibrillated dough, it will cause gaps in the electrode, which is tricky when you’re dealing with a clumpy dry dough. And, at the bonding stage, if there’s not enough heat, the dry electrode won’t bond. If it’s too hot, it’ll change the electrode structure and composition. If the temperature is uneven, it could cause both problems at the same time. Again, courtesy of Cleanerwatt, we have an insight into one of these challenges, the dry feed, and Tesla’s solution.
As per the Maxwell patent, Tesla tried feeding jet-milled powder directly into the roll-mill but it created blockages. Those blockages meant the line had to be shut down to clear the blockages. Tesla solved this problem by compressing the powder into pellets, jet-milling it, and then cooling it to sub-zero temperatures before running it through the roll-mill. Cleanerwatt didn’t provide details on why clumps were forming at the roll-mill and why the solution works. I can speculate but bear in mind that this pure guesswork on my part.
My assumption is that clumps were forming at the first roller because the PTFE binder was interacting with the heat of the first roller and becoming sticky. By chilling the mixture first, it would avoid stickiness, but would still be warm enough for adhesion during the lamination step because the first roller would pre-warm it. As for why powder compression helps, I’m stumped, but it could be that it reduces stray powder particles that could gum things up.
As a final note on the challenges of DBE and why it took 15 years to master the technology: Tesla isn’t just making one batch of cells at a time. There’ll be constant flow of material through the process, Truckloads per day. Furthermore, the margin for error will be at the nanometer scale. This is because the layers of a battery cell are as thin as a human hair and the particles are the size of a red blood cell. If anything is out of place, the battery won’t have the right power and energy characteristics, it won’t last as long as it needs to, or it could short circuit.
For all this difficulty and risk, what’s the reward? First, DBE reduces the footprint and energy required for electrode coating by 90%. This will allow Tesla to scale faster and cheaper while doing so with less environmental impact. In fact, I think the environmental impact is one of the key reasons Tesla took such a big risk with the DBE process.
Second, DBE allows Tesla to eliminate a toxic solvent from the process, NMP, which poses a number of environmental, permitting, health, and safety challenges. Third, based on the research papers I’ve read which were covered in my first DBE video from October of 2020, DBE is probably one of the key factors that allowed Tesla to increase line output by 7x for each cell assembly line. Fourth, the NMP solvent used in a wet process degrades electrodes, which shortens battery cell life, which means that a battery cell using a DBE process may have the potential for increased cycle life. Fifth, and finally, DBE will allow Tesla to produce thick electrodes more quickly and at lower cost. As we covered earlier, thicker electrodes require a dual-layer coating process. That dual layer coating process means more coating steps, more drying lines, and higher costs.
Thicker electrodes are important because they allow for higher energy density battery cells by increasing the ratio of active energy storing material in a cell to inactive material, like the metal current collectors. However, there’s a trade-off. A thicker electrode means it’s more difficult for lithium ions to move in and out of the electrode, meaning lower energy density. So, a manufacturer has the choice of thicker electrodes with high energy density or thinner electrodes with high power output. While we’re on the topic, in the past, I said the limiting factor for electrode thickness is the trade-off between energy density and power output.
However, I overestimated the impact of a thicker electrode on power output. A thicker electrode does reduce power output, but not to the extent I had assumed. As Dr. Juho Heiska pointed out on twitter, if the 85 micron thick electrode we saw with the UC San Diego teardown was formed with a wet process, it would still have solid power output at a c-rate of 1.
A c-rate of 1 is a full battery cell discharge in 1 hour, which is faster than it would ever occur in most EV’s. The electrode thickness would also affect charging speeds, but that’s a different dynamic, where electrode composition would have a larger impact. Regardless, the important thing to note on the graph is the percentage drop between the c-rate .1 and 1C. Roughly speaking, the flatter the slope, the less the battery cell loses umph at higher discharge rates. Up to a 104 microns the discharge rate at 1c is still acceptable.
That is, the limiting factor for electrode thickness is actually a combination of two things: First, the ability of a cell manufacturer to create a thick electrode without defects at low cost, AND the trade-off between energy density and power density. DBE helps solve both of these. First, it can lay down an electrode up to 1 millimeter thick in one pass, which is far thicker than Tesla will probably ever need. Second, if you recall with the wet process, when the binder comes out of solution, it ends up coating parts of the electrode particles that it shouldn’t, which blocks ion flow. With the DBE process, the fibrillated binder forms a series of point to point connections with the conductive carbon particles. This means the ion flow in and out of the particles is better, which should mean electrodes that are thicker while meeting power output requirements.
Moving along, as covered in my Q2 earnings call video, Tesla’s run into challenges with scaling the DBE coating process. This has led to quite a few concerns in the Tesla community and among investors about what happens if Tesla can’t master DBE or if they can only master one electrode. Let’s look at a worst case scenario. The purpose here isn’t to spread fear or say what will happen, because I have confidence that Tesla will solve the challenges of DBE.
Instead, the purpose of exploring a worst case scenario is to show the stability of Tesla’s supply chain because it involves both a failure on the part of Tesla to ramp DBE and a failure of cell suppliers to keep up with Tesla’s needs. In this scenario, Tesla would still grow at a minimum of 30% per year. But, we’re getting ahead of ourselves. Let’s walk through it step-by-step. What follows isn’t investing advice. It’s my best guess at potential futures based on my understanding of battery manufacturing.
First, we have to start with context. The conventional wet battery cell production process and the cells it produces are already good enough to transition the world to sustainable energy. The battery cells are cheap enough, have high enough energy density, charge speed, and cycle life. (Tesla vehicle b-roll!!!) And, as evidenced by companies like CATL, the factories that produce them are scaling rapidly. In fact, the growth of battery cell production is outstripping raw material supplies. So what’s the point of DBE for Tesla? It would give Tesla a tool to scale more quickly as a manufacturer that’s starting from scratch, to help reduce and control cell costs in the face of supply shortages, and reduce environmental impact through less chemical waste and lower energy usage.
In other words, DBE’s a great to have, but not a must have. Even without DBE, if Tesla switched to a wet process, I expect they’d still have some of the best battery cell factories in the world and one of the best supply chains. That’s because Tesla isn’t just innovating at the coating step, they’re reducing the number of process steps from lithium mine to battery line from 30 steps down to 22 steps while at the same time increasing the throughput of those process steps. That is, without DBE, Tesla will be one of the most advanced cell manufacturers in the world.
With DBE, I don’t think there would be a contest. But, as always, I want to stress that it’s not like Tesla’s going to put other cell manufacturers out of business if that happens. And, vice versa, if some other manufacturer develops a breakthrough chemistry, it wouldn’t put Tesla out of business and would actually benefit Tesla.
Demand for battery cells far exceeds supply, and that’ll be the case for the next decade. With that context in place, what would happen if Tesla couldn’t get the DBE coating process working on both the cathode and anode? My view is that it would handicap Tesla’s ability to meaningfully scale in house battery cell production for about 1-2 years from the point they decided to scrap DBE in favour of a wet process. By meaningfully scale, I mean scaling beyond the low double-digit Gigawatt hours.
How do I arrive at 1-2 years? It usually takes 3-4 years to a bring a battery cell production facility online from conception to full production. That includes 1-2 years for building out the facility and another 1-2 years for the production ramp. Tesla could accelerate that 3-4 year timeline to 1-2 years in two ways. First, coating only makes up about 25% of the battery cell factory, and coating is all Tesla needs because they already have the rest of the factory in place. This means less equipment to install and a quicker production ramp. Second, if Tesla used an existing space at one of their factories, they should be able to avoid a lot of the permitting and construction hassles.
The wild card here is that we don’t know if Tesla has contingency plans in place either in house or with suppliers. Tesla clearly already has access to wet coating capacity from somewhere because it was used in the 4680 torn down by UC San Diego. But we don’t know the extent of that capacity. Note that earlier I said Tesla would need to get both the cathode and anode working. This is because if only one electrode was having an issue and had to switch to a wet process, whether that be the cathode or anode, the situation would be roughly the same because that electrode would become the limiting factor for production.
1-2 years sounds pretty bad, but let’s inject some more context. A DBE botch-up would be less of a failure than Tesla’s issues with over-automation in the 2017 to 2018 Model 3 ramp. In that situation, vehicle production stagnated for almost a year. That wouldn’t happen in this situation because Tesla will continue to grow yearly without 4680 production due to third party cell supply. Tesla has at least three cell suppliers with BYD as a likely fourth, and they’ve continually told those suppliers to make as many battery cells as possible. Furthermore, I wouldn’t be surprised if Tesla signs agreements with additional companies in the future like Samsung.
According to BloombergNEF, global cell supply is expected to grow by a little over 30% in from now until 2025. So, if Tesla’s suppliers continue to provide them with cells in proportion to supply growth, that would mean a minimum growth rate of 30%. But, because Tesla is sourcing from multiple suppliers, we might assume that they can grow at more than 30% over the next few years because they’re leveraging multiple supply chains. As a final note on the worst case scenario, it might also mean a scuttled or slower ramp of the Cybertruck and Semi, which were designed with the 4680 cells in mind. Those vehicles could use the 2170, but it would be a setback in terms of efficiency and wasted engineering time. What about a middle of the road scenario? If dry coating works for both the cathode and anode, but Tesla continues to ramp at a slower rate than they’ve guided, from a customer and investor perspective it would be business as usual.
In this scenario, Tesla should be able to supplement their outside cell supply with 4680 production and maintain a 50% growth rate. For example, in 2023, if outside suppliers can provide enough cells for 40% growth, that would mean 12 GWh of slack for Tesla to pick up with their 4680 production lines. Bear mind that the number of potential outcomes here is quite broad, and the numbers I’m providing are meant to be illustrative rather than predictive. Finally, from the current point in time, what’s the best case scenario for the 4680? This was already outlined by Elon and Drew in the last earnings call. Tesla’s been increasing output by 35% per month for the last few months.
If that continues, Tesla will hit an annualized production rate of 4 GWh or more by the end of this year. If that 35% rate continues, they’ll be at an annualized rate of 33 GWh in time for the Cybertruck deliveries in July, which is far more than Tesla will need. If Tesla can ramp to a 100 GWh run rate by the end of 2023, I honestly don’t know what Tesla will do with that many battery cells. To me, the only way to gobble up that many battery cells on top of the cells they’ll be sourcing from outside suppliers would be a huge amount of Cybertruck and Semi production capacity.
As a side note, Tesla plans on ramping the Semi later this year and is currently putting in place a production line for the Cybertruck, which may be a sign of confidence from Tesla in the 4680 ramp. In summary, Tesla took a big risk with DBE. If they fully master it, Tesla would likely be the most advanced cell manufacturer in the world. For a given chemistry, they’d have battery cells with the best combination of power and energy density, the cheapest cells, and they’d be able to scale more quickly, easily, and with less capital than any other cell manufacturer. In a worst case scenario, if it failed, Tesla would likely continue growing at least 30% per year for the next year or two while they bring an in-house wet electrode coating process online.
This is because the broader battery cell industry will grow at that rate. Bear in mind that if Tesla hits their goal of a 2 million vehicle per year run rate by December, they only actually need to grow at 33% per year to hit their target rate of 20 million vehicles per year by 2030. With that said, life would be a lot easier for Tesla with DBE production lines that ran at 7x the speed of a conventional battery line. And of course, Tesla’s promised a growth rate of 50% and that’s what we all want to see. It’s important for Tesla to grow as quickly as possible in the next few years because the law of large numbers in manufacturing says that scaling will get more difficult as the decade rolls on. In a best case scenario, Tesla will be swimming in battery cells despite the production challenges that appear to have delayed the 4680 ramp.
However, I’m not going to get too excited at this point. We need to first see if the 4680 that’s currently in production uses DBE on both electrodes and see what Tesla says in the next couple of earnings calls. As always, I’ll keep you updated as things unfold. If you enjoyed this video, please consider supporting me on Patreon with the link at the end of the video or as a YouTube member.
You can find the details in the description, and I look forward to hearing from you. A special thanks to Martin S. Kristensen and Gort for your generous support of the channel, my YouTube members, and all the other patrons listed in the credits. I appreciate all of your support, and thanks for tuning in.
2022-09-08 17:02
