US Secretary of State Blinken on Russia, Energy Policy, Taiwan, Ukraine
Good morning. Secretary, thank you so much. It's good to be with you. Well, first off, as I just mentioned, Secretary Blinken, thank you so much to you and your team for your time this morning. I know you're very busy.
We have an on the record discussion this morning with the secretary for about 30 minutes with a 10 minute Q and A. We just have one housekeeping item. Since we're not live streaming this, we are asking if you would hold your tweets, headline stories until we wrap the discussion just for a flow of conversation. But again, we're very much looking forward to the conversation. Thank you all for taking time to be
here. So let's get started. Q Secretary, so just this morning, Putin is overseeing some annual nuclear drills with Russian forces. How concerned are you that Russia could use a dirty bomb and blame it on the Ukraine and. Blame it on Ukraine? Look, we're concerned about two things.
We're, of course, concerned about the rhetoric we've heard from Putin and from other Russian officials going back some weeks now over the possible use of nuclear weapons. We're watching that very carefully. We haven't seen reason to change our own nuclear posture. But it's something that we're tracking very carefully. And we've also communicated directly and very clearly to the Russians, to President Putin, about the consequences that would flow from any use of a nuclear device. Separate apart from that, we've seen these allegations coming from the Russians that somehow the Ukrainians are looking or contemplating using a so-called dirty bomb, which is an utter fabrication and something that is also the height of irresponsibility coming from a nuclear power. In fact, the IAEA is now at Ukraine's invitation in Ukraine, visiting as they've done in the past.
The nuclear facilities that the Ukraine has. The reason this particular allegation gives us some concern is because Russia has a track record of projecting, which is to say accusing others of doing something that they themselves have done or thinking about doing. But there again, we communicated very clearly and very directly to the Russians about trying to use this false allegation as a pretext for any kind of escalation on Russia's behalf. And just to hold on that for a second, what would be our response if Russia does do something like that in terms of a mirroring and that. Well, I'm not going to get into speaking
publicly to what we and others would do other than to say that we've communicated that very clearly and very directly to the Russians, including president to the stand on Ukraine for a minute, a little longer in terms of more broadly, we're heading into the midterm elections. We are hearing some concerns grow louder about support for Ukraine, the cost of it. What assurances are you giving to Ukraine, our allies, that we are going to stay supportive for the months ahead? Look, what we've seen today is a remarkable bipartisan consensus and bipartisan support for Ukraine, for putting pressure on Russia to cease its aggression, for taking the steps necessary at NATO to shore up our own defensive alliance. I visited Ukraine. I visited neighboring countries with bipartisan delegations from Congress, from both the House and the Senate. And that consensus, that strong core, I think, remains strong and we'll remain so going forward. Vitally important because it's in the national interest.
And yes, of course, there's deep concern about the horrific destruction that's been done in Ukraine, the brutalization of the Ukrainian people. And that, I think, touches Americans across the board, irrespective of whether they're Republicans or Democrats, members of Congress or citizens. But we also know that this is an aggression against the very principles that are at the heart of the international system necessary for keeping peace and security principles that grew out of the experience of two world wars and a conviction that we had to find ways to make sure that those couldn't be repeated. And so there was an agreement that you can't simply go in and seize territory from another country, that you can't change the borders of another country by force, that you can't try to race its independence and sovereignty from the map. And if we allow that to go unchecked, if
we allow that to proceed with impunity, it opens a Pandora's box around the world for would be aggressors. That's going to create conflict. And we know from history that draws us in. I think in my conversations with members of Congress, Republicans, Democrats, House or Senate, there's a shared conviction that this is important. It's necessary. And we're sticking with Ukraine. You were just referencing history a couple of times there. And I know you have written about, studied, worked on foreign policy related to that intersection of the U.S., Europe, Russia, particularly
around energy for a long time, even writing a book, al resolve on it in the 1980s. So if you fast forward to today. What is your view on whether Europe has finally learned its lesson on energy dependence with its neighbor? What we've seen over the last nine or so months since the Russian aggression began is remarkable in terms of actually moving Europe away from this dependence on Russian energy that's built up over decades. Europe in general, leading countries in particular, have done more of the space of nine months to break that dependence than anything we've seen in years. And we see that in the already dramatically reduced dependence on Russian gas, in particular on Russian oil. And that's vitally important. And it's going to have profound strategic impacts going forward over the coming years and decades. But like any transition, especially a transition from something that's built up over so many years, it's challenging.
It's not without difficulty. It's not without pain. And Europeans are facing that square on. We're working to do everything we possibly can to help, especially to get through this coming winter and the winter beyond. As you know, ever since the Russian
aggression and even going back before that, we've been working to, first of all, to make sure that there's enough energy on world markets to meet demand. We've worked very closely with Europe in particular in the short term to make sure that we could get a surge of LNG supplies, liquefied natural gas to them to make up for what they were losing from Russia. We've worked with partners and allies in Asia to divert supplies of LNG that were going to them to Europe. We've increased our own production of oil and gas to actually to record levels. And of course, the president has drawn down for us to fully reserve in part to keep prices in check. One of the things that's happening in Europe now is because of the very important moves that they've made, including to try to decrease demand during this critical period, to pursue the transition away from Russian energy and to take other steps.
The supply that they have on hand going into the winter will probably be, you know, what's necessary to keep things going and to keep people warm and comfortable. However. The impact on price is what's the immediate concern? Because that has the potential to make it harder for industry to get the energy it needs to keep producing things that has economic impacts, et cetera. So one of the things that we're working on and it's something, of course, that affects our own citizens is not only making sure that the supply is there, but making sure to the best of our ability, the prices are kept in check. And this is in a moment, of course, of global inflation. So all of that things we're working on, we're also working on the longer term with the Europeans. We established a task force with the European Union to work on this longer term transition. Last thing I'll say is that it only
accentuates the need as Europe is moving away from dependence on Russian energy to also pursue this energy transition to renewables. That, too, takes time, but it only, I think, emphasizes the imperative of doing that, not only in terms of dealing with climate, but also in terms of dealing with dependencies on. Fossil fuels, particularly coming from specific countries like Russia. So you just hit on a number of things there that we cover so closely here at Bloomberg Energy Markets, inflation both in the global economy and certainly in the US right now. And it's also make me making me think of Saudi Arabia in terms of relations there. They seem to be at the lowest that they've been in a really long time.
You know, what can you possibly do to potentially recalibrate that relationship? Are you preparing to try and do something like that and re-engage the crown prince at the G 20 coming up, for example? First thing to note is this. This is a relationship that has been built over many decades, over many administrations, different leaderships in Saudi Arabia. It's been built up on a bipartisan basis, taking into account a multiplicity of interests that the United States has in that relationship and ideally in that in that partnership and. As we're looking at where we're going. We're going to do it in a very
deliberate fashion in consultation with members of Congress. The president said to make sure of this, that the relationship better reflects our own interests. So we're looking at how to most effectively do that. Since the decision biopic plus, which we've not been, you know, not not been shy about making very clear the extent to which we view that as a wrong decision and one that. Does nothing actually to advance our interests. On the contrary. The potential for prices to go up to
further align Putin's focus at a time that is committing this aggression to have prices rise. If they were to rise at a time when the world economies are trying to recover from Covid as well as dealing with global inflation. So we've been very clear that this was the wrong decision and also the wrong decision in terms of CAC plus itself.
And in Saudi Arabia, because there was nothing to suggest in the analysis that we have and that we shared with the Saudis that we were looking at prices plummeting in ways that would be problematic for them. But having said that, since the decision, we've seen a few interesting things. The Saudis supported the important resolutions at the United Nations condemning Russia's aggression, particularly the resolution that went forward in the General Assembly, condemning the purported accusations of Ukrainian territory. We've also seen the Saudis come forward with about 400 million dollars in humanitarian assistance for Ukraine. So these are positive developments. They don't compensate for the decision that was made by CAC close plus on production. But we take note of that.
The other hand says this. Right now, we have actually not seen prices go up because we've taken steps, presence taken steps, including further released Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Additional steps on our own production that are keeping prices in check. In fact, they've actually gone down a little. And of course, the actual production cut has not gone into effect. This was an announcement of a decision.
We haven't yet seen the production cuts go into effect themselves. How much of a risk, though, do you see if energy markets in Europe really do tight now tighten up? We see some blackout blackouts or even we see in places like the northeast in the US start to struggle in terms of access to energy this winter. How destabilizing could that be in terms of our support for the war in Ukraine or just the global economy? Look, my own assessment is this and I'm not not the leading expert on this. So maybe Secretary Granholm can come by and others.
But based on the steps that the Europeans have taken over the last six or seven months, and particularly over the last few months, including the summer, they've done a number of things that are very significant that I think will help keep things in the right place through the course of this winter. One is to make sure that their own reserves were as full as they possibly could be. So they've done a very good job in doing that. But too, was to take very significant steps to decrease demand. And that's making a difference. And three, of course, is the work that I alluded to that we've done to make sure that we could help search to them supplies of energy that would compensate for any losses that they're getting as a result of moving away from from Russian oil and gas. And so, again, on the LNG research that
we've diverted, supplies that were going to Asia, we increased our own production. All of this together. I think it's having a very it's having a positive impact. And look, we'll we'll see how things go in the coming months. There are things we can't control like the weather. So we'll see what the winners like. But my own assessment is that the Europeans have taken very important steps to make sure that they can get through the winter in good shape.
So let's turn to U.S. China relations. Last week you made some comments related to thinking that China won't wants to see Taiwan on up. As you said, much faster timeline. What are you seeing that made you think that this is speeding up? What we've seen is this and it goes back a few years, not a few months, and actually let me go back take a step back even further. One of the hallmarks in the relationship or going back some 50 years was the way that we handled the issues surrounding Taiwan. And in particular, there was a fundamental understanding in the relationship between Beijing and Washington that differences over Taiwan, between Beijing and Taiwan would be managed peacefully. That there would be no unilateral changes to the status quo and that fundamentally our interest was in peace and stability in the Taiwan Straits.
That was the basic understanding and that understanding held for decades. And I think it was very successful in doing a few things that allowed Taiwan itself to flourish and its people to flourish. It also made sure I helped to make sure that there wouldn't be conflict between the United States and China over over Taiwan. What's changed is this. A decision by the government in Beijing that that status quo was no longer acceptable, that they wanted to speed up the process by which they would pursue reunification. And they also, I think, have made decisions about how they would do that, including exerting more pressure on Taiwan.
Coercion, making life difficult in a variety of ways. On Taiwan, in the hopes that that would speed reunification, but also holding out the possibility. If that didn't didn't work of using force to achieve their goals. That is what is fundamentally changed. And we've seen that manifested in
actions that the Chinese taken, including with various military maneuvers, the Taiwan Straits, the deployment of forces, et cetera. Now. As we see it, this is first and foremost an effort, as I said, to turn up pressure on Taiwan and as to what Beijing might do and what it might do it.
You know, I can't be any any more precise than that. But the. The fundamental change has been this. This is changing in China's view that the status quo is acceptable. This should be a concern for not just the United States, but for countries not only in the region, but around the world. Why? Because if there's any crisis regarding Taiwan, we've got 50 percent of container ships on a daily basis travelling through the Taiwan Straits. The implications of a crisis, if that
were disrupted or for the world economy. Supply chains are significant. More than six million. Semiconductors. Chips. As everyone knows by now. The 90 percent of the sophisticated chips are produced in Taiwan. If that were for any reason disrupted,
it would have deeply significant consequences for the global economy. The chips that are in our cell phones are dishwashers or automobiles. If that's disrupted, if if that's taken out of the supply chain, everyone has a big problem. So everyone has a very big interest, I think, in making very clear to all involved, starting with Beijing, that the world does not want to see any kind of crisis regarding Taiwan, any kind of disruption.
And the world believes that these differences need to be resolved peacefully and that peace and stability needs to be preserved in the Taiwan Strait. So you were just explaining that change that you're seeing in China's approach and the status quo. From our point of view, does that then mean that the era from the US's approach of strategic ambiguity is that era over? I think what's very important to to recognize from the get go is the relationship as a whole with China.
First of all, it is among the most, if not the most consequential that we have. It's among the most complicated, if not the most complicated that we have. And it also can't be reduced to a bumper sticker.
We clearly have a competition. And in part, it's a competition to shape what the world looks like going forward. Where we've really reached an inflection point, inflection point, because the post-Cold War era is over. There is a competition to shape what comes next.
China, the United States are two of the biggest players in that. And we just have different visions for what the world should look like going forward. I think China wants a world order, but there's would be an illiberal one. We want a world order, but ours would be inspired by liberal values.
So there's a fundamental difference and we're in a competition about that. We're not we're not shy about it. Neither is. Neither is Beijing. But we also continue to have and I think
the world expects us to have cooperation on big issues that are affecting the lives of not just Chinese and not just Americans, but people around the world on things like climate and global health. And so where our interests continue to align. We'll continue to look for ways to cooperate. And then to the extent that the aspects of the relationship are adversarial, we'll clearly stand up and stand up strongly for for our interests. We don't look for conflict. We don't want a Cold War. We're not trying to contain or restrain China.
But equally, we're resolute in standing up for our interests, standing up for our values. And again, when it comes to Taiwan, standing up for the proposition that's held for decades, that these differences need to be managed and resolved peacefully, that there cannot and should not be unilateral changes to the status quo, particularly by force, and that we have an abiding interest in peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. That's a that is a strong basic interest of the United States and one that we're determined to uphold. So you were just talking about that competition between us, but also that the relationship is complicated. When you saw this weekend Xi Jinping when another term as leader of China and also surrounding himself by even more loyalists, concentrating power even more. Does that make your foreign policy approach with China more complicated or in some ways easier? Because you know exactly who you're dealing with.
First, you have to start with, I think, a basic proposition that. What we can do with our foreign policy and by the way, with our domestic policy she'll come to second, is to help shape the environment outside of China, in which kind of makes decisions. We're not going to be doing anything to shape the internal. These are decisions that China will make and that we can't make, but we can shape the external environment in which China is acting and making making decisions about its its policies in the world. That's one thing. One of the most effective ways that we can do that is exactly what we've been doing over the last couple of years.
First. Making the necessary investments in ourselves so that as we're competing with China, as we're working to to shape the international environment for what comes next, that we do it with the strongest possible hand. We just had a almost historic, I would say historic success with the chips and science CAC. Making massive investments in our own ability to retain technological edge when it comes to chips and semiconductors and not just in their production and making sure that we're producing more here, but also investments in the basic science and research and development that will preserve that technological edge. Similarly, the Inflation Reduction Act has historic investments in our ability to deal with climate change, in particular by making sure that we're developing the technologies here in the United States to do that. So these investments make a huge
difference in the investments that we're making across the board in infrastructure and education, as well as in research and development that goes to our fundamental strength at home, which in turn goes to our standing in strength around the world. But the second piece is this, and this is so vital. One of the first instructions that I got from President Biden in taking this job was to invest in virtually every single minute of the day in revitalizing rejuvenated re energizing our alliances and our partnerships and as necessary. Creating new alliance countries that were fit for purpose on any given issue, and that's exactly what we've done. But a big part of that is goes to the competition with China. When we have greater alignment with
other countries, whether it's in Europe, whether it's in Asia, whether it's in every other part of the world, then our ability to. Deal with his competition effectively is enhanced to strengthen. For example, when we see practices that China's engaged in economically that are fundamentally unfair to our workers and to our businesses and we want to see changes. For dealing with those issues on our
own, we're 20, 25 percent of world GDP, significant to say the least. But when we're dealing together with Europe, with the European Union, with partners in Asia, we might be 50 or 60 percent of world GDP. That's a lot harder for China to ignore. So this alignment with others, with Europe, with Asia, with other countries around the world on issues where we have a difference in interests with China, that's a powerful part of what we're able to do to shape the choices that China makes. Great. I want to turn to Cuba and and just one
minute. But when you look ahead to the next year, Secretary, what are you most focused on in terms of at the department working for both, you think? As I said, the what's fundamentally motivating us is this strongly held view that we really are at an inflection point, that this is a moment when the post-Cold War era is clearly over and there is this competition to shape what comes next. And so making sure that we have the tools that we need to be doing as much of that shaping as possible is is front and center in what I'm thinking about. And as I said, that goes to many things we're doing at home in terms of the investments we're making ourselves. For my part, in terms of what I'm responsible for, it's in building the strongest possible partnerships, creating the greatest possible alignment with other countries, like minded countries of one kind or another. Democracies, but also countries that may not fit neatly into the democratic camp, but have a strong interest in having a world order that's actually shaped by rules that everyone plays by. We're working together with many
countries to to achieve that. And then within that, as we're thinking about that and working on that, we also want to make sure that Putin's aggression in Ukraine remains a strategic defeat for Russian, that we continue to pursue alignment with other countries in dealing with competition with China, and that we're finding new and ever more effective ways to deal with a multiplicity of interconnected global challenges that are the things that are really affecting the lives of people in the United States, but also people around the world. And that's global health. That's climate. That's food and security. That is inclusive economic growth. All of these things which, you know, in years past, we're not necessarily front and center in what the State Department focused on. They now are they have to be because more than anything else, they're affecting the lives of citizens in all of our countries.
And so the more that we're actually working together with others to address those issues, which is exactly what we've been doing, where the United States has regained reassert its leadership in helping to try to move the world forward and addressing. That's what we're going to make a big difference. And that's what I'm focused on. We still have a greater ability, in my judgment, than any country on earth to mobilize others in positive collective action.
And that action is more necessary than it's ever been. Collective action, because not a single one of these problems is any one country able to solve effectively on its own. We have to find new ways to collaborate, to cooperate in partnerships. The United States has been leading in the effort to do just that on all of these issues. And the last thing is this. One of the things I think we know from
from history is that the world doesn't organize itself. So if the United States is not engaged in working to do a lot of organizing, then one of two things. Someone else is going to do it and probably not in a way that reflects our interests and values or no one does it. And then you have a vacuum and vacuums tend to be filled by bad things before they're filled by good things. Yeah.
Or chaos. Exactly. Well let me turn to the Q and A. I'm sorry. Would you mind seeing your name and affiliation? Yes. Question Secretary and Brian Katulis and
with the Middle East Institute. Good to see you. Thanks for your service. And I commend your team for trying to put diplomacy first on a number of issues, including a run a year and a half now into it. What's your assessment of the prospects of what you outlined? Is your goal on that? And then how do things like the protests and other things move you and your team to maybe start thinking about what a Plan B looks like if the nuclear negotiations don't succeed? As you thanks for our friend. Well, first, the I think the eyes of the world are focused on Iran and particularly on the protests.
Today marks the fortieth day since the killing of Mousavi, which is a day of significance in terms of commemorating her life and her loss. And I think what we're seeing. Across Iran is a quite remarkable expression of frustration, anger at various policies pursued by the regime. And we're seeing this spontaneously. We're seeing it in different parts of the country. And it appears to be really from the from the grassroots up.
And I think the world is rightly focused on that. We've been in terms of both the solidarity we've expressed with people being able to express themselves freely. And we've done that not only rhetorically. We've also, in terms of the actions we've taken, both in terms of sanctioning those responsible for the repression of the Iranian people's efforts to speak freely, including the so-called morality police, as well as those who were responsible for supporting the repressive actions of the regime.
Right now, the sanctions, but also in trying to help ensure that technology necessary for Iranians to communicate with each other and with the rest of the world, that there are no obstacles to getting that technology to the Iranian people. With regard to the JCP away, the fact of the matter is this right now, I don't see a near-term prospect for that that moving forward. Why? Because the Iranians have continued to try to inject extraneous issues into the discussions over the JCP away that are a dead end. And unless and until they decide to drop those, it's hard to see the JCP moving forward.
We remain determined one way or another to make sure that Iran does not acquire a nuclear weapon. We continue to believe that diplomacy is actually the best and most effective way to do that. And when it was enforced, the JCP actually put Iran's nuclear program in a box. Unfortunately, since the United States pulled out of the agreement, it gave the Iranians an excuse to break out of the box that the agreement put them in. And we've now seen them take steps that have made their nuclear program increasingly dangerous.
And one way or another, we and many countries around the world need to deal with that. And we will. As I say, we continue to believe diplomacy is the best way but president and very clear from day one, even as we sought to get a return to mutual compliance with the Jason Kelly, we're not going to enter into a bad agreement. And we're certainly not going to allow Iran to do things that are unacceptable in other areas for the sake of getting back into the agreement. Courtney from Bloomberg. Mr. Secretary, thanks for joining us and onto another nuclear aspirants. North Korea continues to advance its own capabilities and to resist calls for diplomatic engagement. At what point does the administration
have to alter its own approach, given that it is not bearing fruit just in our hemisphere on Haiti? And how do you attempt or how does the administration hope to help stabilize the situation in Haiti, given the reluctance to send U.S. personnel and obviously also the resistance in Haiti to do so on North Korea? This. This has been a story that's been playing out over. Years, decades, in fact, ever since I've been involved in these issues, since since joining the State Department in 1993 and successive administrations have worked to grapple with this, and I think it's also fair to say that obviously no one has succeeded in resolving the problem posed by North Korea's nuclear program and the danger that that poses both in the region, including to our close partners and allies in Japan and Korea, but also well beyond the region. What we've seen North Korea do in recent months is a very large number of missile tests of one kind or another, including, as you recall, one that flew right over northern Japan. This is in violation of a series of U.N. Security Council resolutions.
We've gone to the United Nations, pursued additional sanctions against against North Korea. We've also done a few things that I think are vitally important, which is to continue to shore up the defense and deterrent capacities of our partners, allies and ourselves in the region working closely with Japan and South Korea. So we're not standing still in the face of provocations from North Korea. We're making sure that we're strengthening our own defensive and deterrent capacity.
We've made it clear the North Koreans going back to the last year that we were ready to engage with them without any preconditions to move toward the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. The North Koreans have not responded to any of those any of those overtures. In fact, the response has been exactly what you cited, which is the increased number of missile tests, the prospect potentially of another nuclear test, which would be the seventh that they that they've undertaken.
So our determination is to work even more closely with with allies and partners, to strengthen defense, strengthen deterrence, to work ever more closely with other countries in the international system, including at the United Nations, to exert appropriate pressure on North Korea for the actions taken. And, of course, to work with other concerned countries to see what influence they can bring to bear on North Korea to stop the dangerous, destabilizing actions that it's taken with regard to Haiti. There are. A multiplicity of challenges that the Haitian people are facing. Some of them nature made, some of them human made, all of them exerting a terrible toll on the Haitian people. So first and foremost, we want to do everything we possibly can to help people who are who are in need. And we continue to do that, including with significant humanitarian assistance. But the fundamental problem right now is
one of security, because in the absence of security, virtually everything that we need to do and others need to do to help Haiti. To help Haiti move forward politically. To help Haiti move forward economically. To help Haiti move forward in dealing with the cholera outbreak that we see there. All of those are made much more
difficult, if not impossible. And so you have gangs that dominate a lot of space in Haiti. Not, not not the state if the gangs are preventing. Things moving freely from ports and airports to places where that where they're needed, whether it's fuel, whether it's water, whether it's medical supplies, then dealing with everything else becomes that much more difficult. So dealing with security problems is, I think, job number one. We've been working to do that in a few ways. One is to shore up the capacity, the
Haitian national police to actually assert security on behalf of the state and not have had the gangs do it. Just a few days ago, along with Canada, play the lead role. We got additional resources to the Haitian national police, including armored vehicles that we think can help them in reasserting control. Second, we need to break a nexus, a very
noxious nexus between the gangs and certain police, political elites who are funding them, directing them and using them to advance their own interests instead of the interests of the country. We just had at the United Nations sanctions passed unanimously at the Security Council, including with the support of China, Russia and the other members, the Security Council, to go at that nexus and to go at the very elites who are in many cases behind the gangs, supporting them, directing the financing. And if we are able to help break that up as well as reinforce the Haitian national police, then I think the government can get a grip on security as they're doing that. We're also working to support the dialogue that exists between the government, the Montana group and others to find a path forward for it, for Haiti on on the political track and on getting to two elections. And then, of course, if we free up the space because of the dealing with the insecurity problem, that's going to allow the assistance that Haiti desperately needs, including to help deal with cholera, to get into the country more freely. And of course, there's a migration
aspect to this, too, because one of the things we're seeing, of course, is Haitians, understandably, in many cases, trying to go somewhere else. Given the horrific challenges they face in Haiti, the more we're able to effectively deal with those challenges, the more we're able to help patients have a more positive life, the less pressure they'll be on migration as well. So we're working on all of those fronts together.
Well, said the secretary. We appreciate your time so much, I think you have a hard stop out at 12 15. So we will say thank you so much. We're grateful for your insights and for the generosity of your time today. I did just want to ask everyone in the audience if you could remain seated while the secretary exits and then we'll have lunch provided for any of you who'd like to stay. Thank you again. Thanks very much. Thanks, everyone.
Good to be with you.